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~ I think that the question whether ~ ~ 
t~ a private lOb-5 action can be main-
~ ~ained for ~imp~e ne~ligence is an ~ ~ 
1mportan t quest1on t at merits con-
si~era t ion now . I don ' t see that a , .,. 
tr1al will really add anything to ~~ 
the cc;urt ' s understanding. (That is C A 1 ~- 4..-- liO'p~~~ 
quest1on #1 in the petit·ion) . 'U-~e s~atu~e of limitati ons question /~{!;-) ~ ~ ,._.,/ .- , 
l1kew1se 1s ready f or decision now ~ ~ 
and probably sufficiently important ~ ~ ~ ~ -i-
to be c/w . The only fear is that ~ ~ ..I- ~ _ ~ 
the Court might avoid the lOb-5 ... L 
Ill~ question by deciding that issue . ~ ~ A ~1!/U~~_.,_~_... 
If you want the lOb-5 issue, and . t~~· '-t 
you want to avoid any possibility of ~ ~ ~1M"t~~ ~ 1 
not reachi ng that issue I would .J. A ~--.-r~ 
reconnnend passing the s/1 question 4 •e~ft.,~ a.~~t.~ 
(question if 2 in petition) and M---- L _ _ -
li~iting the grant ~o question #1 . ,~~ ~~ 
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No. 74-1042 (Swygert, Castle, Sprecher) 
ERNST & ERNST 
v. 
HOCHFELDER, et al. 
ERNST & ERNST 
v . 
MARTIN, et al. 
~'.R~ 
~ io tCJ(fjs-
Federal / civil ~ 
~-f/~...~ ..... -~ t 
~ ~ . 
~,;~~.~ 
Timely ~  
l,l~..r t4..-=~ j / 
Petitioner, an accounting firm, seeksreview of the -~ 
c ourt of appeals reversal of a district court's grant of a 
motion for summary judgment in a l Ob-S action. Respondents 
assert that petitionets failure to comply with local Seventh 
2. 
Circuit rules and notify the lower courts of the intention 
to seek certiorari at this stage has resulted in the district 
court's moving forward with the action, and that certiorari 
should be denied for that and other reasons. 
Facts: The essence of respondents' claim as plaintiffs 
in the lOb-5 litigation is that petitioner's failure adequat e ly 
to audit a small brokerage firm's accounts and practices over 
' the 21 years in which it was employed by the firm allowed 
the president of the company to perpetuate a fraud against them. 
Respondents asserted that proper auditing would have uncovered 
the fraud that caused the loss. The action sterns from the 
activities of Mr. Nay, President of First Securities Company 
of Chicago and owner of 92% of its stock. Respondents were 
brokerage clients of First Securities, and each received 
investment counseling from Nay knowing him to be president. 
Nay persuaded each to invest funds in a fraudulent "escrm.;r " 
account which he represented would produce a high rate of return. 
Some respondents began to invest as early as 1942, and the last 
of the escrow transactions was consummated in 1966. The whole 
scheme fell apart when Nay committed suic ide and left a note 
describing his misdeeds. 
As a result of the scheme, the Seventh Circuit held -that Nay had violated the Securitie s Exchange Act and that 
First Securities was chargeable with Nay's fr~ud as an. ai~er 
and abettor. 
3. 
Securities & Exchange Commission v. First Securities Co. of 
Chicago, 463 F. 2d 981 (1972). With Nay gone and First 
Securities in receivership, however, these respondents have looked 
for another pocket of adequate depth to satiate their financial 
wounds. Ernst & Ernst, an accounting 'finn that had audited 
First Securities for some 21 years without ever discovering 
the fraud, was selected. 
The action was predicated on the theor~ th~~ the 
~ .. --~ -·· .•. ~ .... ·----..... ··-·~-·~ .. _ ............ .. 
negligent auditing of Ernst & Ernst aided and abetted Nay's 
lOb-S violation. Respondents, plaintiffs below, contend that ----
had Ernst & Ernst properly audited First Securities the fraud 
would long ago have been uncovered. The District Court ruled 
in Ernst & Ernst's favor on a motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the statute of limitations had run and apparently 
determining that petitioners were additionally entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed this 
ruling and remanded for trial in accordance with the rather 
elaborate theories of law that it outlined. 
Relying on its previous ruling in Hochfelder v. Midwest 
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA 7 1974), cert denied 419 U.S. 875 
(Douglas, J., dissenting)[See pooi memo in 73-1828] the 
Court fo.und that the statute of limitations had been tolled 
against the negligent party, petitioner herein, by fraudulent 







benefit. The court defined that duty to be one to audit in 
accordance with the generally accepted auditing standards and 
looked to the definitions of The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants to ascertain that standard. The court 
determined that factual issues existed concerning petitioner's 
compliance with those standards and also ruled that factual 
questions were presented relating to a theory of estoppel 
that might preclude respondents' recovery. It remanded for 
trial on those issues. ------- Petitioner's contentions will be discussed Contentions: 
separately and not in the order in which they are presented in 
the petition. Anyone wishing to suggest a limited grant must 
be careful to identify the questions in the order they are 
presented in the petition rather than in the order of discussion 
in this memo. 
1. Statute of Limitations (Question # 2 in petition) 
Petitioner challenges the court of appeals' detexmination that 
the three-year statute of limitations would be tolled against it, 
an allegedly negligent party, on account of the fraudulent 
actions of Nay, who was not a party to the lit igation. The 
court relied on its previous ruling in Hochfelder to hold that 
the tolling doctrine is an equitable one with sufficient 
flexibility to reach this case. The court held in each case 
that the tolling doctrine would toll the statute of limitations 
against a party whose alleged negligence was as s erted to have 
facilitated the concealment of the fraud that caused the 
injury. As in the case of an action against the party who 
perpetrated the fraud, the statute would be tolled ag~~st 
one whose alleged negligence facilitated its concealment 
5 . 
until such time as the plaintiff obtained knowledge of the 
fraud or in the exercise of due diligence should have obtained 
such knowledge. 
Petitioner claims thlt this extension of the tolling 
doctrine is unique to this case and to Hochfelder, and 
that it is in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit opinion 
in Cato v. Southern Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dist. of Int'nl. 
Longshoremen 's Ass'n., 364 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd. 
sub nom, Cato v. International Longshoremen ' s Ass 'n. , 485 F. 2d 
583. In that case the statute of limitations was asserted by 
the defendant employer who was being sued under the Railway 
Labor Act. Plaintiff there argued that the statute should 
be tolled as to defendant employer by the misrepresentations 
of certain co-defendant union representatives. The District Court 
specifically refused to allow the misrepresentations of one 
defendant to toll thestatute of limitations as to another, 
364 F. Supp., at 493, and theCA 5 ~curiam affirmance 
specifically mentioned its agreement with that ruling. 485 
F. 2d, at 583. Petitioner additionally asserts that the ruling 
in this case is contrary to the general characterizations 
of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which points to 
6. 
fraud perpetrated by the person a gainst whom the statute is 
tolled. See Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 49S F. 2d 448, 460 
(CA 2 1974). Petitioner additionally urges that theCA 7 rationale 
is contrary to the basic premise of the statute of limitations, 
which is fairness to defendants. See Burnett v. New York Central 
R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (196S). 
2. Scienter Requirement under lOb-S (Question if 1 in 
petition) Petitioner challenges the assumption of CA 7 t ha t 
a lOb-S action can ever be maintained in the absence of ---
allegations of facts amounting to intent to defraud, reckless 
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device to defraud. 
Petitioner asserts that an allegation that merely charges 
negligence, as this one does, cannot be maintained under lOb-S. 
CA 7 relied on its previous ruling in Hochfelder, which it said 
indirectly decided the issue. The court held that a lOb-S cause 
of action could be satisfied by a showing of the following 
elements: 
"The foregoing elements comprise a flexible 
standard of liability which should be amplified 
according to the peculiarities of each case. 
Accordingly, where, as here, it is urged that 
I the de fendant through action as well as inaction has facilitated the fraud of another, a claim for aiding and abetting is macle on demonstrating; (1) 
that the defendant has a duty of inquiry; (2) the 
plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry; 
(3) the defendant breached the duty of inquiry; 
(4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry 
the defendant breached a duty of discl.osure; and 
(S) there is a causal connection between the breach 
of duty of inquiry and disclosure and the facilitation 
of the underlying fraud; that is, adequate inquiry 
and subsequent disclosure would have led to the 
discovery of the underlying fraud or its prevention." 
{ 
7. 
Petitioner claims that CA 7's negligence standard is 
in direct conflict with rulings of the Second, Sixth, and Tenth. 
Circuits. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1302-1305 
(CA 2 ~bane 1973); Clegg v. Conk, ____ F. 2d _____ , 1973-74 CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ' 94,897 (CA 10 1974). Petitioner notes, on 
the other hand, that dicta in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits 
suggest that those courts of appeal may fall in line with the 
decision he seeks to have reviewed. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 
2d 718, 734-735 (CA 8 1968), ~· denied, 390 U.S. 591; 
Vanderbloom v. Sexton, 422 F. 2d 1233, 1239 (CA 8 ), cert. denied, -- ·---
400 U.S. 852 (1970); White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 736 
(CA 9 1974). Petitioner asserts that this issue is one of 
substantial consequence to the determination of the permissible 
reach of Section lOb-5. 
3. Defense of Estoppel- (Question # . 3 in petition). 
Petitioner seeks to have the Court review the question of whether 
he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the estoppel 
issue. The facts of the case indicate that petitioners mai1 _d 
some of the respondent plaintiffs confirmation forms, requesting 
that they as customers of First Security verify the accuracy 
of the details of their accounts, and moreover, expressly 
requesting that the customers note any differences or exceptions 
between the accounts specified on the form and the actual account 
that the customer maintained. Petitioners indicate that none of 
the respondents who received the confirmation form notified them 
of the unlisted escrow account and that the lower court erred 
. • 
8. 
in not ruling that this failure estopped them as a matter of law. 
The court of appeals indicated that any number of factual 
contexts might arise in which the affirmative defense of estoppel 
might not properly be asserted. It s~ated, for example, that 
the plaintiffs failure to report the unlisted escrow account 
might not be unreasonable if a reasonable investor should not 
have known from the confirmation form that he was to report 
the es.crow account. This was, in the view of the court of appeals, 
) a factual question that should be resolved by the jury. 
4. Exercise of Du ~ · Dilli~ence (Question :fl: 4 in petition) 
,to 
Petitioners claim that they were entitled a judgment as a matter 
A 
of law on the question of their exercise of due diligence. They 
claim to have satisfied the generally accepted accounting standards 
in auditing this account; they thus assert that they could not be 
found to be negligent. 
The court of appeals relied on the standards of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of which 
petitioners are members, for the proposition that responsible 
auditing procedures should encompass some check on the audited 
firm's system of internal accounting controls. The court of 
appeals observed that a factual issue seemed to exist over 
whether adherence to such an auditing procedure might not 




have discovered Mr. Nay's "mail rule," and thus altered a 
responsible accountant to the possibility that something was 
amiss in the company. Petitioners maintain essentially that 
the accounting rules referring to monitoring of internal 
accounting mechanisms are not designed to detect such fraud. 
The court of appeals considered that to be a factual question. 
Respondent's Late Filing Argment - · Respondent does 
not really contest petitioners characterization of the possible 
significance of the issues or of the existence of a lower court 
• 
split as to some of them. Respondent does, however, assert 
that the important questions would be further illuminated by 
allowing the trial to go forth and taking the questions later. 
Respondent notes in this regard that the Local Rules of the 
Sixth Circuit indicate that a mandate will not be stayed to await 
filing of a petition for certiorari absent a showing that there 
is probable cause to believe that petition is not frivolous 
or filed for delay. He clai~s that petitioners waited until 
the 90th day to file for certiorari in this case and that they 
failed to notify the court · of appeals of their intention to file. 
1. The "mail rule" was a firm rule laid down by . h I'IOOJ'Ie., Pres1dent Nay t atA~ was to open correspondence addressed to 
him personally, or to his attention. Nay apparently insisted 
that his mail was not even to be opened in cases in which he would 




Respondent asserts that, as a result, the mandate has long since 
issued and the case is pending for trial before the District 
Court. 
Discussion: Respondent's reliance on the Local Rule 
appears to be a makeweight; surely the case has not advanced 
significantly toward trial during the period required for filing 
and consideration of cert. His claim that the issues would 
benefit from trial on the merits seems better taken in the case 
of the questions of estoppel and the petitioners' s~isfa9,_tion 
of the due diligence standard. Those are more fact-specific -------------
and, in any event, do not appear to be the more significant 
issues presented by the petition. 
Both the statute of limitations question and the 
question of liability for negligence under lOb-S were previously 
decided in Hochfelder, on which the Court recently denied 
certiorari. But the pool memo on the case reveals that neither 
of those issues was presented in that petition for certiorari. 
Petitioners' claim of the existence of a split on these issues 
appears to be correct. 
""---- - - e 
Anyone interested in this case might seek the views of 
the Solicitor General. He recently sought certiorari to urge 
a negligence standard for SEC injunctive actions under Section lOb. 
Au;rvV \) rv- ~ See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F. 2d 1304, 1316-1317, _pool memo 74~661, 
~ . denied January 27, 1975. 
~~ ~}- 0 ~p<ere is a response. 
(V~ [i' (. MardttYz'6, 1975 Boyd 
~p 
CA op in app. 
vv-
Court .. ~.~. :-.. ~ ......... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
2/20/75 Cert. filed. 
HOLD 
FOR 
Rehnquist, J ...... . .......... . 
Powell, J ................ . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J ................ . ... . 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
ERNST & ERNST, Petitioner 
vs. 
OLGA HOCHFELDER, ET AL. 
CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION AB- NOT 
STATEMENT VOT 
~~---+---.---.--~---r---~--+--0~--D~SENT ING-
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF 
/·············· 
,) . ...... . 
. /. .... . 




August 21, 1975 
No. 74-1042, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, et al 
The purpose of this memo, dictated during the summer, 
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record 
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the 
opinions and briefs. 
* * * * * * * 
Leston B. Nay ("Nay"), president of a small brokerage 
firm in Chicago, committed suicide after perpetrating frauds upon 
respondents and other customers of the firm over a period of many 
years. The frauds were accomplished through "escrow" investment 
accounts which Nay personally managed, and from which he mis-
appropriated customer funds. His company, First Securities, was 
registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer, and was a member of 
the NASD. 
Following Nay's suicide, the SEC initiated receivership 
proceedings, and various claimants -- including these respondents 
-- prosecuted claims against First Securities which were duly 
allowed. See SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F."2d 981 (CA7, 
1972), cert.denied, 409 u.s. 880. 
The present litigation was instituted on February 19, 
1971 (Nay's suicide having occurred in June 1968), by respondents 
No. 74-1042 2. 
against the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, petitioner here 
("Ernst").* The sole basis for federal jurisdiction was an 
·---------------------------------
alleged violation of Section lO(b) of the Act of 1934 and 
Rule lOb-5 thereunder, the complaint alleging that Ernst "aided 
and abetted" in the fraud perpetrated by Nay. 
The complaint does not allege that Ernst committed, or 
ft ?1 I 
had knowledge of, any fraud; nor does it charge Ernst with reck-
If .. -
less or willful conduct f:te A. 81, 85-86; see also amended com-
plaint). Rather, the substance of the complaint is that Ernst · 
negligently failed to exercise proper care in its auditing pro-
cedures, and particularly that it failed to comply with generally 
accepted accounting standards.** 
The case was submitted on motion for summary judgment, 
supported by affidavits and depositions. The charge of negligence 
focused on the failure of Ernst to make an adequate inquiry into 
the way in which Nay personally handled the escrow accounts. It 
appears that Nay imposed a rule within his firm to the effect 
that only he could open mail addressed to him or to the firm 
* The first count in this suit was against the Midwest Stock 
Exchange, and is not here involved. 
** The term "negligence" is not used in the complaint, but --
absent fraud or reckless conduct -- there is no other basis 
for the liability asserted. 
No. 74-1042 3. 
("Nay's Mail Ruleil ). The escrow accounts were not reflected on 
the books of the company. Upon his death, a substantial volume 
of correspondence was discovered that related to the escrow 
accounts. The essence of respondents' claim for damages is that 
if Ernst had properly discharged its duty as auditor, it would 
have investigated the way in which mail was handled within the 
firm and would have discovered Nay's mail rule. 
Decisions of the Courts Below 
The DC granted Ernst's motion for summary judgment, 
• • but this was reversed by CA7 ~n a lang and rambling discourse 
(reading more like a second rate law review comment than a court 
opinion) that is somewhat less than illuminating. CA7 held that 
a proper case had been alleged under Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5. 
It was conceded that no actual knowledge of fraud was 
averred, and that scienter was not charged by respondents. In 
effect, CA7 inferred knowledge of fraud (assuming the allegations 
to be true) on the theory that if Ernst had exercised due dili-
gence (i.e., han not breached an alleged duty to inquire into 
..-..__, 
Nay's mail rule) it would have discovered and disclosed the fraud. 
In short, under the rationale of CA7's opinion, proof of negligence 
on Ernst's part in failing to discover Nay's mail rule would 
subject Ernst to damage liability under the Securities Act. 
No. 74-1042 4. 
CA7 thereupon concluded that summary judgment was im-
proper; that there were genuine issues of material fact to be 
decided at trial; and the case was remanded for trial.* 
Although the case at this time is in an "interlocutory" 
status in view of the remand for trial, we granted cert for the 
purpose of considering the applicable standard of liability in 
a damage suit under Section lO{b) and Rule lOb-5. There is a 
conflict among the circuits, although the negligence standard 
adopted by CA7 is the minority view. 
The Question 
The questions which, as I am presently advised, need 
to be considered by this Court are best expressed in the amicus 
brief on behalf of the American Institute ,of CPAs: 
1. May liability for damages be im-
posed upon accountants pursuant to Sec-
tion lO(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 
for negligent failure to comply with generally 
accepted auditing standards in the absence 
of pleading and proof of scienter? 
2. May an auditor be liable in damages 
for aiding and abetting his client's violation 
of Section lO{b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 
in the absence of knowledge of the client's 
violative conduct and solely on the basis of 
negligent performance of audit functions? 
* Other issues are involved in this case, including equitable 
estoppel and the applicable statute of limitations. As I 
presently view the case, these issues need not be reached. 
No. 74-1042 5. 
The issue posed by these related questions is im-
portant. As we had occasion recently to note in Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, private causes of action for damages 
under Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 have evolved expansively by 
judicial interpretation. The decision of CA7, if affirmed by 
us, would advance this process to new frontiers. Damage lia-
bility could be imposed for negligence not only upon the con-
tracting party (the brokerage firm in this case), but also upon 
a "third party" accounting firm. 
The Relevant Statutory and Rule Language 
~ further 
Section lO(b) of the Act of 1934 makes it un-lawful: 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
If the "plain meaning" rule is applied, we need go no 
than the foregoing statutory language. The proscribed 
conduct, applicable "in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any" security, is identified as "any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention" of rules and regulations 
of the Commission. This language has been held by most circuits 
addressing the problem as requiring "scienter," usually defined 
No. 74-1042 6. 
as actual knowledge of or reckless disregard of fraudulent 
conduct. 
Rule lOb-5, adopted pursuant to Section 10 (b), am- ~ fJ 3~ 
plifies the language of the statute. It is unlawful under Sub-
section (1) of the Rule "to employ any device, scheme or arti-
fice" to defraud; under Subsection (2) "to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact nee-
essary to make the statements" not misleading; and under Subsec-
tion (3) to engage "in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person" -- in each of these situations in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
Subsection (2) does not expressly contain the words 
"defraud," "fraud" or "deceit;" nor does it refer to any "manipu-
lative or deceptive device." But the Rule must be construed in -
light of, and consistently with, Section lO(b). Indeed, if the 
r' 
Rule were construed to create a liability based upon simple neg-
ligence, petitioner argues with logic that the Rule would be in-
valid as imposing a standard significantly more exacting than 
that required by the statute itself. 
Legislative and Regulatory History 
The briefs of petitioner and amicus make a rather 
No. 74-1042 7. 
persuasive case to the effect that such legislative history as 
exists also supports the requirement of scienter. See p. 39 et 
~- of petitioner's brief; and p. 13 et seq. of the amicus 
brief of the American Institute of CPAs. 
Decisions of Courts of Appeals 
The briefs assert that decisions in CA2, CAS, CA6, and 
CAlO construe lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 as requiring scienter (i •. e., 
a degree of culpability beyond negligence). I have examined only 
a couple of CA2 decisions, and these do support generally this 
position: ~, ~, Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in SEC 
v. Texas Gulf SulfJ r, 401 F.2d 833, which has since been followed 
in that circuit; and Shemtob v. Sherson, Hammill and Co., 448 F.2d 
442, 445. 
Apparently CA9 (White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724) is generally 
in accord with CA7. 
Petitioner's brief cites Professor Loss and other 
secondary authorities in support of its position. 
Policy Considerations 
In Blue Chip Stamps, we gave weight to "policy consid-
erations." I am inclined to agree that such considerations are 
especially relevant where we are asked to extend by judicial 
No. 74-1042 8. 
interpretation civil liability for damages under a statute which, 
by its terms, imposes no such liability. As in Blue Chip Stamps, 
a negligence standard applicable to auditors would invite liti-
gation based on a simple averment of absence of due care, not 
merely in the recording of the facts as reflected by the company's 
books but in failing properly to discover mismanagement or fraud. 
Third party suits of this kind, brought years after the occurrence. 
of the alleged negli ence and viewed with "hind-sight" vision, --
would impose a high risk of liability on accountqnts. 
Comment 
But quite apart from other considerations, I find no 
basis in the statute -- or indeed in the Rule -- for the negligence 
standard applied by CA7. After all, the respondents elected to 
sue in the federal court and jurisdiction is asserted under Sec-
tion lO(b). This has been viewed from the outset as a "fraud" 
statute. 
Although my present disposition is evident . from this 
memorandum, this is a case with potentially wide ramifications. 
I will try to keep a reasonably open mind pending further study 
and discussion, and the oral argument. 
December 1, 1975 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Greg Palm 
No . 74-1042 Ernst & Ernst v . Hoehfelde~ 
After studying thi s case f a i rly care ful l y 
this pas t summer I discovered that my own conclusions r egar ding 
t he advisa ili ty of a dopting a negligence standard for rule 
lOb-5 liabi li ty were simi lar t o your own(as expressed in your 
"aid-to-memory" memorandum)--ieo the langua ge of t he Etlatute 
and legislative his tory (admi ttedly almost none), i f anythi ng, 
point away f r om the conc lusion that any~f ne&ligence standa rd ---- -----------------------------------
was intended;l1:the structure mf the Securities Ac ts- - ie. then= are 
~ -· -------------------------
places where a type of negligenc e standar d has expres sly been created , 
such as the duty of experts in the case of r egis trat ion s tatements ( 
defense of due diligence )--~upports the conclusion tha t something more 
than mere negligence was intended; policy arguments 
identified i n petitioner's brief--many of which are derived from 
Blue Chip Stamps- - and noted by you in your memorandum also support 
------------..> 
the view that s ome type of quasi-scienter standard is appropriate. 
/ 
The "weight" of judicial authority--ie. Judge Friendly in Texas 
Gulf, Judge Adams ••• • --also supports t his position. 
In light of t his agreement I decided at t hat time that 
it would not be very f r uitf ul to write a memorandum unless and until 
I thought of some important factors that would argue against the 
conclusion reached in your own preliminary memorandum. As yet I 
have t hought of none. Thus, although I intend to review the briefs 
tomorrow so that t hey will be fresh in mind should you want to 
dis cuss the case prior to voting on friday, I intend to give you 
no memorandum i n this cas~ . 
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December 4, 1 975 
Honorable Michael Rodak , Jr. 
C.l''f_·\. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 
______ (!.! 0 ~ 7 4 :.!Q.~~j_ _________ _ 
Dear M:L. Rodak: 
ct~c 41975 
OFFICE OF H 1 r· ~E:··;'< 
SUPRE1'i/IF. COU.il, U.S. 
During the argument yesterday in the above case, Mr. 
Justice Brennan asked government counsel ~~at was the 
position of the Secu:ci-t:i.es and Exchange Commission on whe·ther 
an implied right of action exists under Section 17(a ) . Counsel 
responded that the Conunission h ad taken no position on Uwt 
question. Counsel assumed that the question referred to 
Section 1 7( a ) of the Sec urities Exchange Act of 1934, which 
requires that brokers and dealers maintain certain records 
pertaining t o t.heir financial cond.i..t.ion and sub::Cl.it. reports to 
the Commission. 
Because of a prior colloquy between Mr. J ustice Blackmun 
and one of the counsel for responde n ts, government counsel is 
concerned that Mr. Justice Brennan might have been referring 
to Section 1 7 (a ) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, which 
is an an·tifraud provision. ~[' he Commission has taken the pos:L~:ion 
thut an implied right of action exists for violation of the 
latter provision. 
Coru:-t. 
Would you ple~se distribute copj.e s of this letter to the 
Since rely, 




Kenneth J. Bialkin, Esq. 
Louis A. Craco, Esq. 
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, N.Y. 10005 
Francis D. Morrissey, Esq. 
130 East Randolph Drive 
Chicago, Illinois 60601 
Willard L. King, Esq. 
King, Robin, Gale & Pillinger 
135 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Willard J. Lassers, Esq. 
Elson, Lassers and Wolff 
11 south LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Donald L. Vetter, Esq. 
135 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Leon M. Despres, Esq. 
77 West Washington Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60602 
< '· 
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
'7 </- /0 'fl...-
Ernst & Ernst 
DATE: February 4, 1976 
You were qui~ right in saying that this is not an easy 
case to write. I have no difficulty with the correctness of 
our basic analysis, but nevertheless find it a difficult and 
delicate task to put an opinion together that satisfies. 
draft of 1/16/76. In view of [?] 
14 
I return herewith your 
~~~he number of changes made, and to facilitate your further 
'#) .,UI 
c.~ 
editing, Sally has prepared a partially "cleaned up" copy 
reflecting my editing. I give this to you, together with your 
original draft from which you will be able to see exactly 
what I have done. 
I have adhered to the basic structure of your draft. 
Nor was I able to reduce the length appreciably, and possibly 
not at all. 
As I have devoted all the time now available to me on 
this case (with others backed up awaiting my attention), I 
would appreciate your resuming the editing and revising 
process. In undertaking this, in addition to the changes 







1. The contrast you have drawn throughout the opinion 
is between "knowing or intentional misconduct", on the one 
hand, and negligence or "negligent misfeasance", on the other. 
What is the derivation of this terminology? The briefs and 
arguments, for the most part, spoke simply in terms of 
"scienter" and "negligence". Judge Adams in Korn (at p. 287) 
used language that I like= ~ . tr. \., 
'f.' \.' 
"An intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. " 
Adams, p. 285, also referred to Judge Friendly's formula-
tion as including "recklessness" that amounts to fraud. What 
would you think of our using the term "scienter" and defining 
it early in the opinion, using the Adams/Friendly terminology? 
Also, is there a reason for use of the term "misfeasance" 
in conjunction with "negligence"? In connection with choice 
of terminology, lO(b) uses "deceptive device or contrivance" ' 
and Rule lOb-5, in two of its subsections uses the term 
' 
"fraud". iii' ,,~, 
2. I notice that Adams opinion in ~, in quoting 
the Rule, includes its caption: "Employment of Manipulative 
and Deceptive Devices" •. In the briefs, however, I recall 
no reference to this caption. If, indeed, the published 
rule includes the caption, we should make some reference to 




3. I am under the impression thatthere is a good bit of 
repetition in our references to the sections of the two Acts 
providing for "express" liability. We rely on these sections 
in several different places in the opinion. This is probably 
desirable, but you might keep this in mind in the editing 
process. 
~ 
'B~ ,.. ~~ 4. 
,lrl t"-
r'? 
We do not discuss the absence of "privity" in the 
p~"~j~ common law sense between Ernst & Ernst and respondents. I 
~ 
,; 
view this as an important fact, and indeed one that could be 
controlling with me. We took the case, however, to resolve 
the conflict as to scienter, and I do not think a majority of 
the Court would be willing to dispose of it on the absence of 
privity. We should address this question in a footnote. I 
would welcome your thought as to what should be said. 
5. You have indicated to me the reason for not including 
a discussion of "policy considerations". I was impressed, 
however, with Judge Friendly's discussion of· such considerations 
in his concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur. He was there 
foausing on the effect of a mere negligence rule on management 
of corporations in determining what information to disclose 
to stockholders. I agree with Judge Friendly that a serious 
policy consideration is present in that context. I wonder, 
also, whether a similar - or perhaps even more serious -
policy consideration is not present in a . case like this one , • 











in the absence of privity, and also tn the absence of any 
reliance by the plaintiffs on what the accountant did. You , 
might try your hand at a footnote summarizing generally the 
relevant policy considerations, noting that we need not 
elaborate on these in view of the language and history of 




' ,, ~.~ ,, 
[··· f\ 
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
'11/- !CJ!.f"'-· 
Ernst & Ernst 
DATE: February 18, 1976 
We must do something with footnote 20. Apart from its 
unacceptable length (as a single note), it overdignifies 
some rather far-fetched argument (really "grasping at straws") 
advanced in this case. 
As to reliance on Cochran's reference to "negligence", 
I would dispose of that quite summarily by saying that taken, 
in context, it was a general observation made in a discussion 
of § 8 that was amended prior to passage to require willful 
participation as a prerequisite to liability. I would conclude 
a brief paragraph (a sentence or two) with your statement that 
"the comment, ·n context, sheds no light whatever on the meaning 
of § lO(b)". 
The remainder of note 20, in its present form, considers 
arguments advanced by industry representatives in hearings 
before the Committees. Rather than identify specific arguments, 
I would say merely that the Commission also seeks support for 
its position by relying on arguments made by industry 
representatives at the legislative hearings. A second 
sentence should be added consolidating the last two sentences 
presently in the note, namely, to the effect that testimony 
2. 
during the course of Committee hearings, particularly by 
opponents to the legislation, is entitled to relatively little 
weight even when specifically relevant. (Citing your three 
cases). In this general connection, you might see if there 
is anything helpful in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 







TO: Mr. Greg Palm DATE: February 19, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 74-1042 Ernst & ·Ernst 
I return herewith the latest draft, reflecting some 
editing and the addition of a number of riders . Also, I 
deliver a couple of memos on specific points. 
Between the two of us, a draft has gone through so much 
piecemeal editing that it is difficult to judge whether it is 
in satisfactory form. Indeed, if we had not been short of 
secretarial help, I would have had the entire draft and notes 
recopied before undertaking my veview. I had considerable 
trouble tying the footnotes to the text and even keeping the 
pages straight. In terms of substance, I continue to have 
some difficulty with the extent to which we rely on the language 
of lO(b) and the transition from Part II to Part III. I think 
the language of lO(b) comes very close to being so clear and 
unambiguous, in light of other provisions of the Acts, as 
to require no consideration of legislative history. I prefer, 
nevertheless, to leave Part III in our opinion, but I do not 
wish to imply - in our transition to Part III a any lack of 
confidence in Part II as actually controlling. 
Thank you for your note 29 with respect to "policy 
considerations". _I may try to revise and condense this, or 
I may abandon the idea entirely. 
' J 
As to procedure from now on, I suggest the following: 
1. Review my editing and changes, and discuss with 
2. 
me any questions of substance or major language changes that 
you think appropriate. 
2. I do not think the draft is in satisfactory form to 
give to the printer. Therefore, I suggest that you give the 
notes to Gail and the text to Sally, each to copy such pages 
as may be necessary to give the printer something that is clean 
andd clear enough to minimize printing time and error. I 
doubt that any printer could figure out where to go from the 
present state of things. 
3. Except as to points that you specifically bring to 
my attention, I will not again review the draft until it is 
in printed form as a Chambers Draft. I believe the best way 
to progress this opinion is to get it in print. Then you, 
your editor (Carl, I believe) and I can go to work on it wth 
with the view to making it as coherently and carefully written 
as possible. 
4. I intended saying above that, in reviewing this again, 
I hope you will omit or condense any footnote that does not 
contribute something necessary or worthwhile to the opinion. 
Some of the notes seem to me to be quite marginally relevant. 
5. As you may know, each of us is called on now at 
Friday Conferences to state the status of circulated opinions. 




Court Conference on Friday, March 5,. This means that I will 
have to have a Chambers printed draft no later than the weekend 
of March 28·29. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
' 'i··>,~: .j 
lfp/ss 2/19/- · 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Gre;g Palm DATE: February 19, 1976 




~ ~-} !,, ,. 
No. 74-1042 Ernst & Ernst 
I am not content with Part III, at least on the basis 
of my understanding of the situation. 
The petitioner for certiorari did not present § 17(a) 
as an issue, and no cross petition presented it. As I 
dictate this, I have had no opportunity to review the bill 
of complaint. My recollection, however, is that it is 
predicated solely on 10 (B) and lOb-S •. ,~ 
My recollection is that, at the oral argument, Mr. King 
spoke of amending the complaint to aver a cause of action 
under 17(a). (It is possible that my recollection- which is 
not sharp - is related to a proposed amendment for some other 
purpose). 
This litigation has been going on for many years. If 
there is any way to avoid it, I do not wish to saddle the lower 
federal courts with another year or two of pointless litiga-
tion. I think there is no merit whatever to the 17(a), but 
persistent plaintiffs may find it profitable nevertheless to 






If indeed the complaint does not allege such a cause of 
action, and in the absence of any effort prior to this Court 
to amend the complaint, I would dispose of this i i.ssue simply 
and briefly in a footnote to the effect that respondents 
belatedly, after the petition for certiorari had been filed 
and granted attempted to raise an issue not specified in their 
complaint. Accordingly, the issue is not before us. I would 
simply reverse the case and if they want to initiate a new 





lfp/ss 2/20/76 Possible Footnote (Ernst ~ Ernst) 
We might add something along the following lines at an 
appropriate place in the opinion. It should come up 
near the beginning or at the end. 
We took this case to resolve the long-standing 
conflict as tofue standard of liability under§ lO(b). 
As we find its language and history disoositive of the 
issue, there is no occasion to consider whether policy 
considerations - that may have influenced the lawmakers -
are relevant to the ascertainment of congressional intent. 
We do note that the standard of liability urged by 
respondents would significantly broaden the class of 
plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon 
accountants and other experts who perform services or 
express opinions with resoect to matters under the two 
Acts. Last Term, in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747-748, 
the Court pertinently observed: 
(here copy the quote from Blue Chip that Greg_-
has in his first draft of this note) 
This case, on its facts, may illustrate an extreme example 
of the reach of the standard urged by respondents. They 
2. 
sought to impose substantial personal liability for 
damages for alleged negligent conduct upon which respondents 
concede·"l that they did not rely. Acceptance of their view 
would indeed extend the "hazards" of rendering expert 
advice under the Acts to new frontiers, raising serious 
policy ouestions not yet addressed by Congress. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iu:vt"ttttt <!Joud of t!rt ~tb .itatttl 
Jfagfringtmt. ~. <!}. 2llgtJl.~ 
March 10, 1976 
No. 74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion 





Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
C HAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Snprtm.t Of.mri ttl t!tt 'Jnittb ,jbtttg 
._,aslfittgbnt. ~. ~· 2ll.;i~~ 
March 11, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
t 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHA'tBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~u;vt"tmt Q}oud of t!rt ~tb ~taftg 
Jfaglrittgton. ~. (!}. 2llgtJl.~ 
March 15, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your very good opinion 
in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS O F 
.;§u:p-rtntt <!ftrttd trf tqt ~.cb ~hrlta 
'Ba1llyin:gitrn, lfl. <!f. 2ll,? J.I,~ 
.J U S TI CE WM . .J . BRE N NA N , .JR. c 
March 25, 1976 
RE: No. 74-1042 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, et al. 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju.prtntt <!}ourl 1tf tfrt 'Jlltri:t:tb ,jtatts 
Jfas!ringLm. ~. <4. 2ll~){.~ 
March 2 6, 1976 
Re: 74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your circulation of March 11. 
Regards, 
·~~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss ?'29/76 1 '1- ld</v- E:rn.st & Ernst -
Respondents in this case were customers of a small 
brokerage fir~largely owned by its president, Leston B. 
Nay. Respondents were induced by Nay to invest in a 
fraudulent securities scheme. The firm went bankrupt and 
Nay committed suicide. 
Petitioners in this case, Ernst & Ernst, had audited 
the firm's books for many years. They did not discover 
the fraud because Nay was careful to maintain no records. 
~· His technique included a rul~that he alone was 
authorized to open all mail addressed to his attention. 
After the bankruptcy, respondents sued the accounting 
firm;lalleging that it was negligent in failing to have 
discovered Nay's rule/ with respect to opening mail. The 
theory was/ that if discovered~ that rule ~oul~ have aroused 
the suspicion of theau~ fir;/and ehat upon investiga-
tion j the fraud would have been revealed. 
Th~ suit was brought under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, reversing the District 
Court, held that respondents had stated a valid cause of 
action for damages, even though only negligence had been 
alleged. ~ ~~ a~~~ 'I~ 
..,~ ~"·~·t.f 4 €_. E..' 
s~. IIJ(,~.J  
2. 
Section lO(b) speaks of man~pulative land deceptive 
device,;or contrivances. These words reflect a 
congressional intent' to proscribe a type of conduct 
quite different from negligence. Indeed, the language 
Congress chose in other sections of the Securities Acts, 
~~rected to negligent conduct, stands in sharp 
contrast to the language of § lO(b). 
The legislative history of the 1934 Act, as well as 
the overall pattern of express civil liabilities created 
by the Acts, also supports the view that § lO(b) is not 
directed at merely negligent conduct. 
~s case 
defraud 
For reasons more fully set forth in the opinion for 
~&·L,.~ 
the Court, we ~kAthe Court of Appeals erred in reading 
a negligence standard into § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5. 
Accordingly, we reverse its judgment. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Mr. Justice Brennan joins. Mr. Justice Stevens 
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
April 6, 1976 
Cases Held for No. 74-1042 ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
There are three cases being held for ERNST & ERNST, 
two of which are related and will be discussed together: 
No. 74-1366, Schaefer v. First National Bank of Lincolnwood, 
and No. 74-1407 Roam&n & Renshaw v. Schiefer. 
The petitions in these cases arise from a complex 
stock fraud. A number of persons, including an employee of 
the petitioner brokerage firm in No. 74-1407 [hereinafter 
Rodman & Renshaw] conspired to drive up the price of the 
stock of a certain corporation in order to facilitate a 
merger. Petitioners in No. 74-1366 [hereinafter Schaefer] 
were purchasers of the shares during the period in which 
their market price was artifically inflated. They brought 
this civil action under § 1 of the Sherman Act and various 
sections of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
CA 7 held that Schaefer had a cause of action 
under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 despite the express remedy for 
price manipulation in 1 9 of the 1934 Act and that the 
applicable state statute of lLmitations for civil actions 
under § lO(b) was equitably tolled because Rodman & Renshaw 
had facilitated the fraud of their employee th~oufh 
negligence. The court further held that Schaefer s 
Sherman Act claLm was incompatible with the damage remedies 
under the Securities Acta. 
2. 
Rodman & Renshaw assert that an ~plied cause 
of action under 1 lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 should not be 
permitted where the facts alleged constitute a legitimate 
cla~ under S 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act since this will 
permit plaintiffs to circumvent the statute of l~itations 
provided under 1 9(e). They also challenge the equitable 
toll of the statute of l~itations, and contend that if 
there is a 1 lO(b) cla~, 1 9(e), rather than state law, 
provides the relevant period of l~itations. 
The question whether an ~plied cause of action 
is appropriate under 1 lO(b) for stock price manipulation 
in view of the express cause of action under 1 9(a)(2), 
is certainly not frivolous. The procedural restrictions 
provided by S 9(e) would indeed be circumvented by 
permitting actions under § lO(b). Section 9(a)(2) 
covers manipulative conduct on national securities 
exchanges for the "purpose of inducing the purchase or 
sale of such security by others." The applicability of 
1 lO(b) is not l~ited to national exchanges and it 
contains no special notice requirement other than general 
scienter. Thus, this is a case in which the ~plied cause 
of action under § lO(b) would totally .nullify the restrictions 
on the express action under 1 9(a)(2). Compare Ernst & 
Ernst, slip op. 22-24 & n. 31 with SEC v. National Securities, 
Inc., 393 u.s. 453, 468 (1969). --
Rodman & Renshaw cite no cases in direct conflict 
with CA 7's holding. Moreover, the attractiveness of this 
case as a vehicle for resolving this issue is d~inished 
by the fact that this is an appeal from pre-trial motions 
for summary judgment and the district court expressly noted 
that there was a disputed issue of fact whether the § 9(e) 
statute of l~itations had in fact run in this case. 
Depending upon how the "purpose" clause of S 9(a)(2) is 
construed, the action here thus might be sustainable under 
that section. 
The basis for CA 7's resolution of the tolling 






the court relied principally on its decision in Ernst & 
Ernst which held that negligent facilitation of fraUd may 
justify tolling. But it also note.d that in the original 
complaint Schaefer had alleged direct participation by 
Rodman & Renshaw in the fraud. The issue whether the 
statute of l~itations under § 9 should be applied in 
§ lO(b) actions apparently was not raised below. Rodman 
& Renshaw do not raise the issue of the appropriateness " 
of premising a § lO(b) action on allegations of negligent 
facilitation of fraud. In any event, this case would not 
necessarily be controlled by Ernst & Ernst, as the 
perpetrator of the fraud here was a ROdman & Renshaw 
employee. , l'.. ;, 
Ernst & Ernst has no direct bearing on the 
appropriate resolution of the issues raised in the Rodman 
& Renshaw petition, none of which in my view merit review 
at this t~e. Accordingly, I will vote to deny the 
petition in No • . 74-1407. ,, 
* * * * 
, As to the implied repeal of the Sherman Act as 
urged by Schaefer, CA 7's holding that the existence of 
the damage remedies under the Securities Acts rendered 
"superfluous" private remedies under the antitrust laws 
is questionable. As the Solicitor General points out in 
his amicus brief, however, the circumstances of this case 
are rather unique. Neither Schaefer nor the S.G. is 
aware of any prior cases in which manipulations of 
securities, as distinguished from commodities, have been 
challenged as violative of both the antitrust and securities 
laws. I agree with the S.G. that the case does not merit 
review by this Court an~accordingly, will vote to deny 




No. 75-1065 John Nuveen & Co., Inc. v. Sanders 
This case concerns the application of § lO(b) 
and Rule lOb-5 to dealers in commercial paper. CA 7 held 
that commercial paper with a maturity of 90 days constituted 
"securities" within the meaning of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, despite the definition of "security" in 
1 3(a~(l0) of that Act which expressly states that the 
term 'shall not include • • • any note, draft, bill of 
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at 
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months • • • • " 
The court further held that the petitioner, a dealer in 
commercial paper, was liable for civil damages under 
1 lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 to purchasers of such paper for 
failure to make an adequate investigation of the financial 
strength of the issuer corporation. Although CA 7 purported 
not to rely on a "mere negligence" standard, it is evident 
from the opinion that r.etiti~ner was held liable without 
any proof of "scienter', as that term is used. in Ernst & 
Ernst. Petitioner's liability was premised on the fact 
thit it had failed to make a "reasonable investigation" 
of the issuer, CA 7 noting that petitioner had "acted in 
the mistaken, but honest belief that financial statements 
prepared by certified public accountants correctly represented 
the condition of the issuer •••• " Pet. App. 1. 
Petitioner challenges each of these holdings. 
Although the issue of the scope of the term "security" 
under the 1934 Act is important, in view of the liability 
standard under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 adopted by CA 7, 
I will vote to grant, vacate, and remand in light of 



















































































































































































































































PETITION FOR REHEARING 
May 15, 1976 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 3 
No. 74-1042 
ERNST & ERNST 
v. 
HOCHFELDER 
1. Res ps seek rehearing in this case decided on Mar. 30, 1976, on the 
"sole issue" that this Court was wrong in stating that resps had only proceeded on 
a theory of negligence. Thus, resps contend, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Resps contend that negligence was not mentioned in the complaint. The only mention -
of negligence was in answer to an interrogatory in which they said they were not 
charging petr with intentional fraud but with inexcusable negligence. Resps then 
c 
- 2 -
contend that this case charges petr with deliberate failure to perform a duty. 
This, resps contend, is fraud, not negligence. 
2. Resps appear to be trying to say that the answer to the interroga tory 
should be ignored. However, the Court noted it in footnote 5 and Part III. The 





Ernst & Ernst, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the ~ ~ 
United States Court of Ap- 0:4 ~~
peals for the Seventh Cir- - I . 
v. 
Olga Hochfelder et al. cuit. &!Y1I-' ~~ 
~~~ 
[March -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the C-a---r.-<- j:<SJ .J.o 
Court. ..;:.;- ..n . J 1 _J_ 
The issue in this case is whether an action for civil c:L- I - ~ • 
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 
U. S. C. § 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence 
of an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the 
part of the defendant. 
I 
Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From 
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities 
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small broker-
age firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers, to 
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records. 
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared 
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the Commission) the annual report for First Securities, 
as required by§ 17 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 788 
(a) .1 It also prepared for First Securities responses 
' Section 17 (a) requires that securities brokers or dealer~ 













2 ERNST & ERNST v . HOCHFELDER 
to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock 
Exchange. 
Respondents were customers of First Securities who 
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated 
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of 
92% of its stock., Nay induced the respondents to in-
vest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented 
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so 
from 1942 through 1966. with the majority of the trans-
actions occuring in the 1950's. trans-
actions were not in the customary form of dealings be-
tween First Securities and its customers. Typically, the 
respondents sold legitimate securities through First Se-
curities to obtain funds to invest in 1!fte escrow a~coun . 
,.....-; ~~1ey then drew their personal checks payable to Nay 
')~ ~c::.g:~ or t e an or his account. o sue 1 ~ accounts 
_...- were reflected on the books a.nd records of First Securi-
ties, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to 
respondents. Nor were they included in First Securities' 
filings with the Commission or the Exchange. In fact , 
there were no escrow accounts as Nay converted re-
records, and make ~uch report ~, n~; the Commission by its rul es nnd 
regula tions may prescribe aR neccsRnry or appropriat e in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors." During the period rele-
vant here, CommiRRion Rule 17a-.5 , 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required 
thnt the reports of fin ancial condition include a certifir.ate Rtnting 
"clen rly the opinion of the nccountnnt with respect to the finaneinl 
stat ement covered by the certificate and the accounting principle~ 
and practices reflected therein. " Sec SEC R elease No. 3338 (Nov. 
28, 1948), X-17A-5 (h) . The rule required ErnRt & Ernst to sta te 
in its certificat e, inter alia, "whether the audit was made in nc-
cordnnce with generally accept ed :1\lditing standards applicable in 
the circumst:mres" and proYidrd that nothing should "be ronsl rurd 
to imply authority for the omiH~ion of any proredme whic·h inde-
pendent aceountants would ordinarily employ in the course of an 
audit for the purpose of expresRing the opinions" required by the-
rule. 
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spondents' funds to his own use immediately upon 
receipt. 
This fra.ud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed 
suicide, leaving a note describing First Securities as 
bankrupt and the escrow investments as "spurious." 
Respondents subsequently filed this action 2 for dam-
ages against Ernst & Ernst" in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that 
Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 
of the Comrnission,4 and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided 
~ _and _abettc~ Nay'~ ,violat~ons by it~ ."fa.ilure" to con-
~ duct proper aud1~ of F1rst Secur1t10s. As revealed 
.:--~ through discovery, respondent's cause of action rested 
0 on a theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was 
that Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate 
auditing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, 
thereby failing to discover internal practices of the firm 
2 Two separate, but substantinlly ident ira!, complaints initially 
were filed by different groups of respondents. Subsequently the re-
spondents jointly filed a First Amended Complaint. The two cases 
were treated by the District Court as if they were consolidated 
and were consolidated formally on appeal. 
3 The first cotmt of the complaint was directed againHt the Mid--
west Stock Exchange, char~ing that through its act and omissions it 
had aided and abetted Na.y's fraud. Summary jud~mcnt in favor 
of the Exchange wns affirmed on nppral. Ilochfelder v. Midwest 
Stacie Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875 
(1974). 
4 Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced re-
crivership proceedings ~ First Securities. n those procee mg~ 
all of the respondents except two nssert cd claims based on the 
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were tt'H'....,..,.__ 
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U. S. 880 (1973), where tlw court held that Nay's con-
duct Yiolated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and thnt First Securities 
was li[tb]e for Nay's fraud ns an aider nnd abettor. The question 
of Ernst & Ernst's liability was not considet'ed in that case. 
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said to prevent an effective audit. The practice princi-
pally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open 
mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed 
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in 
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst & 
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have dis-
covered this "mail rule." The exisknce of the rule then 
would have been disclosed in reports to the Midwest 
Stock Exchange and to the Commission. and this would 
have led to an investigation of Nay that would have 
revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents specifi-
cally discla.imed the existence of fraud or intentional 
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst. 5 
After extensive discovery the District Comt granted 
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the action. The court re,i<'cted Ernst & Ernst's 
contention tha.t a cause of action for aiding and abetting 
a securities fraud could not be maintained under§ 10 (b) 
or Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It 
concluded. however, that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had 
conducted its a.udits in arcoJ'dallcc with genemlly ac-
copkd auditing standards." 
5 In their responsr to interrogatorirs in thr District Court re-
~ponclentR conceded that " [ w] e do not aecuse Ernst & Ernst of 
dclibrrate, intentional frnud,"' mNely with "inexcusable negligrnce."' 
App. 81. 
"The Distric·t Court also hrld that rc;;;pondcnts' action was b:trred 
by the doctrine of cquit.ablr cstopprl and 1 be applicable stntc stat-
ute of limitations of thrrc yc:ll''· Sre n. 27, infra. As cu~tomrrR of 
First Securitie::; some of the rc:-;pondent R were sent confirmation form~ 
ns required under § 17 (a) nnd Rule 17a-5 rrquesting that. they 
verify the accuracy of the statements and notify Ernst & Ernst aR to 
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms c-ontained 110 
reference to the escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst were not notified 
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Emst 
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded. 503 F. 2d 1110 (1974).. That court 
held that one who breaches a duty of inquiry and dis-
closure owed another can be liable in damages for aiding 
and abetting a third party's violation of Rule 10-b upon 
demonstrating that but for the breach the fraud would 
have been discovered or prevented. Id., at 1104.7 The 
court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law 
and statutory duty of inquiry as to the a.dequacy of First 
Securities' internal control system because it had con-
tracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing 
with the Commission the annual report of its financial 
was completed in December 1967 and the first complaint in this 
action was not filed until February 1971. 
7 In support of this holding, the Conrt of Appeals cited its decision 
in llochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7 
197 4), where it stated that a cln im for aiding and a betting a :;ecuri-
ties fraud solely by inaction could be maintained under Rule IOb-5. 
In such case the plnintiff must show "that the party eharged with 
aiding and abetting had knowledge of or, but for the breach of a 
duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that 
possrssing such knowledge the party failed to act due 1 o an im-
proper motive or breach of a duty of disclosme." /d., at 374. The 
(•ourt explained in this case that. t.hese "elements ronstitute a flexible 
standard of liability which should be amplified according to the 
pecularities of each case." 50;3 F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our 
holding thnt an intent to deceive, manipulnt<', or defraud is required 
for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule IOb-5, we need not 
consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate 
under the ~>ection and the Rule, nor the elements necessary to cstnb-
li~h such a cnu~e of artion . Ser, e. (! .• B1'ennon v. ~Midwestern 
United Life Insuran ce Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (ND Ind. 1966), 286 
F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), nff'cl. 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7 1969) , 
rert.. denied, 307 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for giving 
active and knowing as<>istanre to a third pnrty rngnged in violations 
of the securities laws). Se<> grn('nill~r Rudrr, Multiple D<'fcndants 
in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, 
In Pari Delicto, IndPmni.ficntion and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L . 
Rev. 59'7, 620-645 (1972). 
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condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act a.ncl Rule· 
17a-5. 17 CFR § 240. 17a-5.s Thr f ourt further rca-
sonrd that respondents wcrP beneficiaries of the statu-
tory duty to inquirP,n and tiH' related dL:ty to disclose 
any material irregularities that wrr{' cliscovrrecl. l d., 
at 110.5-1111. The court eoncluclrd that there were 
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's 
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10 
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry a.nd dis-
closure, id., at 1111. a.ncl whether inquiry and disclosure 
R Seen. 1, Rupra. 
9 The court concludrd that. thr duty of inquiry imposPd on Ernst 
& Ernst under § 17 (a.) was "grounded on a concern for the pro-
tection of investorR such a~ rrr.-;pondent;,;] ," without rearhing the 
qurstion whether the statute imposed a "direct duty" to thr re-
spondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court rrcognizcd that Ernst & 
ErnRt owed no common-law duty of inquiry to re::;pondents :niHing 
from its contract with First Sccuritie:; since Ernst & Ern~t did not 
specifically foresee that re~pondent. · limited class might suffer from 
a nrgligrnt audit, compare Glanze1' v. Shepa1'd, 233 N. Y. 2:~6, 135 
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultmmar<>s Co1'p. v. Touche. 255 N.Y. 170, 
174 N. E. 441 (1931), sec, e.{!., R.I. 1/ospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. 
Swa1'tz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Indeed, respondent:; con-
ceded that they did not rely on thr financial statement~'! and reports 
prepared by Ernst & Ernst or on its certificate of opinion. 503 F. 
2d, at 1107. 
10 In their briefs rcspondrnts allude to sc,·eral other alleged fail-
in!!S by ErnRt & Ernst in it~ audit of First Securitie;;, principally itH 
failure to inf)uire into the collrctibility of rertnin loans by Fir::;t Sc-
curitir"~ to Nay and and its failme to follow up on a 1965 memoran-
dum that characterized Fin;t Seenrities' overall system of internal 
control as weak because of the centralization of functions in the 
ra~hirr. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged 
drficicncics in its opinion in thi~ case, although it did discuss some 
of them in its opinion in Jlnchfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchml{!e, 
503 F. 2d, at 370-371, holding that. they were insufficient to put the 
Exchange 011 notice that further inquiry into First Securitie·' finan-
cial affairs was required. 
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would ha.ve led to the discovery or prevention of Na.y's 
fraud. I d., a.t 1115.11 
We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether 
a private cause of action for damages will lie under 
§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of a.ny allega-
tion of scienter-an intent to deceive, manipula.te. or 
defraud.12 421 U. S. 009 (1975). We conclude that it 
will not and therefore we rcvcrsc. 1 ~ 
11 The Court of Appeals al~o reYer::>ed the District Court'::> holding 
with respect to Ernst & Ernst's equitable estoppel and statute of 
limitations defenses. See n. 6, supra. In view of our dispo::>ition 
of the ease we need not address the issues raised by these defen~es. 
12 Although the verbal formubtions of the standard to be applied 
have varied, several courts of appeals in substance have held 1 hat 
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and 
Rule 10b-5. Sec, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724 (CA9 1974) 
(fiexible duty standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718, 735 (CAS 
1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 951 (1968) (negligent misfeasnnrc 
sufficient for liability); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 
1963) (knowledge not required). Other courts of appeals have 
held that some type of "scienter"-i. e., in tent to defraud, reckless 
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of some practice 1o de-
fraud-is necessary in such an action. Sec, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 
F. 2d 1351, 1361-1362 (CAlO 1974), cert. denied, 422 U. S. 1007 
(1975) (something more than ordinary negligence"); Lanza v. Drexel 
& Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or recklC'SS disre-
gard" of the truth). But few of the derisions announcing 1 hat Rome 
form of negligence suffices for civil liability w1der § 10 (b) and Rule 
10b-5 have involved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 606 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 
879 (1974); Kahn v. American Metal Clima.1:, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255, 
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring); Burklo, Scienter and Rule 
10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972). 
In this opi11ion the term "scienter" refer::> to a mental state em-
bracing an intent to decrive, manipulate, or defraud. In ccrtai11 
arra.:; of the law reckless disregard of 1 he truth is considered equiva-
lent to knowledge for purposes of imposing liability for some aet. 
We need not here address the question whether, in some circum-
fFootnote 13 is on ]J. 8] 
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II 
Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged 
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929. 
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) , 48 Stat. 74, as 
amended 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq., was designed to pro-
vide investors with full disclosure of material informa-
tion concerning public offerings of securities in com-
merce, to protect investors against fraud and, through 
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote 
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The 
1934 Act was intended principalJy to protect investors 
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation 
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting 
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on na-
tional securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1- 5 (Hl34). Although the Acts con-
tain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies 
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient 
regulation of securities trading could not be accom-
plished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the 
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, providing it 
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with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See, 
e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, as 
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9, 
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C. 
§ § 78i, 78s, 78u. 
Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for 
any person 0 0 0 (b) r t] 0 use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 
U. S. C. § 78j.. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power 
eonferred by § 10 (b) , the Commission promulgated 
Rule 10b-5, which provides: 
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive 
devices 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
"(2) to make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessa.ry 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any act. practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security." 
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an 
express civil remedy for its violation , and there is no 
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indication that Congress,'" or the Commission \ovhen 
adopting Rule 10b-5."' contemplated such a remedy, 
the existence of a private cause of action for violations 
of the Rule is no-vv well established. Bl'Ue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Dr'Ug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975); 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 
150-154 (1972); S'Uperintcndent of Insurance v. Bankers 
Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971). Dur-
ing the 30-year period sine<' a private cause of action 
was first implied under ~ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5,'r. a 
substantial body of case law and conm1entary has de-
veloped as to its elements. Courts and commentators 
long ha,ve differed as to whether scienter is a necessary 
element of such a cause of action, or whether negligent 
conduct alone is sufficient.17 In addressing this ques-
tion, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b) , for the 
"starting point in every ease involving construction of a 
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps, 
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring). E. g., FTC v. 
Bunte Brothers, 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941). 
11 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1934); 
Note, Implied Liability Under tho Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv. 
L. Rev. 859, 861 (1948). 
1 " See. e. g., Birnbmtrn v. NewpMt Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461, 463 
(CA2) , cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); 3 Loss, Securities Regu-
lation 1469 n. 87 (2d ed. 1961). 
11:Kardon v. National Gypsmn Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946). 
17 See cases cited in n. 12 , supra. Compare, e. g., Comment, 
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1081 (1969'); 
Note, Negligent Misrepescntations under Rule 10b-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev. 
824, 835-836 (1965); Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 938, 947 (1969); Note, 
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion 
for RephLcing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale ·L. J. 658, 682-689 
( 1965) , with, e. g., 3 Loss, supra, at 1766; 6 id., at 3883-3885 (Supp. 
19(19). 
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A 
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the usc or employ-
ment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The 
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction 
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10 
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional 
conduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert.. 
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969); 
Loss. Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975). 
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, 458 F. 2d 255, 
280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concuning). 
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission 
contends that nothing in the language "any manipula-
tive device or contrivance" limits its operation to know-
ing and intentional practiccs.18 In support of its view, 
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose 
18 The Commission~ would not permit recovery upon ,-c::5 
proof of negligence in all cases. In light of the limitations that 
Congress has placed on the cxpre;;s civil remedies in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, sec pp. ---, infra, the Commission would limit the 
circumstances in which civil liability could be imposed for negligent 
violation of Rule lOb-5 to situations in which (i) "the defendant 
knew or reasonably could forsPe that the plaintiff would rely on 
his conduct, (ii) the plaintiff did in fact so rely, and (iii) the 
amount of the plaintiff's damages caused by the defendant's conduct 
was definite and ascertainable." Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The 
Commission concludes that the present record does not establish 
these conditions for civil liability since respondents in fact did not 
rely on Ernst & Ernst's audits, the financial statements of First 
Securities could not have been rca;;onably foreseen as likely to induce 
rc~pondents to inve t in the escrow accounts, and the amount of 
re:=;pondents' damages was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respond-
cnt.s accept the Commission's analysis of the operative language of 
the statute and Rule, but reject these additional requirement<S for 
recovery for negligent violations. 
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in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against 
false and deceptive practices that may injure them. 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. 8., at 
151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co., 404 U. 8 .. at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 (1963). The 
Commission then reasons that since the "effect" upon 
investors of given conduct is the same whether the 
conduct is negligent or intentional, Congress must have 
intended to bar all such practices and not just those 
done knowingly or intentionally. The logic of this 
effect-oriented approach would impose liability for 
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in 
harm to investors, a result the Commission is unlikely 
to support. But apart from where its logic might lead, 
the Commission would add a gloss to the opera.tive 
language of the statute quite different from its com-
monly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addision v. If. ally ~ 
Hill Co., 32 U. S. 607, 617- 618 (1944).19 The ~ 
d---m~ argument simply ignores the use of the words 
"device" or "contrivance," terms that make unmistak-
able a congressional intent to proscribe a type of con-
1 n "We should of course be faithful to the meaning of a statute. 
But after all Congress expresses its meaning by words. If legis-
lative policy is couehed in vague language, ea8ily susceptible of one 
me:ming as well as another in the common speech of men, we should 
not stifie a policy by a . . . grudging process of eonstrnctio.n. To 
let words dmw on some pUI'J)Ose is one thing. To draw on some 
unexpressed spir.it outside the bounds of the normal meaning of 
wordcl is quite another . . . . After all, legislation when not cx-
prr,sscd in technical terms is addressed to the common run of men 
and is therefore understood according to the sense of the thing, 
as the ordiuary man has a right to rely on ordinary words nddrc~Red 
to him ." 322 U.S., at 617-618. Sec Frunkfnrlu, Some Reflections 
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-587 (1947) . 
' .. 
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duct quite different from negligence.Z° Few concepts 
in the law are more familiar than that of negligence. 
One must assume that if Congress had intended to ex-
tend the reach of § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct 
it would have said so in conventional, commonly ac-
cepted terms. 
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argu-
ment with respect to the operative language of the stat-
ute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with 
"remedial legisla.tion," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "not technically 
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U. S., at 151. This argument assumes that "remedial 
purposes" of the Act embrace as a minimum a negligence 
standard of liability. But in seeking to accomplish its 
broad remedial goals, Congress did not elect a single 
or uniform standard of civil liability even as to express 
civil remedies. In some circumstances and with respect 
to certain classes of defendants, Congress did create ex-
press liability predicated upon a failure to exercise rea-
sonable care, e. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (liability of persons 
such as accountants or lawyers for misleading state-
ments in portions of registrations statements for which 
they are responsible). In other situations good faith is 
an absolute defense, 1934 Act § 18, 15 U. S. C. § 78r 
20 Webster's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device": 
"[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an 
invention; project; scheme; often a schrme to deceive; a stratng('!ll; 
~n artific£ and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing f'On- . 
\V ,~rived or used in contriving; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn, 
"contrive" in pertinent part is defined as "To devise; to plan; to 
. ~· 
plot ... [t]o fabricate ... de . ;ign; invent ... to scheme .... " 
The Commission al~o ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or 
employ," lnngunge that is supportive of the view that Congress 
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct . 
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(misleading statements in any document filed pursuant 
to the Act), while in other circumstances Congress cre-
ated express liability regardless of the defendant's fault, 
1933 Act § 11 (issuer liability for misleading statements 
in the registration statement). 
It i.s thus evident that Congress imposed express civil 
liability in the 1933 and 1934 Acts on a pa.rticnlarized 
basi.s. Ascertainment of congressional intent with re-
spect to the standard of liability created by a particular 
section ojt he Act must therefore rest primarily on the 
language of that section. Where , as here, we deal with 
a judicially implied liability, the statutory language cer-
tainly is no less important. In view of the language 
of § 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional rills-
conduct, and mindful that the language of a statute 
controls when sufficiently clear in its context, United 
States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard 
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), 
further inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now, 
nevertheless, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act 
to ascertain whether there is support for the mean-
ing .attributed to § 10 (b) by the Commission and 
respondents. 
B 
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' 
intent, at history supportJ our cone us1on that § 10 (b) 
was addressed to practices that involve some element 
of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for 
negligent conduct alone. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by 
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1034). H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d 
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SC"ss. (1934). Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which pres-
ent § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the usc of 
"any dcvic~ or contrivance which, or any device or con-
trivance in a way or mn,nner w·hich the Commission may 
by its rules and rcguglations find detrimental to the pub-
lic interest or to the proper protection of investors." The 
othC"r subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices 
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate 
through its rulemaking power. Sec §§ 9 (a) ("short 
sale") , (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings 
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was intro-
duced which abbreviated and modified § 9 (c)'s operative 
language to read "any manipulative device or contriv-
ance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) (1934); H. R. 
7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) ( 1934). Still a third bill, 
retaining the Commission's power to regulate the specific 
practices enumerated in the prior bills, and omitting all 
reference to the Commission's authority to prescribe rules 
concerning manipulative or deceptive devices in general, 
was introduced and passed in the House. H. R. 9323, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1934). The final language of § 10 
is a modified version of a Senate amendment to this last 
House bill. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Scss., 
32-33 (1934). 
Neither the intended scope of§ 10 (b) nor the reasons 
for the changes in its operative language are explicitly 
revealed in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which 
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation. 
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) w~( 
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter J The 
, cnatc Report discusses generally the vanous abuses that 
precipitated the need for the legislation and the inade- 1 
quacy of self-regulation by the stock exchanges. 
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of the statute, but does not par:-;10. The only specific 
reference to§ 10 iB this diseussi~the ~ing: / 
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic pow-
ers conferred on the administrative authority, effec-
tive regulation must include several clear statutory 
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, 
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices 
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful 
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 1() 
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). 
1n the portion of the general analysis section of the 
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there 
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered 
so inimical to the public interest as to be expressly pro-
hibited, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders 21 
and of other practices sue 1 as stabilizatiOn of security 
)rices and grants of options, t 1at m1g t in some cases 
serve legitimate purposes. These latter practices were 
lc~t :o ~~~:~~~:;!:~Com~ission. Significantly, w~ 
thmk, . . .. ,, t 1ere was no m ICa 
tion that any type of criminal or civil liability was to 
attach in the absence of scienter. For example, in dis~ 
cussing the potential abuses resulting from the use of 
options, the Report indicated that self-regulation by a 
21 Wash sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial 
ownership. Matched orders nrc ordN~ for the pnrchasej sale of a 
security that are Pntercd with the knowlrdge that orders of sub-
stantinlly the snme .~ize. at suhRtnntinlly the same time nne! pri<"e, 
have been or will be entered by the same or different persons for 
the saJcjpurchase of such sernrity. Section 9 (n) (1) of the 1984 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78 (a) (1), proscribes wash sales and matrhed 
orders when cffcctuntcd "l}]or the purpose of crentinp: a fal.~c or· 
misleading appearanre of active trading in any scruril)' registered 
on a national scrmitics exehnnge or ... the market for any surh 
security." Sec In re J. A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E. C. 700 (1058); 
In 1·e Thornton & Co., 28 S. E. C. 208 (1D48) . 
1 t}4- ~v:._ 
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securities ·change had proved inadequate because mem-
bers might mploy "lWltlllember.s; ~ by its rules, 6 
to execute transactions. /d., 9. In commenting on the 
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Re-
port explains: 
" ... the bill provides that any person who unlaw-
fully manipulates the price of a security, or who 
induces transactions in a security by means of false 
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or 
misleading statement in the report of a corporation, 
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought 
or sold the security at prices affected by such viola-
tion or statement. In such case the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the 
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied 
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape 
liability by showing that the statement was made in 
good faith." /d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied). 
The Senate Report thus reveals a congressional intent to 
prevent "manipulative and deceptive practices ... which 
fulfill no useful function" and to create a private action 
for damagE'S stemming from "illicit practices," where the 
defendant has not acted in good faith. There is no indi-
cation that Congress intended anyone to be made an 
insurer against potentially misleading conduct or mis-
statement unless he acted otherwise than in good faith. 
-------...:-----r·tw extensive hearmgs that preceded) passage of the 
1934 Act similarly touched only briefly on § 10, and most 
of the discussion was devoted to the enumerated devices 
now proscribed in § 10 (a). The most relevant exposi-
tion of the provision that was to become § 10 (b) was by 
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters. Cor-
coran indicated: 
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(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning 
devices.' ... 
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to 
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there 
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Com-
mission should have tho authority to deal with new 
manipulative devices." 
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and R. R. 8720 before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 
2d Scss., 115 ( 1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b) 
by the spokesman for its drafters is significant. The 
secti~ was described rip;htly as a "catch-all" dausc to 
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative 
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any 
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use 
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely 
negligent acts or omissions. Usc of the word "manipula-
tive" is especially significant. It is virtually a term of 
art when used in connection with securities markets. It 
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to de-
ceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially 
affecting the price of securitics. 22 Neither the legislative 
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify 
any usage or authority for construing manipulative or 
cunning conduct to include negligence. 2a 
22 See Webstt>r's Int'l Dietionnry (2d ed. 1934): "mnnipulate": 
" ... to manage or trr::tt. nrtfully or fraudulently; a.<> to manipulnte 
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges. To force (price~) up or down, as 
hy matched orders, wash sale,;, fictitious reports ... ; to ri~." 
2 " In support on£ its poPition the Commission citPs a statement 
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings that "in modern society there 
Hre mnny things you have to m<lke crimes which arc Rhrcr matters 
of negligence" and "intent is not ncecssary for rvery crimt>." Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Prartircs before the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Scss., 6509-0510 (1934). The 
!'Otnment., taken in context, sheds no light on the meaning of § 10 (b). 
7 
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c 
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated com-
ponents of the federal regulatory scheme governing trans-
actions in securities. Sec Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Se-
ruritics, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence 
of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly 
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language 
Congress has chosen." Recognizing this, respondent and 
The question had been raised whether criminal violations could arise 
under § 8 of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., which beeame § 9 of the 
1934 Act, in the absence of specific intent to influence security 
prices for personal gain. Corcoran's remarks, however·, were not 
addrm<scd to the scope of § 8, but were general obsr,rvations con-
cerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Ferdi-
nand Pecora, cotmsel to the committee, described the draft language 
ns "[e]xcluding from its scope an act that is not done with any 
ultcr.ior motives or purposes, as set forth in the act." ld., 6510. 
Moreover, prior to the passage of the 1934 Act, § 8 was amcndrd to 
require willful participation ns a prerequiRite to civil liability for 
violations. Compare § 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693. 
The Commission further reliec; on objections to a draft vrr::;ion 
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. ---, 
supm-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the 
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the lnnguage was 
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g.,"Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Practices, supm, at 6988; Hearing:> on 
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, Hou~e Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934), 258. Rema.rks of this 
kind made in the course of legi1;lativc debate or hearing~ other than 
by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a 
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 276-277 (1947); United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is espe-
cially so with regard to the ·tatements of legislative opponents who 
"[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill ... understandably tend to over-
,.;tatc its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 65 (1954). 
Sec Schwegmann Bros . v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-
395 (1951). 
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the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of tha 
Acts to support their contention that civil liability may 
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think 
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions. --......-- <' '\ 
of the Act,...iR- wb.ieh- we--fitt-4. e"Vi.GefH:lQ.. su~ ffl-- a; p ~ 
rQQUit:QRTefrl-trhl'ft-an eletMlli gf gc~utQJ;-he---f)fflVed. ~ 
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit 
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard 
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78, which generally proscribes manipulation of securi-
ties prices. Sections 9 (a) (1) and (2), for example, re-
spectively prohibit manipulation of security prices "[f]or 
the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance 
of actual trading in any security ... or ... with respect 
to the market for any such security," and "for the pur-
pose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by 
others." See also § 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e) then im-
poses upon "[a]ny person who willfully participates in 
any act or transaction in violation of" other provisions 
of § 9 liability to anyone who purchased or sold a secu-
rity at a price affected by the manipulative activities. 
From this the Commission concludes that since § 10 (b) 
is not by its terms explicitly restricted to willful, know-
ing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be construed in 
all cases to require more than negligent action or inaction 
as a precondition for civil liability. 
The structure of the Acts docs not support the Com-
mission's argument. In each instance that Congress 
created express civil liability . iu both ~g-tt§' It cfearly 
specified whether recovery was to be premised on know-
ing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely inno-
cent mistake. Sec 1933 Act, §§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 77k, 77l. 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 16. 18, 20. id., §§ 78i, 
78p 78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unam-
biguously creates a private action for damages when a 
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registration statement includes untrue statements of ma-
terial facts or fails to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading. The issuer 
of the securities is held absolutely liable for any damages, 
within the limits specified by § 11 (e), resulting from such 
misstatement or omission. But experts such as account-
ants who have prepared portions of the registration state-
ment are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect, 
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil 
liability with respect to the portions of the registration 
statement for which he is responsible by showing that 
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable 
ground [s] to believe" that the statements for which he 
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a 
material fact.~4 ~ 11 (b)(3)(B)(i). See, e. g., Escott v. 
Barchris Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (SDNY 1968). 
The express recognition of a cause of action premised on 
negligent behavior in ~ 11 stands in sharp contrast to 
the language of § 10 (b), and significantly undercuts the 
Commission's argument. 
Equally significant, while specifying negligence as a 
standard of fault in somP circumstances under the 1933 
Act, sec §§ 11, 12 (2), 15. 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l , 77o,"'' 
24 Other indiYidunls who sign the registration statement, directors 
of the isl:luer, nnd the underwriter of the securities similarly nrc 
accorded n complete defen.<;c ngninst. ('i1·il linbility bnsed on the excr-
ri;,;e of rrnsonnble investig.1tion nml a rrasonuble brlicf thnt the 
rrgistmt ion Rtatement wns not misleading. §§11 (b)(3)(A), (C), 
(D); (r). Ree. e. g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment 
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-5R3 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, hut 
not officer-director,;, estnblished their due diligence defense). See 
gcnernlly R. J enn ings & II. l\Inrsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027 
(3d ed. 1972), nnd ~ourc·e.~ ritrd t hrrrin: Folk, Civil LinbilitieiS under 
the Fcdernl Sreuritie;:; AetH: The 13archris Cnse, 55 Va. L. Rev . 199 
(1969). 
"" Rrrtion 12 (2) erentes potential ci1·il liability for a seller of 
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or 
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Congress indicated no role for such a standard Ill the 
1004 Act. Each of the express liability provisions of the 
Hl34 Act, except those directed to specific classes of inrli-
viduals such as directors. officers, or lOo/o beneficial hold-
ers of securities, sec § 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p,~" contains 
a state of mind requirement for civil liability requiring 
something more than negligence. Section 9 proscribes 
the manipulation of securities on national securities ex-
changes and creates potential civil liability for any per-
son who "willfully participates" in such conduct. § 9 
(e). Section 18 creates potential civil liability for mis-
leading statements filed with the Commission, but pro-
vides the defendant with the defense that "he acted in 
good faith and had no knowledge that such statement 
was false or misleading." 15 U. S. C. § 78r. And § 20, 
15 U. S. C. § 78t, which imposes liability upon "controll-
ing persons" for violations of the Act by persons whom 
they control, exculpates a defendant who "acted in good 
faith and did not ... induce the act ... constituting the 
omissions in connection with the 1 ran~action. The sellrr i~ ex-
culpated if he pro1·e;; th:lf hr did not know, or i11 the exerci~e of 
reasonable care, could not hnvr known of the untruth or omi~:<ion. 
Section 15 of the HJ33 Art, as amended by § 208 of the 1934 Art, 
makes persons who "control" nny person liable under § 11 or § 12 
liable jointly and severally to the same extent as the eontrollcd pcr-
Hon, unless he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground..; to bl'-
licve in the existenre of facts hy reasons of whirh thr liability of 
t.ho controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S. C.§ 77o. Sec Act 
of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, § 208,48 Stat. 908. 
2 r, Section 16 (b) provides that a corporation may recapture for 
itself the profits realized on a Jlurrhnse and sale, or ~ale and pur-
rhasr. of its securities within six months by a direc-tor, o1Iirer, or 
benrficial owner of more than 10% of any elm;~ of the corpor~1 tion's 
N]uity securitie::>. Sec Foremost-M cK.esson, Inc. v. Provident Sec1tri-
ties Co.,- U.S.- (1976); Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973); Reliance ]J}lectric Co. v. 
Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 (1972). 
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violation .... " In Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 736, we 
noted the anomaly of imputing to Congress an intention 
"to expand ... a judicially implied cause of action be-
yond the bounds it delineated for comparable express 
causes of action" in the provisions of these Acts. The 
result urged here by respondents would be no less 
anomalous. 
Finally, the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act al-
lowing recovery for negligent conduct are subject to 
significant procedural restrictions not applicable umler 
~ 10 (b). Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, for example, 
authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit 
under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15 thereof to post a bond for 
costs, including attorneys' fees. Section 13 specifies a 
statute of limitations of one year from the violation, or 
three years from the offer or sale, applicable to actions 
brought under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15. It also is signifi-
cant that simultaneously with the adoption of the 1934 
Act, Congress tightened the restrictions on § 11 and § 12 
actions by amendment of the 1933 Act. Prior thereto, 
§ 11 contained no provision for payment of costs. 48 
Stat. 891. See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 
c. 404, § 206 (e), 48 Stat. 907. The amendments also 
substantially shortened the statute of limitations pro-
vided by § 13 of the 1933 Act. Compare 1933 Act § 13, 
48 Stat. 84, with 15 U.S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 
48 Stat. 908.27 Absent substantial evidence in the legisla-
tive history to the contrary-and there is none-we are 
unwilling to assume that the judicially created private 
27 Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions 
under § 10 (b), as in other case~ of judirially implied remrclics, the 
law of limitations of the forum state i8 followed. Sec Jlolwbera v. 
Annbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and cases citrd therein. Al-
though it is not always certain which state st~ttute of limitation~ 
should be followed, such statui e:s of limit atiolls mmally arc longer 
than the period provided undrr § 13. 3 Loss, supra, nL 1778-1774. 
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damage remedy under § 10 (b) can be extended, con-
sistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised 
on negligent wrongdoing. Except for suits against is-
suers of securities, which are held absolutely liable for 
damages resulting from misleading registration state-
ments, such an assumption would nullify the effectiveness 
of the carefully drawn restrictions on express private 
damages actions that Congress proyided in the 1933 Act 
and the 1934 Amendments.28 See, e. g., Fischman v. 
Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 283 (CA2 1951); 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867-868 
(Friendly, J .. concurring); Rose11berg v. Globe Aircraft 
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (SD Pa. 1948); 3 Loss, supra, 
at 1787-1788; Jennings & Marsh, Securities Regulation 
(3d ed. 1972). 
D 
We have addressed. to this point, primarily the lan-
gua.ge a.nd history of ~ 10 (b). The Commission con-
tends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule 
10lr-5 are cast in language which-if standing alone-
could encompass both intentional and negligent behavior. 
These subsections respectively provide that it is un-
lawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made in 
28 Congress regarded these reRt.rirtiom on private damage uctions 
as significant. In introducing Title IT of 1 he 1934 Act, Senutor 
Fletcher indicnted that the amendment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Art, 
providing for potential payment of rosts, including attorney,, ' fees 
"is the most important famendment] of all." 78 Cong. Roc. 8669. 
One of its purposes wns to doter actions brought solely for their 
potential settlement vn!uo. See Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 740-
741. This deterrent is lacking in the § 10 (b) context, iu which a 
dist rict comt's power to nward nttorne~:s ' fees is sharply rirrum-
scribcd. See Alycska Pi]Jeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 
421 U. S. 240 (1975) ("hnd fnith" requircmrnt); F . D. Rich Co. v. 
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). 
. ,
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light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading ... " or "to engage in any act, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person .... " Viewed in 
isolation the language of subsection (2), and arguably 
that of subsection (3), could be read as proscribing any 
type of material misstatement or omission, or course of 
conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors, 
whether negligently caused or otherwise. 
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmo-
nized with the administrative history of the Rule, a 
history making clear that when adopted the Commission 
intended it to apply only to activities that involved 
scienter.20 More important, Rule lOb-5 was adopted 
~H Appnrently the Rule was a hastil~r drafted response to a situ-
ation involving clenr evidence of intentionn l misconduct. The Com-
mission's Regional Administrator in Boston had reported to the 
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the preRident 
of a rorpor:1tion wns telling the other shnrcholders that the corpora-
tion was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the resultant 
depressed prices, when in fnct the business wns doing exceptionnlly 
well. The Rule was drafted and approved on the dny this rrport 
was received. Sec Conference on Codification of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton 
Freeman, one of Rule's co-drnfters): Bltte Chip Stamps v. Manm· 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S., at 767 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Al-
though adopted pursunnt to § 10 (b), the langnage of the Rule a p-
pears to have been derived in. significn nt pnrt from § 17 of the 1933 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78q, e. (J., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 
401 F. 2d, at 867 (Friend!~' .• T., concurring). There is no indirn-
tion in the administmtive history of the Rule that any of the sub-
sections was intended to proscribe condurt not involving scienter. 
Indeed tho Commission's Release issued contemporaneously with the 
Rule cxplnined: 
"The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the 
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection 
with the purrhase of securities. The previously existing rules 
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pursuant to authority granted the Commission under 
§ 10 (b). The rulcmaki ng power granted to a.n admin-
istrative agency charged with the administra.tion of a 
ferl.eral statute is not the power to make law. Rather, 
it is "the power to adopt r<'gulatiolls to carry into effect 
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute." Dixon 
v. United States, 381 U. S. 68. 74 (1965), quoting Man-
hattan General Equip1ncrlt Co. v. Commissioner, 297 
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view 
of the Rule adva.nced by the Commission in this case,. 
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Com-
mission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons 
stated above, we think the Commission's original inter-
preta.tion of Rule 10b-5 was compelled by tho Jang~1age 
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts. 
See. e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. , 478 F. 2d 
1281 , 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 
2d 1277, 1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas G1llj Sulphur 
Co., supra, at 868; 3 Loss Securities Regula.tion 1766 
(2d .eel. 1961); 6 id., at 3883~3885 (Supp. 1960). ~ 
~ l'here a statute speaks so specifically in terms of 
manipUlation and deception, and of implementing de-
vices or contrivances-the commonly understood ter-
minology of intentional wrongdoing-and where its his-
and dealers. The new mlc close;; a loophole in the protections 
ngninst fraud administered b.v the Commission by prohibiting indi-
viduals or companies from buying srcurities if thry engage in fr::~ud 
in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230 (M11y 21, 1942) . 
Th:1t same year, in its Amnml Report, the Commission again stated 
that the purpose of the rule was to pro teet investors against "fraud": 
"During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-5 
ilR an additional protection to investors. The new rule prohibits 
frnnd by any pcr~on in connection with the purchnse of securities, 
while the previonsly existing rules against frn,ud in the purchnse of 
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep. 
10 (1942). 
.. ~ " 
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tory reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite 
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negli-
gent conduct. 30 
III 
Recognizing that as a precondition to the imposition 
of civil liability § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held 
'10 As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of 
the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine 
r.hc additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties, 
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the 
statute. We do note that the standnrd urged by respondents would 
si~nificantly bronden the clnss of plaintiffs who may seek to impose 
lin bility upon accountants and other experts who perform serYices or 
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term, 
in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U. S., at 747-748, the Court 'pertinently 
observed: 
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the 
elimination of artificial barriers to recover on just claims, we arc not 
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of 
the rlass of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ulti-
mately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, Chief Judge Cardozo ob-
served with respect to 'a, liability in an indeterminate amonnt for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause': 
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the 
implication of the duty that expose::> to these consequences.' Id., at 
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444." 
Thi~ case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the stancl:ud 
nrged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by 
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the 
financial statements prep::trcd by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents con-
ceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or 
Ernst & Ernst's certificate of opiuion. See n. 9. The class of 
pPrsons eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in. this 
cnsc, could be numbered in the thousands. Acceptance of respond-e Ci""~ view would extend\thc "hazards" of rendering expert ad,·ice 
undert he Aet8Uo: 4cw Tro51t1@ raisir1g serious policy questions not 
yet addressed by Congress. cb 
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to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by 
Ernst & Ernst, respondents further contend that what-
ever standard is adopted, the case should be remanded 
for trial. Throughout the lengthy history of this case 
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability 
premised on .negligence, specifically disclaiming that 
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional mis-
conduct.31 In these circumstances, we think it inap-
propriate to remand the action for further proceedings. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
31 See 503 F. 2d, at 1104, 1119; n. 5, supra. 
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The issue in this case Js whether an a.ction for civil 
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 
U. S. C. § 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence 
of an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the 
part of the defendant. 
I 
Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From 
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities 
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small broker-
age firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers, to 
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records. 
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared 
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the Commission) the annual report for First Securities, 
as required by§ 17 (a.) of t.he 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 788 
(a).1 It also prepared for First Securities responses 
1 Section 17 (a) requires that securities brokers or dealers 
"make . . . and preserve ... such accounts . . . books, and other 
.. ,.., ., 
.. . ~ 
<, 
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock 
Exchange. 
Respondents were customers of First Securities who 
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated 
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of 
92o/o of its stock., Nay induced the respondents to in-
vest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented 
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so 
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the trans-
actions occuring in the 1950's. ThP escrow fund trans-
actions were not in the customary form of dealings be-
tween First Securities and its customers. Typically, the 
respondents sold legitimak securities through First Se-
curities to obtain funds to invest in the escrow accounts. 
They then drew their personal checks payable to Nay 
or the bank for his account. No such escrow accounts 
were reflected on the books a~1d records of First Securi-
ties, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to 
respondents. Nor were they included in First Securities' 
filings with the Commission or the Exchange. In fact, 
there were no escrow accounts as Nay converted re-
rerords, and make such reports, a;;: Lhe Commission by its mles nnd 
regulations may prescribr 1\R neressary or appropriate in the p11blic 
interest or for the protection of investors." During the period rele-
vant Iiere, Commission Rnle 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required 
that the reports of financial condition include a certificate stnting 
"clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to the financial 
statement covered by the certiftcate and the accounting principles 
and practices rrflectcd therein." See SEC Release No. 3338 (Nov. 
28, 1948), X-17A-5 (h). The rule required Ernst & Ernst to state 
in its certificate, inter alia, "whether the audit wns mnde in ac-
cordance with generally accepted auditing standards applicable in 
the circumstance.>" an·d provided that nothing should "he construed 
to imply authority for the omis:>ion of any procedure which inde-
pendent accountants would ordinarily employ in the cour~e of an 
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spondents' funds to his own use immediately upon 
receipt. 
This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed 
suicide, leaving a note describing First Seourities as 
bankrupt and the escrow investments as "spurious." 
Respondents subsequently filed this action 2 for dam-
ages against Ernst & Ernst 3 in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that 
Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 
of the Commission/ and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided 
and abetted" Nay's violations by its "failure" to con-
duct a proper audit of First Securities. As revealed 
through discovery, respondent's cause of action rested 
on a theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was 
that Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate 
auditing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, 
thereby failing to discover internal practices of the firm 
2 Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially 
were filed by different groups of respondents. Subsequently the re-
spondents jointly filed a First Amended Complaint. The two cases 
were treated by the District Court as if they were consolidated 
and were consolidated formally on n.ppeal. 
3 The first count of the complaint was directed against the Mid-
west Stock Exchange, charging that through its act and omissions it 
had aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor 
of the Exch::wge was affirmed on a.ppeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest 
Stoclc Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875 
(1974). 
4 Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced re-
ceivership proceedings as to First Securities. In those proceedings 
all of the respondents except two asserted claims based on the 
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were upheld 
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U. S. 880 (1973), where the court held that Nay's con-
duct violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities 
was liable for Nay's fraud as an aider and abettor. The question 
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said to prevent an effective audit. The practice princi-
pally relied on was Nay's rule tha.t only he could open 
mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed 
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in 
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst & 
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have dis-
covered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then 
would have been disclosed in reports to the Midwest 
Stock Excha.nge and to the Commission, a.nd this would 
have led to an investigation of Nay that would have 
revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents specifi-
cally disclaimed the existence of fra.ud or intentional 
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst.5 
After extensive discovery the District Comt granted 
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's 
contention that a, cause of action for a.iding and abetting 
a securities fraud could not be maintained under § 10 (b) 
or Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It 
concluded, however, that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst ha.d 
conducted its audits in accordance with genera.lly ac-
cepted auditing standards.6 
5 In their response to interrogatories in the District Court re-
spondents conceded that " [ w] c do not accuse Ernst & Ernst of 
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "inexcusable negligence." 
App. 81. 
n The District Court also held that. respondents' action was barred 
by the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the applicable state stat-
ute of limitations of three years. Sec n. 27, infra. As customers of 
Fir~t Securities some of the respondents were sent confirmrt,tion forms 
as required under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 requesting that they 
verify the accuracy of the sta tements and notify Ernst & Emst as to 
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms con1ained no 
reference to tho escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst were not notified 
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst 
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded. 503 F. 2d 1110 (1974). That court 
held that one who breaches a duty of inquiry and dis-
closure owed another can be liable in damages for ajding 
and abetting a third party's violation of Rule 10-b upon 
demonstrating that but for the breach the fraud would 
have been discovered or prevented. !d., at 1104.7 The 
court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law 
and statutory duty of inquiry as to the adequacy of First 
Securities' internal control system because it had con-
tracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing 
with the Commission the annual report of its financial 
was completed in December 1967 and the first complaint in this 
action was not filed until Februa.ry 1971. 
7 In support of this holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision 
in Ilochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7 
1974), where it stated that a claim for aiding and abetting a securi-
ties fraud solely by innction could be maintained under Rule 10b--5. 
In such cnse the plaintiff must show "that the party charged with 
niding and abetting had knowledge of or, but for the breach of a 
duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that 
possessing such knowledge the party failed to act due to an im-
proper motive or breach of a duty of disclosure." /d., at 374. The 
court explained in this case thnt these "elements constitute a flexible 
standard of liability which should be amplified according to the 
pecularities of each case." 503 F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our 
holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is required 
for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, we need not 
consider whether civil liability for aiding nnd abetting is appropriate 
under the section and the Rule, nor the elements necessary to cstab-
liRh such a cause of action. Sec, e. g., Brennan v. ltfidwestern 
United Life Insurance Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (ND Ind. 1966), 286 
F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), nff'd. 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for giving 
active and knowing assistance to a third pnrt.y engaged in violatio11s 
of tho securities laws) .. SP.e gencmlly Huder, Mnlt,ip]e Defendants 
in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, 
In Pnri Delicto, IndE'mnification and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L .. 
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condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule 
17a-5, 17 CFR § 240. 17a-5.8 The Court further rea-
soned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statu-
tory duty to inquire.0 and the related dnty to disclose 
any material irregularities that were discovered. I d., 
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were 
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst &' Ernst's 
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10 
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and dis-
closure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure 
8 Seen. 1, 8upra. 
9 The court concluded thnt the duty of inquiry imposed on Ernst 
& Ernst under § 17 (a) was "grounded on a concern for the pro-
tection of investors surh fl~ [respoudents] ," without reaching the 
quest.ion whether the statute imposed a "dirert duty" to the re-
spondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court recognized that Ernst & 
Ernst owed no common-hw duty of inquiry to responde11ts arising 
from its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not 
specifically foresee that respondents limited class might suffer from 
a negligent audit, compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 
174 N. E. 441 (1931), see, e. g., R.I. Ilospital Trust Nat'l Baulc v. 
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Indeed, respoudents con-
ceded that they did not rely on the finanrial statements and reports 
prepared by Ernst & Ernst or on its certificate of opinion. 503 F. 
2d, at 1107. 
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged fail-
ings by Ernst & Ernst in its audit of First Securities, principally its 
failure to in(]uire into the collectibility of certain loans by First Se-
cmities to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memoran-
dum that characterized Fir~t Securitie;,;' overall system of internal 
control as weak because of the centralization of functions in the 
cashier. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged 
deficiencies in its opinion in this case, although it did discuss r.;ome 
ol' them in its opinion in Ilochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 
503 F. 2d, at 370-371, holding that they were insufficient to put the 
Exchange on notice that further inquiry into First Securities' finan-
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would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's 
fraud. I d., at 1115.11 
We granted certiorari to r0solve the question whether 
a private cause of action for damages will lie under 
§ 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 in the absence of any allega-
tion of scienter-an intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.u 421 U. S. 900 (1975). We conclude that it 
will not and therefore v\'C rcverse.' 3 
11 The Court of Appeals al~o reversrd the District Courl'~:> holding 
with respect to Ernst & Ernst's equitable estoppel and statute of 
limitations defenses. See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition 
of the case we need not address the issues raised by these defenses. 
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standard to be applied 
have varied, several courts of appeals in substance have held that 
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and 
Rule 10b-5. Sec, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724 (CA9 1974) 
(flexible duty standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718, 735 (CAS 
1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 951 (1968) (negligent miAfeal:)ance 
sufficient for liability); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 
1963) (knowledge not required). Other courts of appeals have 
held that some type of "scienter"-i. e., intent to defraud, reckless 
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of some practice to de-
fraud-is necessary in such an action. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 
F. 2d 1351, 1361-1362 (CA10 1974), cort. denied, 422 U. S. 1007 
(1975) (something more than ordinary negligence"); Lanza v. Drexel 
& Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless di~:>re­
gard" of the truth). But few of the decision~:) announcing 1 hat some 
form of negligence suffices for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule 
10b-5 have involved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 606 (CAS 1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 
879 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 2.55, 
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 
10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972). 
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state em-
bmcing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain 
arms of the law reckless disregard of lhe truth is considered equiva-
lent to knowledge for purposes of imposing liability for some act. 
We need not here address the que~:>tiou whether, in some cireum-
[Footnote 13 is on p. 8] 
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II 
Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged 
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929. 
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 48 Stat. 74, as 
amended 15 U.S. C. ~ 77a et seq., was designed to pro-
vide investors with full disclosure of material informa-
tion concerning public offerings of securities in com-
merce, to protect investors against fraud and, through 
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote 
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R. 
Rep .. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The 
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors 
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation 
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting 
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on na-
tional securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts con-
tain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies 
and criminal penaltiC's, Congress recognized that efficient 
regulation of securitiPs trading could not be a.ccom-
plished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the 
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, providing it 
stances, reckless behavior is sufllcient for civil liability under§ 10 (b} 
and Rule 10b-5. ·. 
tn Respondents contend thn.t, Ernst & Brost owed them a direct 
duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-.'5 of the 1934 Act to conduct a 
proper audit of First Securitir.~ :.llld that they may premi~e a private 
cause of action agninst Ernst. & Ernst for violation of that duty. 
Respondents original cause of action, however, was premised solely 
on alleged aiding and abetting violation of § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5. 
During the lengthy history of this litigation they appnren1ly made 
no motion to amend their original complaint to include a damnge 
action undpr § 17 (a) and Rule 17n-5. We do not think thnt re-
spondents should be permitted to rai;;e this new cau~e of action for 
the first time in this Court. 
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with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See, 
e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, as 
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9, 
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u. 
Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for 
any person ... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security . . . a.ny 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power 
conferred by § 10 (b), the Commission promulgated 
Rule 10b-5, which provides: 
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive 
devices 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or 
of any fa.cility of any na.tional securities excha.nge, 
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
"(2) to make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fad necessa.ry 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any act. practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security." 
Althou~h § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an 
express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no 
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indication that Congress,H or the Commission when 
adopting Rule 10b-5,'" contemplated such a remedy, 
the existence of a private cause of action for violations 
of the Rule is now wrll established. Blu.e Chip Stampg 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. fi. 723, 730 ( 1975); 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 
150-154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankerg 
Life and Cagualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971). Dur-
ing the 30-year period since a private cause of action 
was first implied undrr § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5/ 6 a 
substantial body of case law and commentary has de-
veloped as to its elements. Courts and commentators 
long have differed as to whether scienter is a necessary 
element of such a cause of action, or whether negligent 
conduct alone is sufficient.' 7 In addressing this ques-
tion, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b). for the 
"starting point in every case involving construction of a 
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps, 
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring). E. g., FTC v. 
Bunte Brothers, 312 U. S. 349. 350 (1941). 
14 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1934); 
Note, Implied Liabilit~r Under t.he Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv. 
L. Rev. 859, 861 (1948). 
1 " Sec, e. g., Birnbnum v. Ne·wport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461, 463 
(CA2), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 956 ( 1952); 3 Loss, Securities Regu-
lation 1469 n. 87 (2d ed. 1961). 
16 Kardon v. National Gyrmtm Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946). 
' 7 See cases cited in n. 12, s'Upra. Compare, e. g., Comment, 
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1081 (1969); 
Note, Negligent Misrepesentations under Rule 10b-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev. 
824, 835-836 (1965); Note, 82 Hnrv. L. Rev. 938,947 (1969); Note, 
Civil Liability Under Section lOB aud Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion 
for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689 
(1965), with, e. g., 3 Loss, supra, at 1766; 6 id., at 3883-3885 (Supp. 
1969). 
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A 
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employ-
ment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The 
words "m~nipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction 
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest tha.t § 10 
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional 
conduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. 
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969); 
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975.). 
See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, 458 F. 2d 255,. 
280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring). 
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission 
contends that nothing in the language "any manipula-
tive device or contrivance" limits its operation to know-
ing and intentional practices.18 In support of its view, 
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose 
18 The Commission, however, would not permit recovery upon 
proof of negligence in all ca es. In light of the limitations that 
Congress has placed on the express civil remedies in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, see pp. ---, infra, the Commission would limit the 
circumstances in which civil liability could be imposed for negligent 
violation of Rule 10b-5 to situntions in which (i) "the defendant 
knew or reasonably could forsee 1 lmt the plaintiff would rely on 
his conduct, (ii) the plaintiff did in fact so rely, aud (iii) the 
amount of the plaintiff's damage~ caused by ihe defendant's conduct 
was definite and ascertainable." Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The 
Commission concludes that the present record does not establish 
these conditions for civil liability since respondents in fact did not 
rely on Ernst & Ernst's audits, the financial statements of First 
Securities could not have been reasonably fore:;een as likely to induce 
re.'lpondents to invest in the escrow accounts, and the amount of 
respondents' damages was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respond-
ents accept the Commission's analysis of the operative language of 
the statute and Rule, but reject these nddii ional requirement;; for 
recovery for negligent ,·iolations. 
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in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against 
false and deceptive practices that may injure them. 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at 
151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co., 404 U. S .. at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research B~treau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 (1963). The 
Commission then reasons that since the "effect" upon 
investors of given conduct is the same whether the 
conduct is negligent or intentional, Congress must have 
intended to bar all such practices and not just those 
done knowingly or intentionally. The logic of this 
effect-oriented approach would impose liability for 
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in 
harm to investors, a result the Commission is unlikely 
to support. But apart from where its logic might lead, 
the Commission would add a gloss to the operative 
language of the statute quite different from its com-
monly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addision v. Hally 
Hill Co., 32 U. S. 607, 617-618 (1944).11) The Com-
mission's argument simply ignores the use of the words 
"device" or "contrivance," terms that make unmistak-
able a congressional intent to proscrihe a type of con-
' u "We should of course be faithful to the meaning of a statute. 
But after all Congress expresses its meanin~ by words. If Jcgis-
latil·e policy is eonched in vague langua~c, ea~ily su~ceptible of one 
meaning as 'wll as another in the rommou ~perch of men, we should 
not. st ifle a policy by a ... ~rudging process of construction. To 
let words draw on some purpose is one thing. To dr;1w on some 
unexpressed spirit out~ide the bounds of the normal mP ..aning of 
word~ is quite another . . . . After all, lrgislation when not ex-
pressed in technical terms is addre~sed to tho common run of men 
and i' therefore understood according to the srnse of the thing, 
as the ordinary man has a right to rel.v on ordinary words addrc.".·ed 
to him." 322 U. S., at 617-618. Sec Frankfurter, Some Reflcrtions 
on the Reading of StatutcR, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-537 (1947) . 
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duct quite different from negligence.2° Few concepts 
in the law are more familiar than that of negligence. 
One must assume that if Congress had intended to ex-
tend the reach of § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct 
it would have said so in conventional, commonly ac-
cepted terms. 
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argu-
ment with respect to the operative language of the stair 
ute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with 
"remedial legislation," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "not technically 
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U. S., at 151. This argument assumes that "remedial 
purposes" of the Act embrace as a minimum a negligence 
standard of liability. But in seeking to accomplish its 
broad remedial goals, Congress did not elect a single 
or uniform standard of civil liability even as to express 
civil remedies. In some circumstances and with respect 
to certain classes of defencla.nts, Congress did create ex-
press liability predicated upon a failure to exercise rea-
sonable ca.re, e. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (liability of persons 
such as accountants or lawyers for misleading state-
ments in portions of registrations statements for which 
they are responsible). In other situations good faith is 
an absolute defense, 1934 Act ~ 18, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78r 
20 Webster's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device": 
"[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an 
invention; project; .scheme; often a scheme to deceive; n stratagem; 
an artifice" and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing con-
trived or used in contriving; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn, 
"contrive" in pertinent part is defined as "To devise; to plan; to 
plot ... [t] o fabricate ... design ; invent ... to scheme .... " 
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or 
employ," language that i ~ snpporti\'(1 of the view that Congress 
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct. 
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(misleading statements in any document filed pursuant 
to the Act), whik in other circumstances Congress cre-
aterl express liability regardless of the defendant's fault, 
1933 Act § 11 (issuer liability for misleading sta.tcments 
in the registration statement). 
It is thus evident that Congress imposed express civil 
liability in the 1933 and 1934 Acts on a partic11larized 
basis. Ascertainment of congressional in tent with re-
spect to the standard of liability created by a particular 
section oft he Act must therefore rest primarily on the 
language of that section. Where, as here, we deal with 
a judicially implied liability, the statutory language cer-
tainly is no less important. In view of the language 
of § 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional mis-
conduct, and mindful that the language of a statute 
controls when sufficiently clear in its context, United 
States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard 
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), 
further inquiry ma.y be unnecessary. We turn now, 
nevertheless, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act 
to ascertain whether there is support for the mean-
ing .attributed to § 10 (b) by the Commission and 
respondents. 
B 
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' 
intent, that history supports our conclusion that § 10 (b) 
was addressed to practices that involve some element 
of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for 
negligent conduct alone. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by 
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d 
.' 
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Sess. (1934). Section 0 (c) of the bills, from which pres-
ent § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the usc of 
"any device or contrivance which, or any device or con-
trivance in a way or manner which the Commission may 
by its rules and reguglations find detrimental to the pub-
lic interest or to the proper protection of investors." The 
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices 
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate 
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) ("short 
sale"), (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings 
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was intro-
duced which abbreviated and modified § 9 (c)'s operative 
language to read "any manipulative device or contriv-
ance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) (1934); H. R. 
7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) (1934). Still a third bill, 
retaining the Commission's power to regulate the specific 
practices enumerated in the prior bills, and omitting all 
refrrence to the Commission's authority to prescribe rules 
concerning manipulative or deceptive devices in general, 
was introduced and passed in the House. H. R. 9323, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1934). The final language of § 10 
is a modified version of a Senate amendment to this last 
House bill. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
32-33 ( 1934). 
Neither the intended scope of § 10 (b) nor the reasons 
for the changes in its operative language are explicitly 
revealed in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which 
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation. 
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was in-
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The 
Senate Report discusses generally the various abuses that 
precipitated the need for the legislation and the inade-
quacy of self-regulation by the stock exchanges. 
The Report then analyzes the component provisions. 
' . 
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of the statute, but does not pare § 10. The only specific 
reference to § 10 in this discussion is the following: 
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic pow-
ers conferred on the administrative authority, effec-
tive regulation must include several clear statutory 
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, 
aimed at those manii)ulative and deceptive pra.ctices 
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful 
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10 
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). 
In the portion of the general analysis section of the 
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there 
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered 
so inimical to the public interest as to be expressly pro-
hibited, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders/1 
and of other practices, such as stabilization of security 
prices and grants of options, that might in some cases 
serve legitimate purposes. These latter practices were 
left to regulation by the Commission. Significantly, we 
think, in discussing these practices, there was no indica-
tion that any type of criminal or civil liability was to 
attach in the absence of scienter. For example, in dis-
cussing the potential abuses resulting from the use of 
options, the Report indicated that self-regulation by a 
~ t Wash sales are transactions involving no change in brneficial 
ownership . Matched orders nrc orders for the purchascjsa]e of a 
security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of ~ub­
stant ially the same s ize, at sub,;t:mti:tlly the same time and price, 
have been or will be entered by t he same or different per~ons for 
the sale/purchase of surh ~rcurity . Section 9 (a ) (1) of the 1934 
Act , 15 U. S. C. § 78 (a ) (1) , pro:>cribes wnsh sales and matched 
orders when effcctu :1 ted " [f] or the purpose of creatin~ a fal se or 
misleading appea rance of act ive trading in any .securit _,, rq~;is t ered 
on a national securities exchange or . . . t he m:uket for any such 
~ecurity." Sec In re J . A . Latime1' & Co., 38 S. E. C. 790 (1958) ; 
In re Thornton <~ Co., 28 S. E. C. 208 (1948) . 
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securities exchange had proved inadequate because mem-
bers might employ nonmembers, not bound by its rules, 
to execute transactions. /d., 9. In commenting on the 
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Re-
port explains: 
" ... the bill provides that any person who unlaw-
fully manipulntes the price of a security, or who 
induces transactions in a security by means of false 
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or 
misleading statement in the report of a corporation, 
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought 
or sold the security at prices affected by such viola-
tion or statement. In such case the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the 
statement \vas false or misleading, and that he relied 
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape 
liability by showing that the statement wa.s made in 
good faith." !d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied). 
The Sena.te Report thus reveals a congressional intent to 
prevent "manipulative and deceptive practices ... which 
fulfill no useful function" and to create a private action 
for damages stemming from "illicit practices," where the 
defendant has not acted in good faith. There is no indi-
cation that Congress intended anyone to be made an 
insurer against potentially misleading conduct or mis-
statement unless he acted otherwise than in good faith. 
The extensive hearings that preceded passage of the 
1934 Act similarly touched only briefly on § 10, and most 
of the discussion was devoted to the enumerated devices 
now proscribed in § 10 (a). The most relevant exposi-
tion of the provision that was to become § 10 (b) was by 
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters. Cor-
coran indicated: 
"Subsection (c) [ § 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10 
18 
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(b) l says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning 
devices.' ... 
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to 
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there 
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Com-
mission should have the authority to deal with new 
manipulative devices." 
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and R. R. 8720 before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 115 ( 1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b) 
by the spokesman for its drafters is significant. The 
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to 
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative 
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any 
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use 
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely 
negligent acts or omissions. Use of the word "manipula-
tive" is especially significant. It is virtually a term of 
art when used in connection with securities markets. It 
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to de-
ceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially 
affecting the price of securitics. 22 Neither the legislative 
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify 
any usage or authority for construing manipulative or 
cunning conduct to include negligence.2 :1 
22 Sec Webster's Int'l DieLionnry (2d ed. 1934): "manipulate": 
" ... to ma.nagc or t.re::tt artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate 
arcounts . . . . 4. Exchanges. To force (prices) up or clown, as 
by matched orders, wash sales, fictitions reports ... ; to rig." 
23 In support of its po~ition the Commission cites n, statement 
by Corcoran in the Senate heari11gs that "in modern Aorict)' there 
are many things yon have to make crimes which arc sheer matters 
of negligence" and "int.cnL is not necessary for every crime." Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Commiltee on 
Banking and Currency, 73cl Cong., 2cl Sess., 6509-6510 (1934). The 
comment, taken in context, sheds no light on the meani11g of § 10 (b). 
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The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated com-
ponents of the federal regulatory scheme governing trans-
actions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Se-
curit·ies, Inc., 393 U. S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence 
of the various sections of the se~rities laws is certainly 
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language· 
Congress has chosen." Recognizing this, respondent and 
The question had been raised whether criminal violations could arise 
under § 8 of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., which became § 9 of the 
1934 Act, in the absence of specific intent to influence security 
prircs for personal gain. Corroran's remarks, however, were not 
addressed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations con-
cerning activity society might prosrribe under criminal law. Ferdi-
nand Pecora, counsel to the committee, described the draft language 
as "[e]xcluding from its scope an act th~tt is not done with any 
ulterior motives or purposes, as set forth in the act." ld ., 6510. 
Moreover, prior to the passage of the 1934 Act, § 8 was amended to 
require willful participation as a prerequisite to civil liability for 
violations. Compare § 9(e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693. 
The Commission further reJip_s on objections to a draft version 
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and II. R. 7852, see pp. ---, 
supra-raised by representatives of the securities indu try in the 
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was 
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hcm-
ings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on 
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, House Cmmn. ou Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934), 258. Remn.rks of this 
kind made in the course of legi~btivc debate or hearings other than 
by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a 
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 27&-277 (1947); United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is espe-
cially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who 
"[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill .. . understandably tend to ovC'r-
state its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58,66 (1964). 
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394--
395 (1951). 
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the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of the 
Acts to support their contention that civil liability may 
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think 
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions 
of the Act, in which we find evidence supportive of a 
requirement that an element of scienter be proved. 
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit 
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard 
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78, which generally proscribes manipulation of securi-
ties prices. Sections 9 (a) (1) and (2), for example, re-
spectively prohibit manipulation of security prices "[f] or 
the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance 
of actual trading in any security ... or ... with respect 
to the market for any such security," and "for the pur-
pose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by 
others." See also § 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e) then im-
poses upon "[a]ny person who willfully participates in 
any act or transaction in violation of" other provisions 
of § 9 liability to anyone who purchased or sold a secu-
rity at a price affected by the manipulative activities. 
From this the Commission concludes that since § 10 (b) 
is not by its terms explicitly restricted to willful, know-
ing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be construed in 
all cases to require more than negligent action or inaction 
as a precondition for civil liability. 
The structure of the Acts does not support the Com-
mission's argument. In each instance that Congress 
created express civil liability in both Acts it clearly 
specified whether recovery was to be premised on know-
ing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely inno-
cent mistake. See HJ33 Act, ~§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 77k, 77l, 77o: 1934 Act §§ 9, 16. 18, 20. id., §§ 78i, 
78p 78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unam-
biguously creates a private action for damages when a 
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registration statement includes untrue statements of ma-
terial facts or fails to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading. The issuer 
of the securities is held absolutely liable for any damages, 
within the limits specified by § 11 (e), resulting from such 
misstatement or omission. But experts such as account-
ants who have prepared portions of the registration state-
ment are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect, 
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil 
liability with respect to the portions of the registration 
statement for which he is responsible by showing that 
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable 
ground[s] to believe" that the statements for which he 
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a 
material fact. 24 § 11 (b) (3) (B) (i). See, e. g., Escott v. 
Barchris Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (SDNY 1968). 
The express recognition of a cause of action premised on 
negligent behavior in § 11 stands in sharp contrast to 
the language of § 10 (b), and significantly undercuts the 
Commission's argument. 
Equally significant, while specifying negligence as a 
standard of fault in some circumstances under. the 1933 
Act, see §§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o,2 " 
24 Other individuals who si~n the regiRtra tion statement , directors 
of tho issuer, and the underwriter of the securities similarly are 
accorded a complete defense ngain~t rivillinbility based on the exer-
ci~e of re:~sonuble investigation ami a rPasonnble belief that the 
re~ristration statement was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A) , (C), 
(D); (c). See, e. (1., Peit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment 
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544. 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but. 
not officer-directors, established their due diligence defense) . See 
generally R. J ennings & H . Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027 
(:3d ed. 1972), and Rourres citrd thrrein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under 
the Federal Securities Acts: The Barchris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 199 
(1969). 
25 Sertion 12 (2) rrentec; potPntii:ll civil liability for a seller of 
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or 
'. 
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Congress indicated no role for such a standard . in the 
1034 Act. Each of the express liability provisions of the 
1934 Act, except those directed to specific classes of indi-
viduals such as directors, officers, or 107o beneficial hold-
ers of securities, sec § 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p,"6 contains 
a state of mind requirement for civil liability requiring 
something more than neg] igencc. Section 9 proscribes 
the manipulation of securitif's on national sec uri ties ex-
changes and creates potential civil liability for any per-
son who "willfully participates" in such conduct. § 9 
(e). Section 18 creates potential civil liability for mis-
leading statements filed with the Commission, but pro-
vides the defendant with the defense that "he acted in 
good faith and had no knowledge that such statement 
was false or misleading." 15 U. S. C. § 78r. And § 20, 
15 U. S. C. § 78t, which imposes liability upon "controll-
ing persons" for violations of the Act by persons whom 
they control, exculpates a defendant who "acted in good 
faith and did not ... induce the act ... constituting the 
omissions in connection wi1 h 1 he tranHaction. The seller is ex-
eulpaled if he proves that he did not know, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care, could not have known of the uni ruth or omiHsion. 
Section 15 of the 1933 Act. , ns amended by § 208 of the 19:34 Act, 
makes perRons who "control" any person liable under § 11 or § 12 
liable jointly and severally to the same extent as the rontrolled per-
~on, unless he "had no knowledp.:c of or reasonable gronnds to be-
lieve in the existence of facts by reasons of which the liability of 
tho controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S. C.§ 77o. Sec Act 
of .Tune 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, § 208, 48 Stat. 908. 
20 Section 16 (b) provides that a corporation may recapture for 
itself the profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sa le and pur-
chase, of its securities within six months by a director, officer, or 
benc.ficial owner of more than 10% of any class of the rorporntion's 
equity securities. Sec Foremost-111cKesson, Inc. v. Provident Srcuri-
ties Co., - U. S. - (1976) ; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. i'iR2 (1973); Reliance Electric Co. v. 
Emenwn Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 ( 1972). 
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violation .... " In Blue Ch1:p Starnps, supra, at 736, we 
noted the anomaly of imputing to Congress an intention 
"to expand ... a judicially implied cause of action be-
yond the bounds it delineated for comparable express 
causes of action" in the provisions of these Acts. The 
result urged here by respondents would be no less 
anomalous. 
Finally, the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act al-
lowing recovery for negligent conduct are subject to 
significant procedural restrictions . not applicable under 
~ 10 (b). Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, for example, 
authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit 
under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15 thereof to post a bond for 
costs, including attorneys' fees. Section 13 specifies a 
statute of limitations of one year from the violation, or 
three years from the offer or sale, applicable to actions 
brought under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15. It also is signifi-
cant that simultaneously with the adoption of the 1934 
Act, Congress tightened the restrictions on § 11 and § 12 
actions by amendment of the 1933 Act. Prior thereto, 
§ 11 contained no provision for payment of costs. 48 
Stat. 891. See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No . . 291, 
c. 404, § 206 (e), 48 Stat. 907. The amendments also 
substantially shortened the statute of limitations pro-
vided by § 13 of the 1933 Act. Compare 1933 Act § 13, 
48 Stat. 84, with 15 U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 
48 Stat. 908.27 Absent substantial evidence in the legisla-
tive history to the contrary-and there is none-we are 
unwilling to assume that the judicially created private 
27 Since no statute of lirnitai ions is provided for civil actions 
under § 10 (b), as in other cases of judicially implied remedies, the 
law of limitations of the forum state is followed. See HoLmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and case::; cited therei.n. Al-
though it is not always certain which state statute of limitation::; 
should be followed, such sl atute::; of limitation" mmally arc longer 
than the period provided under § 13. 3 Loss, supra, at 1773-1774. 
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damage remedy under § 10 (b) can be extended, con-
sistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised 
on negligent wrongdoing. Except for suits against is-
suers of securities, which are held absolutely liable for 
damages resulting from misleading registration state-
ments, such an assumption would nullify the effectiveness 
of the carefully drawn restrictions on express private 
damages actions that Congress provided in the 1933 Act 
and the 1934 Amendments.28 See, e. g., Fischman v. 
Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 283 (CA2 1951); 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867-868 
(Friendly, J., concurring); Rose11berg v. Globe Aircraft 
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (SD Pa. 1948); 3 Loss, supra, 
at 1787-1788; Jennings & Marsh, Securities Regulation 
(3d ed. 1972). 
D 
We have addressed, to this point, primarily the lan-
guage and history of ~ 10 (b). The Commission con-
tends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule 
101>-5 are cast in language which-if standing alone-
could encompass both intentional and negligent bd1avior. 
These subsections respectively provide that it is un-
lawful "[tlo make any untrue statement of a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made in 
28 Con~rcss regarded thc;.;c rest rie1ions on private damage actions 
ns significant. In introclnring Title IT of the 1934 Act, Senator 
Fletcher inclic:1tcd that the :lmPndment to § 11 (c) of the 1933 Act, 
prm·ic!ing for potcnti:1l pnymcnt of costs, including nttorneyR' fee:; 
"is the most import:1nt [:1mendmcnt] of all." 78 Cong. RPc . 8669. 
One of its purposes wns to deter actions brou~J:ht solely for their 
potential settlement vnht<'. tke Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 740--
741. This deterrent is lacking in the § 10 (b) contr.xt, in which a 
dist rirt eourt'R powpr to awnrd attorneys' fcc.~ i ~ Rharply rircum-
F;cribPc! . Se<' Alycska Pi7Jeline Service Co. v. fVildemess Society, 
421 U. S. 240 (197.'5) ("h:1d f:1ith" r<'f)ltircmPnt); F. D. Rich Co. v_ 
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 12!) (1974). 
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light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading ... " or "to engage in any act, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person .... " Viewed in 
isolation the language of subsection (2), and arguably 
that of subsection (3), could be read as proscribing any 
type of material misstatement or omission, or course of 
conduct, tha.t has the effect of defrauding investors, 
whether negligently caused or otherwise. 
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmo-
nized with the administrative history of the Rule, a 
history making clear that when adopted the Commission 
intended it to apply only to activities that involved 
scienter.29 More important, Rule lOb-5 was adopted 
" 9 Appnrrntlv the Rule was a hastily drafted response to a situ-
ation invoh·ing rlear evidence of intentional misconduct. The Com-
mission's Regional Administrator in Roston had reported to the 
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the president 
of a corporation was telLing the other shareholders that the corpora-
tion was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the rrsultant 
depressed prires, when in fnct the busine.ss wns doing exceptionally 
well. The Rule was drafted and approved on the day this rrport 
was received. Sre Conferenre on Codification of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 79:3, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton 
Freeman, one of Rule's co-drnfters); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S., at 767 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting). Al-
though ndopted pm·Ruant to § 10 (b), the language of the Rnlc ap-
pcnrs to have been derived in signifirnnt part from § 17 of the 1933 
Art, 15 U. S. C. § 78q, e. g., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 
401 F. 2rl, at 8fi7 (Friendly, J., concnrring). There is no indira-
tion in the administrntive history of the Rule that any of the sub-
sections was intended t.o proseribc conduct not involving srienter. 
Indeed the Commi~sion's HeleaRe iRsued contemporaneously with the 
Rnle explained: 
"The Securitie.s nnd Exchange Commission today announced the 
ndoption of n rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection 
with the purrhase of securities. The previously existing rules 
agr~inst fraud in thr purchase of sccurit,ics applied only to brokers 
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pursuant to authority granted the Commission under 
~ 10 (b). The rulemaking power granted to an admin-
istrative agency chargrcl with the administration of a 
federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, 
it is "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect 
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute." Dixon 
v. United States, 381 U. S. 68. 74 (1965) , q11oting Man-
hattan General Equipment Co. v. Cornm1:ssioner, 297 
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view 
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, 
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Com-
mission by Congress under ~ 10 (b). For the reasons 
stated above, we think the Commission's origina.l inter-
pretation of Rule lOb-5 was compelJed by the language 
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts. 
Sec. e. g., Gerstle v. Garnble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 
1281. 1299 (CA2 1973): Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 
2d 1277, 1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., sur.rra, at 868; 3 Loss Securities Regulation 1766 
(2d eel. 19EH); 6 id., at 3883- 3885 (Supp. 1969). In 
short, where a statute speaks so specifically in terms of 
manipulation and deception , and of implementing de-
vices or contrivances- the commonly understood ter-
minology of intentional wrongdoing-and where its his-
and dealers. The new rule cloHcs a loophole in the protections 
ngainst fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting indi-
Yidun,ls or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud 
in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) . 
Thn,t same year, in its Annual Report, the Commission again stated 
that, the purpose of the rule wa8 to protect investors against "fraud": 
"During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-IOB-5 
as an additional protection to investors. The now rule prohibits 
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities, 
while the previou~J:v existing rules against fraud in the purchase of 
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep. 
10 (1942). 
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tory reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite 
umvilling to extend the scope of the statute to negli-
gent conduct.80 
III 
Hccognizing that a.'3 a precondition to the imposition 
of civil liability § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held 
~ 0 As we find the l:mguage :-tnd history of § 10 (b) dispositive of 
the approprintc stnndnrcl of liability, there is no occasion to examine 
the additionnl considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties, 
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the 
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would 
~ignificantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose 
liability upon accountants and other experts who perform services or 
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term, 
in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U. S., at 747-748, the Court pertinently 
observed: 
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the 
elimination of artificial barriers to recover on just claims, we arc not 
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of 
the class of plaintiffs who may sut> in this area of the law will ulti-
mately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, Chief Judge Cardozo ob-
served with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate amount for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate rause': 
" 'The hazards of a businei's conducted on these terms arc so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the 
implication of the duty thnt rxposcs to these consequences.' /d., at 
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444." 
This case, on its facts, illustrntcs the extreme reach of the standard 
nrged by respondents. As investor.,; in transactions initiated by 
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the 
financial statements prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Res11ondents con-
ceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or 
Ernst & Ernst's certificate of opinion. See n. 9. The class of 
prrsons eligible to benefit from sueh a stnndard, though small in thi~ 
case, could be numbered in the thousands. Acceptance of re.~pond­
ents' view would extend thr "hazards" of rendering expert ad1·ire 
under the Acts to new frontiNs, raising serious policy questions not 
yet addressed by Congress. 
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to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by 
Ernst & Ernst, respondents further contend that what-
ever standard is adopted, the case should be remanded 
for trial. Throughout the lengthy history of this case 
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability 
premised on .negligence, specifically disclaiming tha.t 
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional mis-
conduct.31 In these circumstances, we think it inap-
propriate to remand the action for further proceedings. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed .. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
3 1 Sec 503 F . 2d, at 1104, 1119; n . 5, supra. 
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The issue in this case is whether an action for civil 
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S. C. 
§ 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 
lOb--5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence of an allega-
tion of intent to deceive, manipula.te, or defraud on the 
part of the defendant. 
I 
Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From 
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities 
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small broker-
age firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange 
and of the National Association of Securities Dealers, to 
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records. 
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared 
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the Commission) the annual reports required of First 
Securities under§ 17 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78q 
(a).1 It also prepared for First Securities responses 
t Section 17 (a) requires that securities brokers or dcalen; 
"make ... and preserve ... sueh accounts ... books, and other 
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock 
Exchange (the Exchange). 
Respondent-s were customers of First Securities who 
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated 
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of 
927o of ita stock. Nay inrluced the respondents to in-
vest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented 
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so 
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the trans-
actions occurring in the 1950's. In fact, there were no 
escrow accounts as Nay converted respondents' funds to 
his own use immediately upon receipt. These trans-
actions were not in the customary form of dealings be-
tween First Securities and its customers. The respond-
ents drew their personal checks payable to Nay or 
the bank for his account. No such escrow a.ccounts 
were reflected on the books and records of First Securi-
ties, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to 
respondents in connection with their other investments. 
Nor were they included in First Securities' filings with 
the Commission or the Exchangr. 
records, and make sur.h reports, as the Commi~sion by its rulr~~ :md 
regulations may prescribr as nrr.CR~ary or appropriate in the public 
interm;t or for thr protection of investor;;." During the prriod rele-
vant Iiere, Commission Rule 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required 
tlmt Fir;:t Seruritie~ filr an annual rrport of its finanri:tl condition 
thnt included a cPrtificatr ~t:1i ing "r·lrarl:v the opinion of the arrount-
ant. with respert to thr finanrinl siatemrni rm·rrr·d by the ccrtificn1r 
and the arcountin~ prinriplrs nnd prariirrs rdlcctrd thrrcin." See 
SEC Relense No. 3:{:iR (Nm·. 28, 1948), X-17A-5 (h). The rule re-
quirrd Ern~t & Fr11~1 to Htair in its rrrtifiratc, inter alia. "whether 
thr audit was m;•de in areorcbnre with grncrally accrpted nuditing 
standards applirablc in the circumRt.'Lneef'" nnd prm·ided that noth-
ing in the rulo f'hould "bP ronf'trued to imp!~· authority for the 
omis8ion of any procedure which independent n.crountnntR would 
ordinarily employ in thr rour~e of an audit for tho purpose of 
exprcf'sing the opinions rrqnirrd" by the rulr. 
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This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed 
suicide, leaving a note that described First Securities as 
bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." Re-
spondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages 
against Ernst & Ernst a in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that 
Nay's escrow scheme violated ~ 10 (b) and Commission 
Rule 10b-5/ and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and 
abetted" Nay's violations by its "failure" to conduct 
proper audits of First Securities. As revealed through 
discovery, respondent's cause of action rested on a 
theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was that 
Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate audit-
ing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, thereby 
failing to discover internal practices of the firm said 
to prevent an effective audit. The practice princi-
pally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open 
2 Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially 
were filed by different membrrs of the pre~ent group of respondents. 
Subsequently the respondrnts jointly filed a Fir~t Amended Com-
pln.int. The two cases were treated by the District Court ns if they 
were consolida,t.ed and were comolidated formally on appeal. 
3 The first count of the complaint wns directed against the 
Exch:mge, charging that throu~th itR acts and omis.~ions it had 
aided and abett.ed Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor 
of the Exchange wn.s a:ffirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest 
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7) , cert. denied, 419 U. S. 87& 
(1974). 
1 Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced re-
ceivership proceedings a~ta.inst Firet Securities. In tho,~e proceedings 
all of the respondents except two aRsertcd clai:mR based on the· 
fraudulent escrow arronnts. These claims ultimately wcro allowed 
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), crrt. 
denied , 409 U. S. 880 (1973). where the court held that Nay's con-
duet violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities 
wns lia.ble for Nay's frand ns an aider and abettor. The question 
of Emst & Ernst's liability was not considered in that case. 
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mail addressed to him at First Securiti0s or addressed 
to First Securities to his attenti0n, even if it arrived in 
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst & 
Ernst had conducted a proper andit, it would have dis-
covered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then 
would have been disclosed in reports to the Exchange 
and to the Commission by Ernst & Ernst's res0rvation 
that the mail rule prevcnt,ed an effective audit. This 
would have led to an investigation of Nay that would 
have revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents spe-
cifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional 
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst." 
After extensivf' discov<'ry the District Covrt granted 
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dis-
. missed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's 
contention that a cause of action for aiding and abetting 
a securities fraud could not be maintained under § 10 (b) 
and Rule lOb-5 merely on aJlegations of negligence. It 
concluded, however. that there wa.s no genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had 
conducted its audits in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards." 
5 In their response to interrogatories in the District Court re-
spondents conceclecl that they did "not. accuse Ern~t & Emst of 
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "inexcusable negligence." 
App. 81. 
6 The District Court al~o held respondent's action \\'as ba.rred by 
the doctrine of equitable e~toppel and the n,pplicable Illinois sta.t-
utr of limitations of three years. Seen. 27, infra. As customers of 
First Securities respondents were sent confinnation forms as re-
quired under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a.-5 requesting that they verify 
the n.ccuracy of the statrmrnts and notify Ernst & Ernst as to 
any exceptions. Although the confirm:ttion forms contained no 
reference to t,he escrow a.crounts, Ernst & Ernst was not notified 
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst 
was completed in Derembrr 1967 and the first complaint in this 
action wa.s not filed until February 1971. 
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The Court of Appeals for tho Seventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty 
of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable in dam-
ages for aiding and abetting a third party's violation of 
Rule 10b-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or· 
prevented but for the breach. 503 F. 2d 1100 (1974).7 
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law 
and statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First 
Securities' internal control system because it had con-
tracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing 
with the Commission the annual report of its financial 
condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule 
17a- 5, 17 CFR § 240.17a- 5.8 The Court further rea-
7 In support of thi~ holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision 
in Ilochfeldcr v. Midwest Stork Rxchanae, supra, where it detailed 
the clements necessary to establish a claim under Rule 10])-5 based 
on a. defendant's aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by 
inaction. Sec n. 3 supra. In sueh a case the plaintiff mnst show 
"that the party ch:uged with aiding and abetting had knowledge of 
or, but. for the brca.ch of a duty of inquiry, should have had knowl-
edge of tho fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party 
failed to act due to an improper motive or brPach of a. duty of · 
disclosure." !d., at 374. The court explained in the instant ('ase 
that these "elements constitute a flexible standa.rd of liability which 
should be amplified according to tho peculiarities of each case." 503 
F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10 (b) 
:md Rule lOb-5, we ne€d not consider whether civil liability for 
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the rule, 
nor the elements necessa ry to Pstablish such a cause of ac.tion. See, 
e. g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Snpp. 673 
(1966), 286 F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F . 2d 147 (CA7 
1969) , cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for 
giving active and knowing assistance to a third party enga.ged in 
violations of the securities Jaws). Sec generally Rud(;'r, Multiple 
De fondants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, 
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Ind('mnification and Contribution, 120 , 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 620-645 (1972). 
8 See n. 1, ~upra. 
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soned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statu-
tory duty to inquire 9 and the related duty to disclose 
any material irregularities that were discovered. Id., 
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were 
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's 
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10 
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and dis-
closure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure 
would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's 
fraud. ld., at 1115.u 
9 The court concluded that the duty of inquiry imposed on Em~t 
& Ernst under § 17'(a) was "grounded on a concern for the pro-
tection of investors such as [respondents]," without reaching the 
question whether the statute imposed a "direct duty" to the re-
spondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court held that Ernst & 
Ernst owed no common-law duty of inquiry to respondents arising 
from its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not 
specifically foresee that respondents' limited class might suffer from 
a nrgligent audit, compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramare.~ Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 
174 N. E. 441 (1931) ; see, e. g., R.I. Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. 
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972) . Moreover, r<'spondcnts 
conceded that they did not rely on the financial statements and 
reports prepared by Ernst & Ern~t or on its certificate of opinion. 
503 F. 2d, at 1107. 
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged fail-
ings by Ernst & Ernst in its audit of First Securities, principnlly its 
failure to inquire into the collcctibility of cerktin loans by First Se-
curities to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memoran-
dum that characterized First Securities' overall system of internal 
control as wenk because of the centralization of functions in the 
cashier. The Court of Apprals mentioned none of these nllc!!ed 
deficiencies in its opinion in this rase, although it did discuss the 
loans to Nay and certain other related maHers in its opinion in 
Hochfelder v. Midwe8t Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d, at 370-371, hold-
ing that the existence of thcl'le facts was insufficient to put the 
Exchange on notice that further inquiry into First Securities' finan-
cia 1 affairs was required . 
11 The Court of Appeals also reversed the District Court's holding 
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We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether 
a private cause of action for damages will lie under 
§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allega-
tion of scienter-an intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.1 ~ 421 U. S. 909 (1975). We conclude that it 
will not and therefore we reverse.13 
with respect to equitable estoppel :m.d the statute of limit.'1tions. 
See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition of the case we need not 
address these is:;;ues. 
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standa.rd to be applied 
have varied, several courts of appeals have held in substance that 
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and 
Rule lOb-5. See, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 730 (CA9 
1974) ("flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718, 
735 (CA8 Hl67), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (negligence sufii-
cient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 1963) (knowl-
edge not required). Other courts of appeals have held that some 
type of scienter-i. e., intent to defraud, reckleBs disregard for the 
truth, or knowing use of some practice to defraud-is necessary in 
such an act,ion. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F. 2d 1351, 1361-
1362 (CAlO 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (an element 
of "scienter or conscious fault"); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d 
1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless disregard" of the 
truth). But few of the doci~ions 1mnounr.ing that, some form of 
negligence sufiices for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 
actually have involved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 5i9, 606 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 
879 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255, 
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 
lOb-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972). 
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state em-
braeing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain 
areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of inten-
tional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. 
We need not address here the question whether, in some circum-
stances, reckless behaYior is sufi'icicnt for civil liability under § 10 (b) 
and Rule lOb-5. 
tk Respondent~ further contend thn t Ernst & Ernst owed them a 
direct duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a.-5 of the 1934 Act to con-
duct a proper audit of First Securities and that they may premise a 
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II 
Federal regulation of transactions in s0curities emerged 
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929. 
The Securities Act of 1933 (1903 Act). 48 Stat. 74. as 
amended 15 U. S. C. ~ 77a et seq., was designed to pro-
vide investors with full disclosure of material informa-
tion concerning pnhlic offerings of securities in com-
merce, to protect investors against fraud and. through 
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote 
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong. , 1st Sess., 1- 5 (1933). The 
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors 
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation 
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets. a.nd to impose regular reporting 
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on na-
tional securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts con-
tain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies 
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient 
regulation of securities trading could not be accom-
plished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the 
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, which is pro-
vided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See, 
e. g., 1933 Act ~§ 8, 19. 20. 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86. as 
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9, 
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889. 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u. 
private cause of action a.gainst Ernst & Ernst for viola.tion of that 
duty. Respondents cause of action, however, was premised solely 
on the alleged violation of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. During the 
lengthy history of this lit.ig[l.tion they h~tve not amellded their 
original complaint to aver a cause of action under § 17 (a) and 
Rule 17a-5. We therefore do not consider that a claim of liability 
under § 17 (a) is properly before us even assuming respondents 
could assert such a claim independently of § 10 (b). 
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Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for 
any person . . . (b) [ t l o use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15· 
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power 
conferred by § 10 (b), the Commission promulga.ted· 
Rule lOb-5, which now provides: 
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive 
devices. 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or· 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails. or· 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
"(2) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
"(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security." 
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an 
express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no 
indication that Congress,14 or the Commission when 
14 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934); 
Note, Implied Littbility Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv .. 
L. Rev. 858, 860 (1948). 
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adopting Rule lOb-5, 15 contemplated such a remedy, 
the existence of a private cause of action for violations 
of the statute and the rule is now well established. Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stor.es, 421 U. S. 723, 730 
(1975); Affiliated Ute C£tizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 150-154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v. 
Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9 
(1971). During the 30-ye,ar period since a private cause 
of action was first implied under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5,16 
a substantial body of case law and commentary has de-
veloped as to its elements. Courts and commentators 
long have differed with regard to whether scienter is a 
necessa.ry element of such a cause of action, or whether 
negligent conduct alone is sufficient.17 In addressing this 
question, we turn first to the language of §10(b), for 
"[t]he starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps, 
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J .. concurring); e. g., FTC v. 
Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941). 
A 
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employ-
ment of "any manipula.tive or deceptive device or con-
15 SEC Securities Exchange Relea.~c No. 3230 (1942); Birnbaum 
v. Newport Steel Corp., 19:3 F. 2d 461, 463 (CA2), cert. denied, 343 
U.S. 956 (1952). 
16 Kard,on v. Nation<1l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa. 
1946). 
17 See cases cited in n. 12, supra. Compare, e. g., Comment, 
Scienter and Rule lOh-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080--1081 (1969); 
Note, Negligent Misrepcscntatio11:3 under Rule lOb--5, 32 Chi. L. Rev. 
824. 839-844 (1965); Not,e, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 9~8, 947 (1969); Note, 
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and R11le lOB-5: A Suggestion 
for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689 
(1965), with, e. g .. 3 L. Lo~s, Securitiefl Regulation 1766 (2d ed. 
1961); 6 id., a.t 3883-3885 (Supp. 1969). 
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trivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The 
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction 
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10 
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional 
misconduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. 
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969); 
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975). 
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 
255, 280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring). 
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission 
contends that nothing in the language "manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance" limits its operation to 
knowing or intentional pra.ctices.18 In support of its view, 
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose 
in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against 
false and deceptive practices that might injure them. See 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at 
18 The Commis8ion would not permit recovery upon proof of 
ne~ligence in all caser;. In order to harmonize civil liability nndcr 
§ 10 (b) with the express rivil remedies contained in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, the Commission would limit the circumstances in which 
civil liability could be imposed for negligent viola.tion of Rule 
lOb--5 to situations in which (i) the defendant knew or reasonably 
could forsee that the plaintiti would rely on his conduct, (ii) the 
plaintiff did in fact so rely, and (iii) the amount of the plaintiff's 
damages caused by the defendant's conduct was definite and ascer-
tainable. Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The Commission con-
cludes that the present record does not establish these conditions 
since it could not reasonably have been forsecn that the finanrial 
sta.tements of First Securities would induce respondents to invest 
in the escrow accounts, respondents in fact did not. rely on Ernst & 
Ernst's audits, and the amount of respondents' damages was un--
ascertainable. Id., 33-36. Re~pondents accept the Commission's 
basic analysis of the operative language of the st-atute and rule,. 
but reject these additional requirements for recovery for negligent 
violations. 
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151; Super-£ntendent of Insurance v. Bm1ke1·s Life & 
Casualty Co., 404 U. S .. at 11-12; .T. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1064). See also SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 
(1963). The Commission then reasons that since the 
"effect" upon investors of given conduct is the same re-
gardless of whether the conduct is negligent or intentional, 
Congress must have inknded to bar all snch practices and 
not just those done knowingly or intrntionally. The logic 
of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for 
wholly faultless conduct \vhcre such conduct results in 
harm to investors, a result tlw Commission would br un-
likely to support. But apart from where its logic might 
lead. the Commission would add a gloss to the operative 
language of the statutR quite different frorn its com-
monly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addison v. Holly 
H1:ll Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-618 (1944).w 
Tho argument simply ignores the usc of the words "manip-
ulative" "device" or "contrivance," terms that make un-
mistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of 
conduct quite different from negligence.20 Use of the 
10 "To let general words draw on somr purpose is one thing. To 
draw on some unexpressed Rpirit outside the bounds of the normal 
moaning of words is qnite another . . . . After all, lcgisla,tion when 
not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of 
men and is theref~re under~tood arcording to the srnse of thr thing, 
ns the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed 
to him." 322 U. S .. at 617-618. See Frankfurter, Some Rcflertions 
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 536-537 (1947). 
20 WebstPr's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as 
"rtJhat which is devised, or formed by de~ign; a contrivance; an 
invention; project; srheme; often a scheme to deceive; a stratap;rm; 
an artifice," and "contrivanre" in portinrnt part as "r a] thing con-
tri\·rd or used in rontriving; a srhcme, plan, or artifice." In 1urn, 
"contrive" in pertinent part is dcfinocl as "r t] 0 devise; to plan; to 
plot ... [tlo fabrirate ... dc~ign; im·ent ... to scheme .... " 
The Commission also ignore~ the use of the terms "[t]o u~e or 
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word "manipula.tive" is especially significant. It is and 
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with 
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful 
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities. 21 
In addition to relying upon the Commission 's argu-
ment with respect to the operative la.nguage of the stat-
ute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with 
"remedial legislation ," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "'not technically 
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.'" Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United Sta,tes, 406 
U. S., at 151 , quoting SEC v. Capital Ga1:ns Research 
Bureau, supra, at 186. They argue that the "remedial 
purposes" of the Acts demand a construction of § 10 (b) 
that embraces negligence as a standard of liability. But. 
in seeking to a.ccomplish its broad remedial goals, Con-
gress did not adopt uniformally a negligence standard 
even as to express civil remedies. In some circumstances 
and with respect to certain classes of defendants. Con-
gress did create express liability predica.ted upon a failure 
to exercise reasonable care. E. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (3) 
(B), 48 Stat. 82 as amended 15 U. S. C. § 77k (b) (3) (B) 
(liability of "experts," such as accountants, for mislead-
ing statements in portions of registration statements for 
which they are responsible) .22 But in other situations 
good faith is a.n absolute defense. 1934 Act § 18, 48 Stat. 
897, as amended 15 U.S. C. § 78r (misleading statements 
employ," language that is ~upportive of the view that Congress 
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct . 
21 Webster's Int'l Dictionary, supra, defines "manipuhte" as 
". . . to manage or treat ar tfully or fraudulently ; as to manipulate 
accounts . . . . 4. Rxchanges. To force (prices) up or down , as 
by matched orders, wash sales, fict itious rrport.s ... ; to rig ." 
22 See p . 21 & n. 26, infra. 
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in any document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act). And 
in still other circumstances Congress created express lia-
bility regardless of the defendant's fault, 1933 Act § 11 
(a) (issuer liability for misleading statements in the reg-
istration statement). 
It is thus evident that Congress fashioned stand-
ards of fault in the express civil remedies in the 
1933 and 1934 Acts on a pa.rticula.rized basis.. Ascer-
tainment of congressional intent with respect to the 
standard of liability created by a particular section of 
the Acts must therefore rest primarily on the language 
of that section. Where, as here, we deal with a judi-
cially implied liability, the statutory language certainly 
is no less important. In view of the language of 
§ 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional miscon-
duct, and mindful that the language of a statute con-
trols when sufficiently clear in its context, United States 
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643,, 648 (1961); Packard Motor 
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), further 
inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now, neverthe-
less, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act to ascertain 
whether there is support for the meaning a.ttributed to 
§ 10 (b) by the Commission and respondents. 
B 
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 
Act is bereft of any explicit explana.tion of Congress' 
intent, we think the relevant portions of tha.t history 
support our conclusion that § 10 (b) was addressed to 
practices that involve some element of scienter and can-
not be read to impose liability for negligent conduct 
alone. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by 
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693, 
'· 
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73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1934). Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which pres-
ent § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the use of 
"any device or contrivance which, or any device or con-
trivance in a way or manner which the Commission may 
by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the pub-
lic interest or to the proper protection of investors." The 
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices 
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate 
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) (short 
sale), (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings 
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was intro-
duced in both Houses which abbreviated a.nd modified 
§ 9 (c)'s opera.tive language to read "any manipulative 
device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
§ 10 (b) (1934); H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) 
(1934). Still a third bill, retaining the Commission's 
power to regulate the specific practices enumerated in 
the prior bills, and omitting all reference to the Commis-
sion's authority to prescribe rules concerning manipula-
tive or deceptive devices in general, was introduced and 
passed in the House. H. R.. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
§ 9 (1934). The final language of § 10 is a modified 
version of a Senate amendment to this last House bill. 
See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 
(1934) (Conference Report). 
Neither the intended scope of § 10 (b) nor the reasons 
for the changes in its operative language are revealed 
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which 
deals primarily with other aspects of the legisla.tion. 
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was in-
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The 
extensive hearings that preceded passage of the 1934 
Act touched only briefly on § 10, and most of the dis-
cussion was devoted to the enumerated devices that the 
.. 
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Commission is empowered to proscribe under § 10 (a). 
The most relevant exposition of the provision that was 
to hecome § 10 (b) vYas by Thomas G. Corcoran, a 
spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated: 
"Subsection (c) [§ 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10 
(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning 
devices.' ... 
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to 
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there 
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Com-
mission should have the authority to deal with new 
manipulative devices.'' 
Hea.rings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 115 ( 1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b) 
by a spokesman for its dmftcrs is significa.nt. The 
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to 
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative 
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any 
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use 
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely 
negligent acts or omissions. 23 Neither the legislative 
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify 
any usage or authority for construing "ma.nipulative [or 
cunning] devices" 24 to include negligence. 
2 '1 Roe n. 21, supra. 
24 In support of its position the Commi~sion cites statcmc.nts 
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings t b~tt "in modern society there 
are many things you have to make crimes which arc sheer matters 
of ne~rligcnce" and "intent is not necessary for every crime." Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Pmctices before the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6509-6510 (1934). The 
comment, taken in context, sheds no light on the meaning of § 10 (b). 
Corcoran's remarks were made during a discussion of whether crimi-
nal violations could arise under § 8 (a) (3) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d 
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The legislative reports do not address the scope of 
§ 10 (b) or its catch-all function directly. In consider-
ing specific manipulative practices left to Commission 
regulation, however, the reports indicate that liability 
would not attach absent scienter, supporting the con-
clusion that Congress intended no lesser standard under 
§ 10 (b). The Senate Report of S. 3420 discusses gener-
Sess., which in material part was incorporated in § 9 of the 1934 Act, 
15 U.S. C. § 78; in the absence of specific intent to influence security 
prices for personal gain. The remarks, moreover, were not ad-
dre..qsed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations con-
cerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Fercli-
nand Pecora., cmmsel to the committee and a draftman of S. 2693, 
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.,- U.S.-, 
- n. 24 (1976), described the language as "[e]xcluding from its 
scope an act that is not done with any ulterior motives or pur-
poses, as set forth in the act." ld., at 6510. Further, prior to 
the passage of the 1934 Act, proposed § 8 was amended to require 
willful behavior as a prerequisite to civil liability fm vio~ations. 
Compare§ 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with§ 8 (c) of S. 2693. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934). 
The Commission also relies on objections to a draft. version 
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. 14-15, 
supra-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the 
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was 
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on 
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Con g., 2d Sess., 258 ( 1934). Rema.rks 
of this kind made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other 
than by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a 
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 276-277 (1947); United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is espe-
cially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who 
"[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill ... understandably tend to over-
state its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964). 
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-
395 (1951). 
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ally the various abuses that precipitated the need for the 
legislation and the inadequacy of self-regulation by the 
stock exchanges. The Report then analyzes the compo-
nent provisions of the statute, but does not parse § 10. 
The only specific reference to § 10 is the following: 
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic pow-
ers conferred on the administrative authority, effec-
tive regulation must include several clear statutory 
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, 
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices 
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful 
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10 
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess .. 6 (1934). 
In the portion of the general analysis section of the 
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there 
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered 
so inimical to the public interest as to require express 
prohibition, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders,2 r. 
and of other practices that might in some cases serve 
legitimate purposes, such as stabilization of security 
prices and grants of options. /d., at 7-9. These latter 
practices were left to regulation by the Commission. 
1934 Act§§ 9 (a)(6), (c), 48 Stat. 890, 15 U.S. C.§§ 78i 
(a)(6), (c). Significantly, we think, in the discussion of 
25 "WaRh" sales are trans:tctions involving no eh:mge in beneficial 
ownership. "Matched" orders arc ordcrR for the purch:1se/sale of a 
security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of sub-
stantially the same .size, at substantially the same time and price, 
have been or will be entered by the same or different persons for 
the salejpurchase of such security. Section 9 (a) (I) of the 1934 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (a) (1), prosrribes wash sales and matched 
orders when effectuated "[f]or the purpose of creating a false or 
misleading appearance of active trading in any security registered 
on a national securities exrhange, or , .. with respect to the market 
for any ~;;uch security." See In re J. A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E. C. 
790 (1958); In re Thornton & Co., 28 S. E. 208 (1948). 
' . 
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this latter category of specified manipulative practices, 
there is no indication that any type of criminal or civil 
liability is to attach in the absence of scienter. For ex-
ample, in discussing the potential abuses resulting from 
the use of options, the Report indicates that self-regula-
tion by securities exchanges had proved inadequate be-
cause membe.rs might deliberately circumvent the rules of 
the exchange by employing nonmembers to execute trans-
actions. ld., at 9. Furthermore, in commenting on the 
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, theRe-
port explains: 
" . . . if an investor has suffered loss by reason of 
illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be 
allowed to recover damages from the guilty party .... 
The bill provides that any person who unlaw-
fully manipulates the price of a security, or who 
induces transactions in a security by means of false 
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or 
misleading statement in the report of a corporation, 
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought 
or sold the security at prices affected by such viola-
tion or statement. In such case the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the 
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied 
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape 
liability by showing that the statement was made in 
good faith." /d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied). 
With regard to the specified manipulative practioo; 
considered in the Report, therefore, there is revealed an 
overall congressional intent to prevent "manipulative 
and deceptive practices ... which fulfill no useful func--
tion" and to crea.te private actions for damages stemming 
from "illict practices," where the defendant has not acted 
in good faith. The views expressed in the House Report 
are consistent with this interpretation. H. Rep. No. 
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1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, 20-21 (1934) (H. R. 
9323). There is no indication that Congress intended 
anyone to be made liable for misleading conduct or mis-
statement unless he acted other than in good faith. The 
catch-all provision of § 10 (b) should be interpreted no 
more broadly. 
c 
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated com-
ponents of the federal regulatory scheme governing trans-
actions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S .. at 
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Se-
curities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence 
of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly 
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language 
Congress has chosen .... " Recognizing this, respondents 
and the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of 
the Acts to support their contention that civil liability ma.y 
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think 
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions 
of the Acts. 
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit 
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard 
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 889, 
15 U. S, C. § 78i, which generally proscribes manipulation 
of securities prices. Sections 9 (a)(1) and (a)(2). for 
example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security 
prices " [ f] or the purpose of creating a false or misleading 
appearance of actual trading in any security ... or ... 
with respect to the market for any such security," and 
"for the purpose of including the purchase or sale of such 
security by others." See also§ 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e) 
then imposes upon "[a]ny person who willfully partici-
pates in any act or transaction in violation of" other pro-
visions of § 9 civil liability to anyone who purchased or 
sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative 
, ·· 
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activities. From this the Commission concludes that 
since § 10 (b) is not by its terms explicitly restricted to. 
willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be 
construed in all cases to require more than negl~gent 
action or inaction as a precondition for civil liability. 
The structure of the Acts does not support the Corn-
mission's argument. In each instance that Congress 
created expFess civil liability in favor of defrauded pur-
chasers or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether 
recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional 
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake.. See 
1933 Act, §§ 11 , 12, 15, 48 Stat. 82, 84, as amended 15 
U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 18, 20, 48 Stat. 
889, 896, 897, 899, as amended 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i, 
78r. 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambigu-
ously creates a private action for damages when a 
registration statement includes untrue statements of ma-· 
terial facts or fails to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading. Within the 
limits specified by § 11 (e), the issuer of the securities is 
held absolutely liable for any damages resulting from such 
misstatement or omission. But experts such as account-
ants who have prepared portions of the registration state-
ment are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect, 
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil 
liability with respect to the portions of the registration 
statement for which he was responsible by showing that 
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable 
ground[s] to believe" that the statements for which he 
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a 
material fact.~6 § 11 (b) (3)(B)(i) . See, e. g., Escott v. 
26 Other individuals who sign the registration statement, directors 
of the issuer, and the underwriter of the securities similarly arc 
accorded a complete defense against civil liability based on the exer-
cise of reasonable investigation and a reasonable belief that the 
7 4-1042-0PINION 
22 ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER 
Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697- 703 
(SDNY 1968). The express recognition of a cause of 
action premised on negligent behavior in § 11 stands in 
sharp contrast to the language of § 10 (b), and signifi-
cantly undercuts the Commission's argument. 
We also consider it significant that each of the express 
civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negli-
gent conduct, see ~§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U.S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 
77o/7 are subject to significant procedural restrictions not 
applicable under § 10 (b).28 Section 11 (e) of the 1933 
registration statement was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A), (C), 
(D), (c). See, e. g. , Feit v. Leasco Data Proces&ing Equipment 
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but 
not officer-directors, established their due diligence defense). See 
generally R. Jenning8 & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027 
(3d ed. 1972), and sources cited therein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under 
the Federal Securities ActR: The Barchris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 199 
(1969). 
21 Section 12 (2) crea.tcs potential civil liability for a seller of 
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or 
omissions in connection with the t.ranRaction. The seller is ex-
culpated if he proves that he did not know, or in the exer~ise of 
reasonable care, could not. have known of the untruth or omission. 
Section 15 of the 1933 Act, a.~ amended by § 208 of Title II of the 
1934 Act, makes persons who "r.ontrol" any person liable under § 11 
or § 12 liable jointly nnd severa.lly to the same extent as the controlled 
person, unless he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to be-
lieve in the existence of the fncts by reason of which the liability of 
the controlled pcr~on is allcg;ed t.o exi~<t" 15 U.S. C.§ 77o . See Act 
of .Tunc 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II § 208, 48 Stat. 908. 
28 Each of the provisions of tho 1934 Act that expressly crr_ate 
civil liability, except tho~e directed to specific classes of individuals 
such as directors, officers, or 10% benefirinl holders of sccnritics, see 
§ 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p, Fm·emost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident 
Securities Co., supra; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973), contains n statr-of-mind some-
thing more than negligence. Section 9 creates potr.ntial civil lia-
bility for any person who "willfully participntcs" in the manpulation 
of securities on a national exchange. § 9 (e). 15 U.S. C.§ 78i (e). 
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Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plain-
tiff bringing a suit under§ 11, § 12 (2), or§ 15 thereof to 
post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees. Section 
13 specifies a statute of limitations of one year from the 
time the violation was or should have been discovered, in 
no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or 
sale, applicable to actions brought under § 11, § 12 (2), 
or § 15. These restrictions, significantly, were imposed 
by amendments to the 1933 Act passed as part of the 
1934 Act. Prior to amendment § 11 (e) contained no 
provision for payment of costs. 48 Stat. 83. Act of 
May 27, 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, c. 38, Title I, § 11 (e). 
See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II 
§ 206 (e), 48 Stat. 908. The amendments substantially 
shortened the statute of limitations provided by § 13. 
Compare Pub. L. No. 22, supra, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, with 15 
U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 48 Stat. 908. See 
n. 28 attached that the judicially created private 
damage remedy under § 10 (b)-which has no compara-
ble restrictions 29-cannot be extended, consistently with 
Section 18 creates potential civil liability for misleading st11,tements 
filed with the Commission, but provides the defendant with the 
defense that "he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that 
such statement was false or mislca.ding." 15 U. S. C. § 78r. And 
§ 20 which imposes liability upon "controlling persons" for violations 
of tho Act by those they control, exculpates a defendant who "ac·ted 
in good faith and did not ... induce the act ... constituting the 
viohtion .... " 15 U. S. C. § 78t. Emphasizing the important 
difference between the operative language a11d purpose of § 14 (a) 
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 14n (a), as contrasted with § 10 (b) 
however, some courts have concluded that proof of scienter is 
unnecessary in an action for damages by the slmreholder recipients· 
of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issncr corpo-
r:d.ion. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Slcogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281, 129!} 
(CA2 1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., supra, at 
289-290. 
2 !1 Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions 
under § 10 (b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed 
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the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent 
wrongdoing. Such extension would allow causes of 
action covered by § 11, § 12 (2), and § 15 to be brought 
instead under § 10 (b) and thereby nullify the effective-
ness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on 
those express actions. See. e. g., Fischman v. Raytheon 
Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 786-787 (CA2 1951); 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867- 868 
(Friendly, J., concurring); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft 
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (ED Pa. 1948); 3 L. Loss, 
supra, at 1787-1788; R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities 
Regulation 1070-1074 (3d ed. 1972). We would be un-
willing to bring about this result absent substantial sup-
port in the legislative history, and there is none.'10 
D 
We have addressed, to this point, primarily the lan-
guage a.nd history of § 10 (b). The Commission con-
as in other cases of judicially implied remedies. See Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 ( 1946), and cases cited therein. Al-
though it is not always ccrtnin which state statute of limitations 
should be followed, such statutes of limitations usually nre longer 
than the period provided under § 13. 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1773-
177 4. As to costs see n. 30 infra. 
3° Congress regarded these restrictions on private damage ar-tions 
ns significant. In introducinp: Title II of the 1934 Act, Senator 
Fletcher indicated that the nmcnclment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, 
providing for potential payment of costs, induding attorneys' fees, 
" is the most important [amendment] of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669. 
One of its purposes was to deter actions brought solely for their 
potential settlement value, See H. Rep. 1838, 73d Cong., Zd Sess., 
42 (1934) (Conference Report) ; Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 740-
741. This deterrent is lacking in the § 10 (b) context, in which a 
dist rict court's power to award [lttorneys' fees is sharply circum-
Rcribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 
421 U. S. 240 (1975) ("bad faith" requirement); F. D. Rich Co. v. 
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). 
,• 
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tends, however, that subsections (2) anci (3) of Rule-
lOb-5 are cast in language which-if standing alone-
could encompass both intentional and negligent behavior._ 
These subsections respectively provide that it is un-
lawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order· 
to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading ... "· 
and "to engage in any act. practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person. . . ." Viewed in isolation the lan-
guage of subsection (2), and arguably that of subsec-
tion (3), could be read as proscribing, respectively, any 
type of material misstatement or omission, and a.ny 
course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding in-
vestors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not. 
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmo-
nized with the administrative history of the rule, a his-
tory making clear that when the Commission adopted 
the rule it was intended to apply only to activities that 
involved scienter.31 More importantly, Rule lOb-5 was 
31 Apparently the rule was a hastily drafted response to a situ-
ation clearly involving of intentional misconduct. The Com-
mission's Hegional Administrator in Boston had reported to the 
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the president 
of a corporation was telling the other shareholders that the corpora-
tion was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the rc~ultant 
depressed prices, when in fact the business was doing exceptionally 
well. The Hule was drafted and approved on the day this report 
was received. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Se-
euritics Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton 
Freeman, one of rule's co-drafters); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, a.t 
767 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Although adopted pursua.nt to 
§ 10 (b), the language of the rule ttppenrs to have been derived in 
significant part from § 17 of· the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q. 
E. g., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867 
(Friendly, J ., concurring). There is no indication in the adminis-
•. 
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adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission 
under § 10 (b). The rulema.king power granted to an 
administrative agency charged with the administration 
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, 
it is " 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect 
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' " Di.rcon 
v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Man-
hattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view 
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, 
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Com-
mission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons 
stated above, we think the Commission's original inter-
pretation of Rule 10b-5 was compelled by the language 
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts. 
See, e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Slcogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 
1281, 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel .& Co., 479 F. 
2d 1277, 1304-1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf 
trative history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended 
to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. Indeed the Commis-
sion's release issued contemporaneously with the rule explained: 
"The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the 
adop1 ion of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection 
with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules 
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers 
and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections 
against fraud administered by the Commiflsion by prohibiting indi-
viduals or companies from buying sccuritieR if they engage in fr:1ud 
in their purchase." SEC Jlelease No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). 
That f'ame year, in its Annunl Report, the Commission again statrd 
that the purpose of the rule was to protect investors against "fmnd": 
"During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-f} 
as an additional protection to inve:;tors. The new rule prohibits 
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of sceuritir.s, 
while the preYiously exist.ing rules against fraud in the purchnse of 
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Sulphur Co., supra, at 868; 3 L. Loss, Securities Regula-
tion 1766 (2d ed. 1961) (concurring opinion); 6 id., at 
3883-3885 (Supp. 1969) . When a sta.tute spea.ks so spe-
cifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of 
implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly 
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and 
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we 
are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to 
negligent conduct.32 
32 As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of 
the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine · 
t he additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties, 
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the 
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would 
significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose 
liability upon accountantg and other experts who perform services or 
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term, 
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 747-748, the Court pertinently 
observed: 
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the 
elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not 
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of 
the class of plaintiffs who mny sue in this area of the law will ulti-
mately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), Chief Judge Cardozo 
observed with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate Eunotmt for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause': 
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the 
implica.tion of a dut.y that exposes to t,hese consequences.' Jd., at 
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444." 
This case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the standard 
urged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by 
Nay, not First Securities, they were not fore~eec'lble users of the 
financial statementR prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents con-
ceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or 
Ernst & Ernst's certificates of opinion. See n. 9, supra. The class 
of per~on.'S eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in 
this case, could be numbered in the thousMds in other cases. Ac-
ceptance of respondents' view would extend to new frontiers the· 
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III 
Recognizing that § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held 
to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by 
Ernst & Ernst as a precondition to the imposition of 
civil liability respondents further contend that the ease 
should be remanded for trial under whatever standard 
is adopted. Throughout the lengthy history of this case 
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability 
premised on negligence, specifically disclaiming that 
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional mis-
conduct.~3 In these circumstances, we think it inap-
propriate to remand the action for further proceedings. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
"hazards" of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious 
polioy questions not yet addressed by Congress. 
""See 503 F. 2d, u,t 1104, 1119; n. 5, supra. 
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The issue in this case is whether an action for civil 
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act) , 48 Stat. 891 , 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78j (b) , and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 
10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b- 5, in the absence of an allega-
tion of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the 
part of the defendant. 
I 
Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From 
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities 
Company of Chicago (First Securities) , a small broker-
age firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange 
and of the National Association of Securities Dealers, to 
perform periodic audits of the firm 's books and records. 
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared 
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the Commission) the annual reports required of First 
Securities under § 17 (a ) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78q 
(a) .1 It also prepared for First Securities responses 
1 Section 17 (a) requires that secunties brokers or dealers 
"make ... and preserve . . such accounts ... books, and other 
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock 
Exchange (the Exchange) . 
Respondents were customers of First Securities who 
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated 
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of 
92% of its stock. Nay induced the respondents to in-
vest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented 
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so 
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the trans-
actions occurring in the 1950's. In fact, there were no 
escrow accounts as Nay converted respondents' funds to 
his own use immediately upon receipt. These trans-
actions were not in the customary form of dealings be-
tween First Securities and its customers. The respond-
ents drew their personal checks payable to Nay or a desig-
nated bank for his account. No such escrow accounts 
were reflected on the books and records of First Securi-
ties, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to 
respondents in connection with their other investments. 
Nor were they included in First Securities' filings with 
the Commission or the Exchange. 
records, and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and 
regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors." During the period rele-
vant here, Commission R11le 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required 
that First Securities file an annual report of its financial condition 
that included a certificate stating "clearly the opinion of the account-
ant with respect to the financial statement covered by the certificate 
and the accounting principles and practices reflected therein." See 
SEC Release No. 3338 (Nov. 28, 1948) , X-17A-5 (h). The rule re-
quired Ernst & Ernst to state in its certificate, inter alia, "whether 
the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards applicable in the circumstances" and provided that noth-
ing in the mle should "be constmed to imply authority for the 
omission of any procedure which independent accountants would 
ordinarily employ in the course of an audit for the purpose of 
.expressing the opinions required" by the rule. 
74-1042-0PINION 
ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER 3 
This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed 
suicide, leaving a note that described First Securities as 
bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." Re-
spondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages 
against Ernst & Ernst 3 in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that 
Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10 (b) and Commission 
Rule 10b-5;4 and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and 
abetted" N~ty's violations by its "failure" to conduct 
proper audits of First Securitie~. As revealed through 
discovery, respondents' cause of action rested on a 
theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was that 
Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate audit-
ing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, thereby 
failing to discover internal practices of the firm said 
to prevent an effective audit. The practice princi-
pally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open 
2 Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially 
were filed by different members of the present group of respondents. 
Subsequently the respondents jointly filed a First Amended Com-
plaint. The two cases were treated by the District Court as if they 
were consolida.ted and were consolidated formally on appeal. 
8 The first count of the complaint was directed against the 
Exchange, charging that through its acts and omissions it had 
aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor 
of the Exchange was affirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest 
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875 
(1974) . 
4 Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced re-
ceivership proceedings against First Securities. In those proceedings 
all of the respondents except two asserted claims based on the 
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were allowed 
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1973) , where the court held that Nay's con-
duct violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities 
was liable for Nay's fraud as an aider and abettor. The question 
of Ernst & Ernst's liability was not considered in that case. 
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mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed 
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in 
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst & 
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have dis-
covered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then 
would have been disclosed in reports to the Exchange 
and to the Commission by Ernst & Ernst as an irregular 
procedure that prevented an effective audit. This 
.would have led to an investigation of Nay that would 
have revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents spe-
cifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional 
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst. 5 
After extensive discovery the District Court granted 
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's 
contention that a cause of action for aiding and abetting 
a securities fraud could not be maintained under§ 10 (b) 
and Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It 
concluded, however, that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had 
conducted its audits in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards.6 
5 In their response to interrogatories in the District Court re-
spondents conceded that they did "not accuse Ernst & Ernst of 
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "mexcusable negligence." 
App. 81. 
6 The District Court also held respondent's action was barred by 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the applicable Illinois stat-
ute of limitations of three years. See n. 29, infra. As customers of 
First Securities respondents were sent confirmation forms as re-
quired under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 requesting that they verify 
the accuracy of the statements and notify Ernst & Ernst as to 
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms contained no 
reference to the escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst was not notified 
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst 
was completed in December 1967 and the first complaint in this 
{l,ction was not filed until February 1971. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty 
of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable in dam-
ages for aiding and abetting a third party's violation of 
Rule 10b-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or 
prevented but for the breach. 503 F. 2d 1100 (1974).7 
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law 
and statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First 
Securities' internal control system because it had con-
tracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing 
with the Commission the annual report of its financial 
condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule 
17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5.8 The Court further rea-
7 In support of this holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision 
in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supra, where it detailed 
the elements necessary to establish a claim under Rule lOb-5 based 
on a defendant's aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by 
inaction. See n. 3 supra, In such a case the plaintiff must show 
"that the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge or 
or, but for the breach of a duty of mquiry, should have had knowl-
edge of the fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party 
failed to act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of 
disclosure." Id., at 374. The court explained in the instant case 
that these "elements constitute a flexible standard of liability which 
should be amplified according to the peculiarities of each case." 503 
F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil liability for 
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the rule, 
nor the elements necessary to establish such a cause of action. See, 
e. g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673' 
(1966), 286 F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7 
1969), ccrt. denied, 397 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for 
giving active and knowing assistance to a third party engaged in 
violations of the securities laws). See generally Ruder, Multiple 
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases : Aiding and Abetting, 
Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 12(J 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 620-645 (1972).. 
s See n l, supra. 
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soned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statu-
tory duty to inquire 9 and the related duty to disclose 
any material irregularities that were discovered. I d., 
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were 
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's 
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10 
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and dis-
closure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure 
would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's 
fraud. !d., at 1115.11 
9 The court concluded that the duty of inquiry imposed on Ernst 
& Ernst under § 17 (a) was "grounded on a concern for the pro-
tection of investors such as [respondents]," without reaching the 
question whether the statute imposed a "direct duty" to the re-
spondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court held that Ernst & 
Ernst owed no common-law duty of inquiry to respondents arising 
from its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not 
specifically foresee that respondents' limited class might suffer from 
a negligent audit, compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 
174 N. E. 441 (1931); see, e. g., R.I. Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. 
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Moreover, respondents 
conceded that they did not rely on the financial statements an<l 
reports prepared by Ernst & Ernst or on its certificate of opinion. 
503 F. 2d, at 1107. 
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged fail-
ings by Ernst & Ernst m its audit of First Securities, principally its 
failure to inquire into the collectibility of certain loans by First Se-
curities to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memoran-
dum that characterized First Securities' overall system of internal 
control as weak because of the centralization of functions in the 
cashier. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged 
deficiencies m its opinion in this case, although it did discuss the 
loans to Nay a.nd certain other related matters in its opinion in 
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supra, at 370-371, hold-
ing that the existence of these facts was insufficient to put the 
Exchange on notiCe that further inquiry into First Securities' finan-
cial affairs was required 
11 The Court of Appeals also reversed the District Court's holding 
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We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether 
a private cause of action for damages will lie under 
§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any alle-
gation of scienter-intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.12 421 U. S. 909 (1975). We conclude that it 
will not and therefore we reverse.13 
with respect to equitable estoppel and the statute of limitations. 
See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition of the case we need not 
address these issues. 
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standard to be applied 
have varied, several courts of appeals have held in substance that 
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and 
Rule 10b-5. See, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 730 (CA9 
1974) ("flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718, 
735 (CA8 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 951 (1968) (negligence suffi-
cient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 1963) (knowl-
edge not required). Other courts of appeals have held that some 
type of scienter~i. e., intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the 
truth, or knowing use of some practice to defraud-is necessary in 
such an action. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F. 2d 1351, 1361-
1362 (CA10 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (an element 
of "scienter or conscious fault"); Lanza v. D1·exel & Co., 479 F. 2d 
1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless disregard" of the 
truth). But few of the decisions announcing that some form of 
negligence suffices for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 
actually have involved· only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 606 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 
879 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255, 
2.86 (CA3 1977) (Adams, J., concurring); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule · 
10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972) . 
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state em~ 
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain · 
areas of the law recklessness is cons1dercd to be a form of inten~ , 
tiona! conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. 
We need not. address here the question whether, in some circum~. 
stances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under§ 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5. 
· 13 Respondents further contend that Ernst & Ernst owed them a 
direct duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 of the 1934 Act to con-
duct a proper audit of Fir~t Securiti~ and :that they may base a, · 
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Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged 
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929. 
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 48 Stat. 74, as 
amended 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq., was designed to pro-
vide investors with full disclosure of material informa-
tion concerning public offerings of securities in com-
merce, to protect investors against fraud and, through 
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote 
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The 
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors 
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation 
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting 
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on na-
tional securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts con-
tain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies 
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient 
regulation of securities trading could not be accom-
plished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the 
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, which is pro-
vided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See, 
e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, aff 
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9, 
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C. 
§ § 78i, 78s, 78u. 
private cause of action against Ernst & Ernst for violation of that 
duty. Respondents cause of action, however, was premised solely 
on the alleged violation of § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5. During the 
lengthy history of th1s litigatiOn they have not amended their 
original complaint to aver a cause of action under § 17 (a) and 
Rule 17a-5. We therefore do not consider that a claim of liability 
under § 17 (a) is properly before us even assuming respondents. 
cmlld assert such a claim mdependently of § 10 (b) . 
' 'I 
.. 
ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER 
Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful fort 
any person . . . (b) [ t] o use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security . .. any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting · pursuant to the power 
conferred by § 10 (b) , the Commission promulgated 
Rule lOb- 5, which now provides : 
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive· 
devices. 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly ot 
indirectly, by "the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or' 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
" ( 1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
"(2) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
"(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, in connection with -the 
purchase or sale of any security." 
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an 
express civil remedy for its violation, and there is nO' 
indication that Congress,14 or the Commission when 
1 4 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934); 
Note, Implied Liability Under the Securit ies Exchange Act, 61 Harv, 
L, R~v. 858, 860 (1948} . 
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adopting Rule 10b~5,1 5 contemplated such a remedy, 
the existence of a private cause of action for violations 
of the statute and the rule is now well established. Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 150--154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v. 
Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9 
(1971). During the 30-year period since a private cause 
of action was first unplied under§ 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5/6 
a substantial body of case law and commentary has de-
veloped as to its elements. Courts and commentators 
long have differed with regard to whether scienter is a 
necessary element of such a cause of action, or whether 
negligent conduct alone is sufficient.17 In addressing this 
question, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b), for 
" [ t] he starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps, 
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring); e. g., FTC v .. 
Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941). 
A 
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employ-
ment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
:1 5 SEC Securities Exchange Release No. 3230 (1942); Birnbaum· 
v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F . 2d 461 , 463 (CA2), cert. denied, 343 
U.S. 956 (1952) . 
16 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa. 
1946) . 
17 See cases cited in n 12, supra Compare, e. g., Comment,. 
Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1081 (1969); 
Note, Neghg;ent l\Iisrepesentat10ns under Rule lOb-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev .. 
824, 839-844 (1965) , Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 938, 947 (1969); Note, 
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule IOB-5: A Suggestion 
for Replacing the Doctrme of Privity, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689· 
(1965), with, e g. , 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1766 (2d eeL 
1961); 6 td ., at 3883-38&'> (Supp. 1969), 
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trivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The 
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction 
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10 
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional 
misconduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. 
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969); 
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975). 
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 
255, 280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring), 
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission 
contends that nothing in the language "manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance" limits its operation to 
knowing or intentional practices.18 In support of its view, 
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose 
in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against 
false and deceptive practices that might injure them. See 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at 
18 The Commission would not permit recovery upon proof of 
negligence in all cases. In order to harmonize civil liability under 
§ 10 (b) with the express civil remedies contajned in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, the Commission would limit the circumstances in which 
civil liability could be imposed for negligent violation of Rule 
lOb-5 to situations in which (1) the defendant knew or reasonably 
could forsee that the plaintiff would rely on his conduct, (ii) the 
plaintiff did in fact so rely, and (iii) the amount of the plaintiff's 
damages caused by the defendant's conduct was definite and ascer-
tainable. Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The Commission con-
cludes that the present record does not establish these conditions 
since Ernst & Ernst could not reasonably have forseen that the fi-
nancial statements of First Securities would induce respondents to 
invest in the escrow accounts, respondents in fact did not rely on 
Ernst & Ernst's audits, and the amount of respondents' damages 
was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respondents accept the Commis-
sion's basic analysis of the operative language of the statute and rule, 
but reject these additional reqmrements f9r recovery for negligent 
violations. 
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151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co., 404 U. S., at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1964). See also SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 
( 1963). The Commission then reasons that since the 
"effect" upon investors of given conduct is the same re-
gardless of whether the conduct is negligent or intentional, 
Congress must have intended to bar all such practices and 
not just those done knowingly or intentionally. The logic 
of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for 
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in 
harm to investors, a result the Commission would be un-
likely to support. But apart from where its logic might 
lead, the Commission would add a gloss to the operative 
language of the statute quite different from its com-
monly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addison v. Holly 
Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-618 (1944).19 
The argument simply ignores the use of the words "manip-
ulative," "device," and "contrivance," terms that make 
unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of 
conduct quite different from negligence. 20 Use of the 
19 "To let general words draw on some purpose is one thing. To 
draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal 
meaning of words is quite another . . . . After all, legislation when 
not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of 
men and is therefore understood according to the sense of the thing, 
as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed 
to him." Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607, 
617-618 (1944) . See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading 
of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-537 (1947). 
20 Webster's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as 
"[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an 
invention; project; scheme; often a scheme to deceive; a stratagem; 
an artifice;" and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing con-
trived or used in contriving ; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn, 
"contrive" in pertinent part lS defined a.s " [t]o devise; to plan; to 
plot . . . [ t 1 o fabricate . . . design ; invent . . . to scheme . . . .'" 
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word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is and 
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with 
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful 
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities.21 
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argu-
ment with respect to the operative language of the stat-
ute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with 
"remedial legislation," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "'not technically 
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.'" Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 
supra, at 151, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, supra, at 186. They argue that the "remedial 
purposes" of the Acts demand a construction of § 10 (b) 
that embraces negligence as a standard of liability. But 
in seeking to accomplish its broad remedial goals, Con-
gress did not adopt uniformally a negligence standard 
even as to express civil remedies. In some circumstances. 
and with respect to certain classes of defendants, Con-
gress did create express liability predicated upon a failure 
to exercise reasonable care, E. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (3) 
(B), 48 Stat. 82 as amended 15 U.S. C. § 77k (b) (3)(B) 
(liability of "experts," such as accountants, for mislead-
ing statements in portions of registration statements for 
which they are responsible). 22 But in other situations-
good faith is an absolute defense. 1934 Act § 18, 48 Stat. 
897, as amended 15 U.S. C. § 78r (misleading statements 
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or 
employ," language that is supportive of the view that Congress~ 
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct. 
21 Webster's Int'l Dictionary, supra, defines "manipulate" aB' 
" .• . to manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate 
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges . To force (prices) up or down, as; 
·by matched orders , wash sales, fictitious reports . .. ; to rig." 
::J! Seep. 21 & n. 26, infra. 
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in any document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act). And 
in still other circumstances Congress created express lia-
bility regardless of the defendant's fault, 1933 Act § 11 
(a) (issuer liability for misleading statements in the reg-
istration statement). 
It is thus evident that Congress fashioned stand-
ards of fault in the express civil remedies in the 
1933 and 1934 Acts on a particularized basis. Ascer-
tainment of congressional intent with respect to the 
standard of liability created by a particular section of 
the Acts must therefore rest primarily on the language 
of that section. Where, as here, we deal with a judi-
cially implied liability, the statutory language certainly 
is no less important. In view of the language of 
§ 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional miscon-
duct, and mindful that the language of a statute con-
trols when sufficiently clear in its context, United States 
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard Motor 
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), further 
inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now, neverthe-
less, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act to ascertain 
whether there is support for the meaning attributed to 
§ 10 (b) by the Commission and respondents. 
B 
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' 
intent, we think the relevant portions of that history 
support our conclusion that § 10 (b) was addressed to 
practices that involve some element of scienter and can-
not be read to impose liability for negligent conduct 
alone. 
The onginal version of what would develop into the 
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by 
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693~ 
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73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. ( 1934) . Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which pres~ 
ent § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the use of 
1'any device or contrivance which, or any device or con~ 
trivance in a way or manner which the Commission may 
by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the pub-
lic interest or to the proper protection of investors." The 
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices 
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate 
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) (short 
sale), (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings 
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was intr~ 
duced in both Houses which abbreviated and modified 
§ 9 (c)'s operative language to read "any manipulative 
device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
§ 10 (b) (1934); H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) 
(1934). Still a third bill, retaining the Commission's 
power to regulate the specific practices enumerated in 
the prior bills, and omitting all reference to the Commis-
sion's authority to prescribe rules concerning manipula-
tive or deceptive devices in general, was introduced and 
passed in the House. H. R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
§ 9 (1934). The final language of § 10 is a modified 
version of a Senate amendment to this last House bill. 
See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 
(1934) (Conference Report). 
Neither the intended scope of§ 10 (b) nor the reasons 
for the changes in its operative language are revealed 
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which 
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation. 
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was in. 
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The 
extensive hearings that preceded passage of the 1934 
Act touched only briefly on § 10, and most of the dis-
<eussion was devoted to the enumerated devices that the 
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Commission is empowered to proscribe under § 10 (a). 
The most relevant exposition of the provision that was 
to become § 10 (b) was by Thomas G. Corcoran, a 
spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated: 
"Subsection (c) [ § 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10 
(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning 
devices.' ... 
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to 
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there 
is any objection to that kind of clause.' The Com .. 
mission should have the authority to deal with new 
manipulative devices." 
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 115 (1934). This brief explanation of§ 10 (b) 
by a spokesman for its drafters is significant. The 
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to 
enable the Commission ((to deal with new manipulative 
[or cunning l devices." It is difficult to believe that any 
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use 
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely 
negligent acts or omissions. 23 Neither the legislative 
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify 
any usage or authority for construing ((manipulative [or 
cunnin~ devices" to include negligence.24 
23 Seen. 21, sup1·a. 
24 In support of 1ts position the Commission cites statement" 
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings that "in modern society there 
are many things you have to make crimes which are sheer matters 
of negligence" and "intent is not necessary for every crime." Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6509-6510 (1934). The 
comments, taken in coni CJd, s11ed no light on the meaning of § 10 (b). 
Corcoran's remarks were made during a discussion of whether mimi.,. 
n!Ll. violations could arise under § 8 (a) (3) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d 
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The legislative reports do not address the scope of 
§ 10 (b) or its catch-all function directly. In consider-
ing specific manipulative practices left to Commission 
regulation, however, the reports indicate that liability 
would not attach absent scienter, supporting the con-
clusion that Congress intended no lesser standard under 
§ 10 (b). The Senate Report of S. 3420 discusses gener-
Sess., which in material part was incorporated in § 9 of the 1934 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 78i, in the absence of specific intent to influence security 
prices for personal gain. The remarks, moreover, were not adA 
dressed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations con-
cerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Ferdi-
nand Pecora, counsel to the committee and a draftman of S. 2693, 
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.,- U.S.-, 
- n. 24 (1976), described the language as "[e]xcluding from its 
scope an act that is not done with any ulterior motives or pur-
poses, as set forth in the act." !d., at 6510. Further, prior to 
the passage of the 1934 Act, proposed § 8 was amended to require 
willful behavior as a prerequisite to civil liability for violations. 
Compare § 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934). 
The Commission also relies on objections to a draft versi011 
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. 14-15, 
supra-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the 
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was 
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hear-
ings on Stoc"k Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on 
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 258 (1934). Remarks 
of this kind made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other 
than by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a 
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275-277 (1947); United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is espe-
cially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who 
·" [i]n their zeal to defeat a bill . . . understandably tend to over-
state its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964). 
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-
395 (1951). 
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ally the various abuses that precipitated the need for the 
legislation and the inadequacy of self-regulation by the 
stock exchanges. The Report then analyzes the compo· 
nent provisions of the statute, but does not parse § 10. 
The only specific reference to § 10 is the following: 
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic pow-
ers conferred on the administrative authority, effec· 
tive regulation must include several clear statutory 
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, 
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices 
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful 
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10 
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). 
In the portion of the general analysis section of the 
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there 
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered 
so inimical to the public interest as to require express 
prohibition, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders/5 
and of other practices that might in some cases serve 
legitimate purposes, such as stabilization of security 
prices and grants of options. !d., at 7-9. These latter 
practices were left to regulation by the Commission. 
1934 Act§§ 9 (a)(6) , (c) , 48 Stat. 890, 15 U.S. C.§§ 78i 
(a)(6), (c). Significantly, we think, in the discussion of 
25 "Wash" sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial 
ownership. "Matched" orders are orders for the purchase/sale of a 
security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of sub-
-stantially the same size, at substantially the same time and price, 
have been or will be entered by thr same or different persons for 
the sale/ purchase of such security. Section 9 (a) (1) of the 1934 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (a) (1), proscribes wash sales and matched 
orders when effectuated " [f]or the purpose of creating a false or 
misleading appearance of active t rading in any security registered 
on a national securities exchange, or , . . with respect to the market 
for any such security." See In re J. A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E . C. 
790 (1958) ; In re Thornton -& Co., 28 S. E. C. 208 (1948) . 
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the need to regulate even the latter category of practices 
when they are manipulative, there is no indication that 
any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach in the 
absence of scienter. Furthermore, in commenting on the 
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Re~ 
port explains : 
H • • • if an investor has suffered loss by reason of 
illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be 
allowed to recover damages from the guilty party ... , 
The bill provides that any person who unlaw-
fully manipulates the price of a security, or who 
induces transactions in a security by means of false 
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or 
misleading statement in the report of a corporation, 
shall be liab1e in damages to those who have bought 
or sold the security at prices affected by such viola-
tion or statement. In such case the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the 
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied 
thereon · -to his damage. The defendant may escape 
liability by showing that the statement was made in 
good faith." I d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied). 
The Report therefore reveals with respect to the speci-
fied practices, an overall congressional intent to prevent 
"manipulative and deceptive practices . . . which fulfill 
no useful function" and to create private actions for 
damages stemming from "illicit practices," where the de-
fendant has not acted in good faith. The views expressed 
in the House Report are consistent with this interpreta-
tion. H. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, 20-
21 ( 1934) (H. R. 9323). There is no indication that 
Congress intended an{1me to be made liable for such 
practices unless he acted other than in good faith. The-
catch-all provision of § 10 (b) should be interpreted n~ 
more broadly. 
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c 
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated com· 
ponents of the federal regulatory scheme governing trans· 
actions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U. S., at 
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Se-
curities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence 
of the varwus sections of the securities laws is certainly 
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language 
Congress has chosen . ... " Recognizing this, respondents 
and the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of 
the Acts to support their contentiOn that civil liability may 
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think 
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions. 
of the Acts. 
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit 
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard 
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 889, 
15 U. S. C. § 78i, which generally proscribes manipulation 
of securities prices. Sections 9 (a)(1) and (a)(2), for 
example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security 
prices "[f] or the purpose of Cl'eating a false or misleading 
appearance of actual trading in any security ... or ... 
with respect to the market for any such security," and 
"for the purpose of including the purchase or sale of such 
security by others." See also § 9 (a)( 4). Section 9 (e) 
then imposes upon "[a] ny person who willfully partici-
pates in any act or transaction in violation of" other pro-
visions of § 9 civil liability to anyone who purchased or 
sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative· 
activities. From this the Commission concludes that 
since § 10 (b) is not by 1ts terms explicitly restricted to · 
willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be 
construed in all cases to reqmre more than negligent 
action or inactiOn as a precondition for civil liability. 
The str.uct_ure of the. Act.s. does_ not support the Com:--
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mission's argument. In each instance that Congress 
created express civil liability in favor of purchasers 
or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether 
recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional 
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake. See 
1933 Act, §§ 11, 12, 15, 48 Stat. 82, 84, as amended 15 
U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 18, 20, 48 Stat. 
889, 897, 899, as amended 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i, 
78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambigu-
ously creates a private action for damages when a 
registration statement includes untrue statements of ma-
terial facts or fails to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading. Within the 
limits specified by § 11 (e), the issuer of .the securities is 
held absolutely liable for any damages resulting from such 
misstatement or omission. But experts such as account-
ants who have prepared portions of the registration state-
ment are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect, 
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil 
liability with respect to the portions of the registration 
statement for which he was responsible by showing tha.t 
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable 
ground[s] to believe" .that the statements for which he 
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a 
material fact. 26 § 11 (b)(3)(B)(i). See, e. g., Escott v. 
26 Other individuals who sign the registra.tion statement, directors 
of the issuer, and the underwriter of the securities similarly are 
accorded a complete defense against civil liability based on the exer-
cise of reasonable investigation and a reasonable belief that the 
regist.ration statement was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A), (C), 
(D), (c). See, e. g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment 
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but 
not officer-directors, established their due diligence defense). See 
generally R. .Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027 
(3d ed. 1972), and sources cited therein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under 
the Federal Securities Acts: The B:uchris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 199 
(1969) , 
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Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 
(SDNY 1968). The express recognition of a cause of 
action premised on negligent behavior in § 11 stands in 
sharp contrast to the language of § 10 (b), and signifi~ 
cantly undercuts the Commission's argument. 
We also consider it significant that each of the express 
civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negli-
gent conduct, see§§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U.S. C.§§ 77k, 77l, 
77o,27 is subject to significant procedural restrictions not 
applicable under § 10 (b). 28 Section 11 (e) of the 1933 
27 Section 12 (2) crea.tes potential civil liability for a seller of 
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or 
omissions in connection with the transaction. The seller is ex-
culpated if he proves that ht? did not know, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care, could not have known of the untruth or omission. 
Section 15 of the 1933 Act, as amonded by § 208 of Title II of the 
1934 Act, makes persons who "control" any person liable under § 11 
or § 12 liable jointly and severally to the same extent as the controlled 
person, unless he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to be-
lieve in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of 
the controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S. C. § 77o. See Act 
of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II § 208, 48 Stat. 908. 
28 Each of the provisions of the 1934 Act that expressly create 
civil liability, except those directed to specific classes of individuals 
such as directors, officers, or 10% bC'nt?ficial holders of securities, see 
§ 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p, 1i'oremos~-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident 
Securittes Co., supra; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petro~ 
leum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), contains a state-of-mind condition 
requiring something more than negligence. Section 9 creates poten-
tial civil liability for any person who "willfully participates" in the 
manipulation of secunties on a national exchange. § 9 (e) . 15 
U.S. C. §78i (e). Section 18 creates potential ctvilliability for mis-
leading statements filed with the CommissiOn, but provides the de-
fendant with the defense that "he acted in good faith and had no 
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." 15 U.S. C. 
§ 78r. And § 20, wluch imposes liability upon "controlling persons" 
for violations of the Act by those they control, exculpates a defend-
.ant. who "actrd m good faith and did not . mduce the act . . . 
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Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plain-
tiff bringing a suit under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15 thereof to 
post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees and in 
specified circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion 
of the litigation. Section 13 specifies a statute 
of limitations of one year from the time the 
violation was or should have been discovered, in 
no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or 
sale, applicable to actions brought under § 11, § 12 (2), 
or § 15. These restrictions, significantly, were imposed 
by amendments to the 1933 Act adopted as part of the 
1934 Act. Prior to amendment § 11 (e) contained no 
provision for payment of costs. 48 Stat. 83. Act of 
May 27, 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, c. 38, Title I, § 11 (e). 
See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II 
§ 206 (e), 48 Stat. 908. The amendments also substan-
tially shortened the statute of limitations provided by 
§ 13. Compare Pub. L. No. 22, supra, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, 
with 15 U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 48 Stat. 908. 
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the 
judicially created private damage remedy under § 10 
(b)-which has no comparable restrictions 29-cannot be 
constituting the vwlation .... " 15 U. S. C. § 78t. Emphasizing the 
important difference between the op(;'rative language and purpose of 
§ 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 14n (a), as contrasted with 
§ 10 (b )J however, some courts have concluded that proof of scienter 
is unnecessary in an action for damages by the shareholder recipients 
of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issuer corpo-
ration. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. , 478 F. 2d 1281, 1299 
(CA2 1973) ; Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., supra, at 
289-290. 
29 Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions 
under § 10 (b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed 
as in other cas(;'s of judicially implied remedies. See Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and cases cited therein. Al-
though it is not always C(;'rtain which state statute of limitations 
should be followed, such ~tatutes of limitations usually are longer 
... 
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extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to ac .. 
tions premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension 
would allow causes of action covered by § 11, § 12 ( 2), 
and § 15 to be brought instead under § 10 (b) and thereby 
nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural 
restrictions on these express actions.30 See, e. g., Fisch ... 
man v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 786-, 
787 (CA2 1951); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F. 2d, at 867-868 (Friendly, J., concurring); Rosenberg 
v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (ED Pa. 
1948); 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1787-1788 (2d 
ed. 1961); R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regu ... 
lation 1070-1074 (3d cd. 1972). We would be un ... 
willing to bring about this result absent substantial sup-
port in the legislative history, and there is none.31 
than the period provided under § 13. 3 L. Loss, supm, at 1773-
1774. As to costs seen. 30 infra. 
8° Congress regarded these restrictions on private damage actions 
as significant. In mtroducing Title II of the 1934 Act, Senator 
Fletcher indicated that the am£>ndment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, 
providing for potential payment of costs, including attorneys' fees, 
"i~:~ the most important [amendment.j of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 . 
One of its purpo~:~es was to deter actions brought solely for their po-
tential settl£>ment value. S£>e ibid.; H. Rep. 1838, 73d Cong., 2q 
Sess., 42 (1934) (Conference Report); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 
740-741. This deterrent is laekmg in the § 10 (b) context, in which 
a district court's power to award attorneys' fees is sharply circum-
scribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 
421 U. S. 240 (1975) ("bad faith" requmment); F. D. Rich Co. v. 
Industrial LumbPr Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) 
a1 Section 18 of the 1934 Act creates a private cause of action 
against persons, such as accountants, who "make or cause to be 
made" materially misleading statements m reports or other docu-
ments filed with the CommissiOn. 15 U. S. C. § 78r. We need not 
consider the questiOn whether a cause of action may be maintained 
under § 10 (b) on the basis of actions that would constitute a vio-
lation of § 18. Under § 18 habihty extends to persons who, in re-
liance on such statements, purchased or sold a secunty whose price 
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We have addressed, to this point, primarily the lan-
guage and history of § 10 (b). The Commission con-
tends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule 
lOb-5 are cast in language which-if standing alone-
could encompass both intentional and negligent behavior. 
These subsections respectively provide that it is un-
lawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading ... " 
and "to engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person. . . ." Viewed in isolation the lan-
guage of subsection (2), and arguably that of subsec-
tion (3), could be read as proscribing, respectively, any 
type of material misstatement or omission, and any 
was affected by the statement . Liability is limited, however, in 
the important respect that the defendant is accorded the defense 
that he acted in "good faith and had no knowledge that such state-
ment was false or misleading." Consistent with this language the 
legislative history of the section suggests something more than negli-
gence on the part of the defendant is required for recovery. The ~ 
original version of §18 (a), § 17 (a) of S. 2693, H. R. 78~ 
H . R. 7855, see pp. 14-15, supra, provided that the defendant would 
not be liable if "he acted in good faith and in the exercise of reason-
able care had no ground to believe that such statement was false 
or misleadmg." The accounting profession objected to this pro-
vision on the ground that liability would be created for honest errors· 
in judgment. See Senate Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, 
supra, at 7175-7183; House Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720. 
supra, at 653. In subsequent drafts the current formulation was 
adopted. It is also significant that actions under § 18 are limited 
by a relatively short statute of limitations similar to that provided 
in § 13 of the 1933 Act. § 18 (c). Moreover, as under § 11 (e) 
of the 193:3 Act the District Court is authorized to require the· 
plaintiff to post a bond for costs, mcluding attorney's fees, and to 
assess such costs at the cQUc!usian Qf the. litigation. § 18 (a) ... 
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course of conduct, that has the -effect of defrauding in-
vestors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not. 
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmo~ 
nized with the administrative history of the rule, a his-
tory making clear that when the Commission adopted 
the rule it was intended to apply only to activities that 
involved scienter.32 More importantly, Rule lOb-5 was 
82 Apparently the rule was a hastily drafted response to a situ-
ation clearly involving it intentional misconduct. The Com-
mission's Regional Administrator m Boston had reported to the 
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the president 
of a corporation was telling the other shareholders that the corpora-
tion was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the resultant 
depressed prices, when in fact the business was doing exceptionally 
well. The Rule was drafted and approved on the day this report 
was received. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton 
Freeman, one of rule's co-drafters); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 
767 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) . Although adopted pursuant to 
§ 10 (b), the language of the rule appears to have been derived in 
significant part. from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q. 
E . g., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867 
(Friendly, J. , concurring). There is no indication in the adminis-
trative history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended 
to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. Indeed the Commis-
sion's release issued contemporaneously with the mle explained: 
"The Securities and Exrhange Commission today announced the 
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection 
with the purchase of securities. The previously 'existing rules 
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers 
and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections 
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting indi-
viduals or companies from buymg securities if they engage in fraud 
in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). 
That same year, in its Annual Report, the Commission again stated 
that the purpose of the rule was to protect investors against "fraud": 
"During the fi."cal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-5 
as an additional protection to investors . The new rule prohibits· 
fraud by any person m connection with the purchase of securities. 
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adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission 
under § 10 (b). The rulemaking power granted to an 
administrative agency charged with the administration 
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, 
it is " 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect 
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.'" Dixon 
v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Man-
hattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view 
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, 
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Com-
mission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons 
stated above, we think the Commission's original inter-
pretation of Rule lOb-5 was compelled by the language 
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts. 
See, e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 
1281, 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 
2d 1277, 1304--1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., supra, at 86~3 L. Loss, supra, 1766; 6 id., at 
3883-3885 (Supp. 1969).. When a statute speaks so spe-
cifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of 
implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly 
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and 
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we 
are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to 
negligent conduct.83 
while the previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of 
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep. 
10 (1942). 
88 As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of 
the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine 
the additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties, 
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the 
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would 
significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impos& 
liability upon accou.ntan~ and other experts who perform services or 
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III 
Recognizing that § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held 
to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by 
Ernst & Ernst as a precondition to the imposition of 
civil liability, respondents furth~r contend that the case 
should be remanded for trial under whatever standard 
is adopted. Throughout the lengthy history of this case 
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability 
premised on negligence, specifically disclaiming that 
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional mis-
conduct.84 In these circumstances, we think it inap-
propriate to remand the action for further proceedings. 
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term, 
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 747-748, the Court pertinently 
observed: 
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the 
elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not 
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of 
the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ulti-
mately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N, Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), Chief Judge Cardozo 
observed with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate amount for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause': 
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the 
implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.' !d., at 
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444." 
This case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the standard 
urged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by 
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the 
financial statements prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents con-
ceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or 
Ernst & Ernst's certificates of opinion. See n. 9, supra. The class 
of persons eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in 
this case, could be numbered in the thousands in other cases. Ac-
ceptance of respondents ' view would extend to new frontiers the 
"hazards" of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious 
policy questions not yet addressed by Congress. 
84 See 503 F. 2d, at 1104, 1119 ; n. 5, supra. 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
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The issue in this case is whether an action for civil 
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Commission R . le 
10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence of an allega-
tion of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the 
part of the defendant. 
] 
Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From 
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities 
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small broker-
age firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange 
and of the National Association of Securities Dealers, to 
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records. 
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared 
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the Commission) the annual reports required of First 
Securities under § 17 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78q 
(a) .1 It also prepared for First Securities responses 
1 Section 17 (a) reqmres that secunt1es brokers or dealers 
"make ... and preserve . such accounts ... books, and other 
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock 
Exchange (the Exchange) . 
Respondents were customers of First Securities who 
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated 
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of 
92% of its stock., Nay induced the respondents to in-
vest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented 
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so 
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the trans-
actions occurring in the 1950's. In fact, there were no 
escrow accounts as Nay converted respondents' funds to 
his own use immediately upon receipt. These trans-
actions were not in the customary form of dealings be .. 
tween First Securities and its customers. The respond-
ents drew their personal checks payable to Nay or a desig-
nated bank for his account. No such escrow accounts 
were reflected on the books and records of First Securi-
ties, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to 
respondents in connection with their other investments. 
Nor were they included in First Securities' filings with 
the Commission or the Exchange. 
records, and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and 
regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors." During the period rele-
vant here, Commission Rule 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required 
that First Securities file an annual report of its financial condition 
that included a certificate stating "clearly the opinion of the account-
ant with respect to the financial statement covered by the certificate 
and the accounting principles and practices reflected therein." See 
SEC Release No. 3338 (Nov. 28, 1948), X-17A-5 (h). The rule re-
quired Ernst & Ernst to state in its certificate, inter alia, "whether 
the audit was made in accordance w1th generally accepted auditing 
standards applicable in the circumstances" and provided that noth-
ing in the rule should "be constnwd to imply authority for the 
omission of any procedure which independent accountants would 
mdinarily employ in the course of an audit for the purpose of 
expressing the opmions required" by the rule. 
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This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed 
suicide, leaving a note that described First Securities as 
bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." Re-
spondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages 
against Ernst & Ernst 8 in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that 
Nay's escrow scheme violated §10 (b) and Commission 
Rule 10b-5/ and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and 
abetted" Nay's violations by its "failure" to conduct 
proper audits of First Securities. As revealed through 
discovery, respondents' cause of action rested on a 
theory of negligent nonfeasance. The premise was that. 
Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate audit-
ing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, thereby 
failing to discover internal practices of the firm said 
to prevent an effective audit. The practice princi-
pally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open 
2 Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially 
were filed by different members of the present group of respondents. 
Subsequently the respondents jointly filed a First Amended Com-
plaint. The two cases were treated by the District Court as if they 
were consolidated and were consolidated formally on appeal. 
8 The first count of the complaint was directed against the· 
Exchange, charging that through its acts and omissions it had 
aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor· 
of the Exchange was affirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest· 
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875 
(1974) . 
4 Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced re-
ceivership proceedings against First Securities. In those proceedings 
all of the respondents except two asserted claims based on the 
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were allowed' 
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U. S. 880 (1973), where the court held that Nay's con-
duct violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities: 
was liable for Nay's fraud as an aider and abettor. The question 
oi Ernst & Ernst's liability was UQt cQUsi.dered in that case. 
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mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed 
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in 
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst & 
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have dis-
covered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then 
would have been disclosed in reports to the Exchange 
and to the Commission by Ernst & Ernst as an irregular 
procedure that prevented an effective audit. This 
would have led to an investigation of Nay that would 
have revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents spe-
cifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional 
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst.5 
After extensive discovery the District Court granted 
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's 
contention that a cause of action for aiding and abetting 
a securities fraud could not be maintained under § 10 (b) 
and Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It 
concluded, however, that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had 
conducted its audits in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards.6 
6 In their response to interrogatories in the District Court re-
spondents conceded that they did "not accuse Ernst & Ernst of 
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "inexcusable negligence." · 
App. 81. 
6 The District Court also held respondent's action was barred by 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the applicable Illinois stat-
ute of limitations of three years. See n. 29, infra. As customers of 
First Securities respondents were sent confirmation forms as re-
quired under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 requesting that they verify 
the accuracy of the statements and notify Ernst & Ernst as to 
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms contained no· 
reference to the escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst was not notified 
of this fact . The last aud1t of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst 
was completed in December 1967 and· the first complaint in this; 
a.ction was not filed until February 1971. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty 
of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable in dam-
ages for aiding and abetting a third party's violation of 
Rule lOb-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or 
prevented but for the breach. 503 F. 2d 1100 (1974).7 
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law 
and statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First 
Securities' internal control system because it had con-
tracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing 
with the Commission the annual report of its financial 
condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule 
17ar-5, 17 CFR § 240.17ar-5.8 The Court further rea-
7 In support of this holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision 
in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supr-a, where it detailed 
the elements necessary to establish a claim under Rule 10b-5 based 
on a defendant's aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by 
inaction. See n. 3 supra. In such a case the plaintiff must show 
"that the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge of 
or, but for the breach of a duty of inquiry, should have had knowl-
edge of the fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party 
failed to act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of 
disclosure." I d., at 37 4. The court explained in the instant case 
that these "elements constitute a flexible standard of liability which 
should be amplified according to the peculiarities of each case." 503 
F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil liability for 
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the rule, 
nor the elements necessary to establish such a cause of action. See, 
e. g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673' 
(1966), 286 F . Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for 
giving active and knowing assistance to a third party engaged in 
violations of the securities laws). See generally Ruder, Multiple 
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, 
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 12() 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 620-645 (1972),. 
s Seen. 1, .vupra. 
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soned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statu~ 
tory duty to inquire 0 and the related duty to disclose 
any material irregularities that were discovered.. I d., 
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were 
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's 
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10 
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and dis~ 
closure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure 
would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's 
fraud. Id., at 1115.11 
0 The court concluded that the duty of inquiry imposed on Ernst 
& Ernst under § 17 (a) was "grounded on a concern for the pro-
tection of investors such as L respondents]," without reaching the-
question whether the statute imposed a "direct duty" to the re-
spondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court held that Ernst & 
Ernst owed no common-law duty of inquiry to respondents arising-
from its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not 
specifically foresee that respondents' limited class might sulfer from 
a negligent audit, compare Glanze1· v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 
174 N. E. 441 (1931); see, e. g., R.I. Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. 
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Moreover, respondents 
conceded that they did not rely on the financial statements and 
reports prepared by Ernst & Ernst, or on its certificate of opinion .. 
503 F. 2d, a,t 1107. 
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged fail-
ings by Ernst & Ernst in its audit of First Securities, principally its: 
fa1lure to inquire into the collectibility of certam loans by First Se-
cunties to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memoran-
dum that characterized Fir;;t Secunties' overall system of internal 
control a::; weak because of the centralization of functions in the 
cashier. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged 
deficiencies in 1ts opmion m this case, although it did discuss the 
loans to Nay and certain other related matters in its opinion in 
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supra, at 370-371, hold-
·ing that the existence of these facts was insufficient to put the 
Exchange on notice that further mquiry into First Securities' finan-
•cial affairs was required . 
11 The Court. of Appeals also rt>versed. the District Court's holding 
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We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether 
a private cause of actwn for damages will lie under 
§ 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 m the absence of any alle-
gation of "scienter"-intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
with respect to equitable estoppel and the statute of limitations. 
See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition of the case we need not 
address these issues. 
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standard to be applied 
have varied, several courts of appeals have held m substance that 
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and 
Rule 10l:r-5. See, e. g., Whtte v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 730 (CA9 
1974) ("flexible duty" stand.a.rd), Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718, 
735 (CAS 1967), cert. demed, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (negligence suffi-
cient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 1963) (knowl-
edge not required) Other courts of appeals have held that some 
type of scienter-i. e., mtent to defraud, reckless disregard for the 
truth, or knowmg use of some practice to defnmd-is necessary in 
such an action. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F. 2d 1351, 1361-
1362 (CAlO 1974), cert. demed, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (an element 
of "scienter or conscious fault") ; Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d 
1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless disregard" of the 
truth) . But few of the deCisiOns announcmg that some form of 
negligence sttffices for civil habihty under § 10 (b) and Rule 10l:r-5 
actually have mvolved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 606 (CA5), cert . denied, 419 U. S. 
879 (1974), Kohn v Amencan Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255, 
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J ., concurrmg); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 
10b-5, 67 Nw. U L Rev . 562, 568-570 (1972) 
In this opimon the term "scienter" refers to a mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, mampulate, or defraud. In certain 
areas of the law recklessness 1s considered to be a form of inten-
tional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. 
We need not. address here the questwn whether, in some circum-
stances, reckless behavior 1~ sufficient for civil liability under§ 10 (b) 
and Rule lOb-5. 
Smce this case concerns an actiOn for damages we also need not J 
consider the question whether sc1enter IS a necessary element in an 
actiOn for mjuncttve rehef under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. Cf. 
SEC v Ca7?ital Gatru; Research Bureau, Inc ., 375 U. S. 180 (1963). 
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defraud. 12 421 U. 8. 909 (1975). We conclude that it 
will not and therefore we reverse.13 
II 
Federal regulation of transactions 'in securities emerged 
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929. 
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 48 Stat. 74, as 
amended 15 U. S. C. ~ 77a et seq., was designed to pro-
vide investors with full disclosure of material informa-
tion concerning public offerings of securities in com-
merce, to protect investors against fraud and, through 
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote 
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The 
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors 
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation 
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting 
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on na-
tional securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts con-
tain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies 
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient 
regulation of securities trading could not be accom-
plished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the 
13 Re:spondent.<.; further contend that Ernst & Ern::;t owed them a 
·direct duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 of the 1934 Act to con-
·duct a proper audit of First Securities and that they may base a 
private cause of action against Ernst & Ernst for violation of that 
·duty. Respond<:>nts cau~:>e of actwn, how<:>ver, was premised solely 
·on the alleged violatiOn of § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5. During the 
lengthy history of tim; ht1gatwn they hav<:> not amended their· 
original complaint to a.ver tt cause of aetwn under § 17 (a) and 
Rule 17a-5. WP therefor<:> do not con~:>Id<:>r that <t claim of liability 
under § 17 (a) 1:s propf'rly bf'forf' us even assuming respondents.: 
coqJd a,<;sert. such 11 ch1.im md<:>pPnd<:>ntly of § 10 (h) . 
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1934 Act Congress created the Commission, which is pro. 
vided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See, 
e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, as 
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9, 
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u. 
Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for 
any person ... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connec. 
tion with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power 
conferred by § 10 (b), the Commission promulgated 
Rule 10b-5, which now provides : 
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive 
devices. 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
" ( 1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
11 (2) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
" ( 3) To engage m any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, m connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security." 
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an 
$:press. civil remedy for ita violation, and there is no 
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indication that Congress,-'"'1 or the Commission when 
adopting Rule 10b-5,t5 contemplated such a remedy, 
the existence of a pnvate cause of action for violations 
of the statute and the rule is now well established. Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 150-154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v. 
Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9 
(1971). During the 30-year period since a private cause 
of action was first implied under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5,16 
a substantial body of case law and commentary has de-
veloped as to Its elements. Courts and commentators 
long have differed with regard to whether scienter is a 
necessary element of such a cause of action, or whether 
negligent conduct alone is sufficient.17 In addressing this 
question, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b), for 
" [ t] he starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself.'' Blue Chip Stamps, 
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring); e. g., FTC v. 
Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941). 
14 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934); 
Note, Implied L1ab1lity Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv. 
L. Rev. 858, 860 (1948) 
n SEC Secunties Exchange Release No. 3230 (1942); Birnbaum 
v. Newport Steel Corp ., 193 F 2d 461,463 (CA2), cert. denied, 343 
U.S.956 (1952) . 
16 Kardon v National Gypsum Co, 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa. 
1946) . 
17 See cases cited in n. 12, supra. Compare, e. g., Comment, 
Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1081 (1969); 
Note, Negligent Mll:;rrpesentations under Rule 10b-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev. 
S24, 839-844 (1965) ; Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 938, 947 (1969); Note, 
Civil Lmbility Under Section lOB and Rule lOB-5: A Suggestion 
for Replacmg tlw Doctrme of Pnv1ty, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689 
(1965), w1th, r g., 3 L. Lolis, Securit1es Regulation 1766 (2d ed, 
19tH) ; 6 uf :tt , 3&1:~-3R85 (Supp . 1969). 
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A 
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employ-
ment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The 
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction 
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10 
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional 
misconduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert., 
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969); 
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975). 
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 
255, 280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring), 
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission 
contends that nothing in the language "manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance" limits its operation to 
knowing or intentional practices.'8 In support of its view, 
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose 
18 The Commission would not permit recovery upon proof of 
negligence in all cases. In order to harmonize civil liability under 
§ 10 (b) with the express civil remedies contained in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, the Commission would limit the circumstances in which 
civil liability could be imposed for negligent violation of Rule 
lOb-5 to situations in which (i) the defendant knew or reasonably 
could forsee that the plaintiff would rely on his conduct, (ii) the 
p1'1intiff dJd in fact so rely, and (iii) the amount of the plaintiff's 
damages caused by the defendant's conduct was definite and ascer-
tainable. Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33 . The Commission con-
cludes that the present record does not establish these conditions 
since Ernst & Ernst could not reasonably have forseen that the fi-
nancial statements of First Securities would induce respondents to 
invest in the escrow accounts, respondents in fact did not rely on 
Ernst & Ernst's audits, and the amount of respondents' damages 
was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respondents accept the Commis-
sion's basic analysis of the operative language of the statute and rule, 
but reject these additional requirements for recovery for negligent 
violations, 
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in the 1933 and 1934: Acts to protect investors against 
false and decept1ve practices that might injure them. See 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at 
151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co., 404 U. S., at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1964). See also SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 
( 1963). The CommissiOn then reasons that since the 
"effect" upon mvestors of given conduct is the same re-
gardless of whether the conduct is negligent or intentional, 
Congress must have intended to bar all such practices and 
not JUSt those done knowingly or intentionally. The logic 
of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for 
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in 
harm to investors, a result the Commission would be un-
likely to support. But apart from where its logic might 
lead, the Commission would add a gloss to the operative 
language of the statute quite different from its com-
monly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addison v. Hally 
Hill Fruit Products, inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-618 (1944).19 
The argument simply ignores the use of the words "manip-
ulative," "device," and "contrivance," terms that make 
unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of 
conduct quite different from negligence. 20 Use of the 
10 "To let general words draw on 8ome purpose is one thing. To 
draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal 
meaning of words is quite another . . . After all, legislation when 
not expressed m techmcal terms is addressed to the common run of 
men and is therefore understood accordmg to the sense of the thing, 
as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed 
to him." Addtson v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc ., 322 U. S. 607 • 
617-618 (1944) . See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading 
of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev 527, 536-537 (1947) . 
20 Webster 's Int'l D1et10nary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as 
" [t]hat which IS devised, or formed by design ; a contrivance ; an 
invention , proJect , scheme; often a scheme to deceive ; a stratagem; 
an art1fice," and "contrlVanrp'' m (>f'rtinPnt pa.rt as "[a] thing con-
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word ''manipulative" is especially significant. It is and 
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with 
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful 
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities.21 
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argu-
ment with respect to the operative language of the stat-
ute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with 
"remedial legislation," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "'not technically 
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.' " Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 
supra, at 151, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, supra, at 186. They argue that the "remedial 
purposes" of the Acts demand a construction of § 10 (b) 
that embraces negligence as a standard of liability. But 
in seeking to accomplish its broad remedial goals, Con-
gress did not adopt uniformly a negligence standard 
even as to express civil remedies. In some circumstances 
and with respect to certain classes of defendants, Con-
gress did create express liability predicated upon a failure 
to exercise reasonable care. E. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b)(3) 
(B), 48 Stat. 82 as amended 15 U. S. C. § 77k (b)(3) (B) 
(liability of "experts," such as accountants, for mislead-
ing statements in portions of f\egistration statements for 
which they are responsible).22 But in other situations 
trived or used in contriving ; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn, 
"contrive" in pertment part is defined as " [ t] o devise; to plan; to 
plot ... [t]o fabricate ... design, mvent . .. to scheme .... " 
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or 
employ," language that is supportive of the view that Congress 
did not mtend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct. 
21 Webster's Int'l Dictionary, supra, defines "manipulate" a8' 
" . , . to manage or t.reat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate 
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges. To force (prices) up or down, as; 
by matched orders, wash sales, fictitious reports . . . ; to rig." 
ll.2 See p. 21 & n 2fi, mjr11, , 
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good faith is an absolute defense. 1934 Act § 18, 48 Stat. 
897, as amended 15 U.S. C. § 78r (misleading statements 
in any document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act). And 
in still other circumstances Congress created express lia-
bility regardless of the defendant's fault, 1933 Act § 11 
(a) (issuer liability for misleading statements in the reg-
istration statement) . 
It is thus evident that Congress fashioned stand· 
ards of fault in the express civil remedies in the 
1933 and 1934 Acts on a particularized basis. Ascer-
tainment of congressional intent with respect to the 
standard of liability created by a particular section of 
the Acts must therefore rest primarily on the langua.ge 
of that section. Where, as here, we deal with a judi-
cially implied liability, the statutory language certainly 
'is no less important. In view of the language of 
§ 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional miscon-
duct, and mindful that the language of a statute con-
trols when sufficiently clear in its context, United States 
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard Motor 
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), further 
inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now, neverthe-
less, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act to ascertain 
whether there is support for the meaning attributed to 
§ 10 (b) by the Commission and respondents. 
B 
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' 
intent, we think the relevant portions of that history 
support our conclusion that § 10 (b) was addressed to 
practices that involve some element of scienter and can-
not be read to impose liability for negligent conduct 
alone. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
1934 Act was contained in identica-l bills introduced by 
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Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. ( 1934) . Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which pres-
ent § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the use of 
"any device or contrivance which, or any device or con-
trivance in a way or manner which the Commission may 
by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the pub-
lic interest or to the proper protection of investors." The 
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices 
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate 
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) (short 
sale), (b) ("stop~loss order"). Soon after the hearings 
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was intro-
duced in both Houses which abbreviated and modified 
§ 9 (c)'s operative language to read "any manipulative 
device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
§ 10 (b) (1934); H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) 
(1934). Still a third bill, retaining the Commission's 
power to regulate the specific practices enumerated in 
the prior bills, and omitting all reference to the Commis-
sion's authority to prescribe rules concerning manipula-
tive or deceptive devices in general, was introduced and 
passed m the House. H. R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
§ 9 (1934) The final language of § 10 is a modified 
version of a Senate amendment to this last House bill. 
See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 
(1934) (Conference Report) . 
Neither the intended scope of § 10 (b) nor the reasons; 
for the changes in its operative language are revealed 
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which 
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation~ 
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was in--
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The· 
extensive hearings that preceded passage of the 1934 
Act touched only briefly on § 10, and most of the dis-
QUssiQJJ. was devoted to the enumerated devices that the 
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,Commission is empowered to proscribe under § 10 (a). 
The most relevant exposition of the provision that was 
to become § 10 (b) was by Thomas G. Corcoran, a 
·spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated: 
"Subsection (c) [~ 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10 
(b)] says. 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning 
devices.' ..• 
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to 
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there 
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Com-
mission should have the authority to deal with new 
manipulative devices." 
·Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 115 (1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b) 
by a spokesman for its drafters is significant. The 
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to 
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative 
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any 
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use 
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely 
·negligent acts or omissions. 23 Neither the legislative 
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify 
any usage or authority for construing "manipulative [or 
cunning] devices" to include negligence/4 
23 Seen. 21, supra. 
24 In support of its position the Commission cites statements 
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings that "in modern society there 
are many things you have to make crimes which are sheer matters 
of negligence" and "intent is not necessary for every crime." Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6509-6510 (1934) . The 
comments, taken in context, shed no light on the meaning of § 10 (b) . 
Corcoran's remarks were made during a discussion of whether crimi· 
nal violations could anse under § 8 (a) (3) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d 
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The legislative reports do not address the scope of 
§ 10 (b) or its catch-all function directly. In consider-
ing specific manipulative practices left to Commission 
regulation, however, the reports indicate that liability 
would not attach absent scienter, supporting the con-
clusion that Congress intended no lesser standard under 
§ 10 (b). The Senate Report of S. 3420 discusses gener-
Sess., which in material part was incorporated in § 9 of the 1934 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 78i, in the absence of specific intent to influence security 
prices for personal gain. The remarks, moreover, were not ad~ 
· dressed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations con-
cerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Ferdi-
nand Pecora, cotmsel to the committee and a draftman of S. 2693, 
·Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.,- U.S.-, 
- n. 24 (1976), described the language as "[e]xcluding from its 
scope an act that is not done with any ulterior motives or pur-
poses, as set forth in the act." !d., at 6510. Further, prior to 
the passage of the 1934 Act, proposed § 8 was amended to require 
willful behavior as a prerequisite to civil liability for violations. 
Compare § 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693. See H. ·R. 
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934) . 
The Commission also relies on objections to a ·draft version 
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. 14-15, 
supra-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the 
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was 
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on 
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 258 (1934). Remarks 
of this kind made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other 
than by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a 
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 276-277 (1947) ; United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110; 125 ( 1942). This is espe-
cially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who 
·"[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill ... understandably tend to over-
state its reach:" NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964). 
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert /)istillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-
395 (l95l). 
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ally the various abuses that precipitated the need for the 
legislation and the inadequacy of self-regulation by the 
stock exchanges. The Report then analyzes the compo~ 
nent provisions of the statute, but does not parse § 10. 
The only specific reference to § 10 is the following: 
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic pow-
ers conferred on the administrative authority, effec-
tive regulation must include several clear statutory 
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, 
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices 
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful 
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10 
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). 
In the portion of the general analysis section of the 
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there 
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered 
so inimical to the public interest as to require exp~ess 
prohibition, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders/5 
and of other practices that might in some cases serve 
legitimate purposes, such as stabilization of security 
prices and grants of options. Id., at 7-9. These latter 
practices were left to regulation by the Commission. 
1934 Act§§ 9 (a)(6), (c), 48 Stat. 890, 15 U.S. C. §§ 78i 
(a)(6), (c). Significantly, we think, in the discussion of 
25 "Wash" sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial 
ownership. "Matched" orders are orders for the purchase/sale of a 
security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of sub-
stantially the same size, at substantially the same time and price, 
have been or will be entered by the same or different persons for 
the salejpurchase of such security . Section 9 (a) (1) of the 1934 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (a) (1), proscribes wash sales and matched 
orders when effectuated " [ f] or the purpose of creating a false or 
misleading appearance of active trading in any security registered 
on a national securities exchange, or , .. with respect to the market 
for any such security." See In re J. A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E. C. 
790 ( 1958) ; In re Thornton & Co ., 28 S. E . C 208 ( 1948) . 
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the need to regulate even the latter category of practices 
when they are manipulative, there is no indication that 
any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach in the 
absence of scienter. Furthermore, in commenting on the 
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Re-
port explains : 
" . , . if an investor has suffered loss by reason of 
illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be 
allowed to recover damages from the guilty party ... , 
The bill provides that any person who unlaw-
fully manipulates the price of a security, or wh~ 
induces transactions in a security by means of false 
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or 
misleading statement in the report of a corporation, 
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought 
or sold the security at prices affected by such viola-
tion or statement. In such case the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the 
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied 
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape 
liability by showing that the statement was made in 
good faith." ld., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied). 
The Report therefore reveals with respect to the speci-
fied practices, an overall congressional intent to prevent 
"manipulative and deceptive practices ... which fulfill 
no useful function" and to create private actions for 
damages stemming from "illicit practices," where the de-
fendant has not acted in good faith. The views expressed 
in the House Report are consistent with this interpreta~ 
tion. H. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, 20-
21 (1934) (H. R. 9323). There is no indication that 
Congress intended anyone to be made liable for such 
practices unless he acted other than in good faith. The 
catch-all provision of § 10 (b) should be interpreted ne 
rnore ·broadly, 
. ' . 
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c 
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated com~ 
ponents of the federal regulatory scheme governing trans~ 
actions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Se~ 
curities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence 
of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly 
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language 
Congress has chosen . ... " Recognizing this, respondents 
and the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of 
the Acts to support their contention that civil liability may 
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think 
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions 
of the Acts. 
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit 
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard 
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 889r 
15 U. S. C. § 78i, which generally proscribes manipulation 
of securities prices. Sections 9 (a) (1) and (a) (2), for 
example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security 
prices "[f] or the purpose of creating a false or misleading· 
appearance of actual trading in any security ... or ... 
with respect to the market for any such security," and 
"for the purpose of including the purchase or sale of such 
security by others." See also§ 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e} 
then imposes upon "[a]ny person who willfully partici-
pates in any act or transaction in violation of" other pro-
visions of § 9 civil liability to anyone who purchased or 
sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative· 
activities. From this the Commission concludes that 
since § 10 (b) is not by its terms explicitly restricted to· 
willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be 
construed in all cases to requrre more than negligent 
action or inaction as a precondition for civil liability. 
The structure of thr Acts does nat support the Com-
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mission's argument. In each instance that Congress 
created express civil liability in favor of purchasers 
or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether 
recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional 
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake. See 
1933 Act, §§ 11, 12, 15, 48 Stat. 82, 84, as amended 15 
U. S. C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 18, 20, 48 Stat. 
889, 897, 899, as amended 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i, 
78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambigu-
ously creates a private action for damages when a 
registration statement includes untrue statements of ma-
terial facts or fails to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading. Within the 
limits specified by § 11 (e), the issuer of the securities is 
held absolutely liable for any damages resulting from such 
misstatement or omission. But experts such as account-
ants who have prepared portions of the registration state-
ment are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect, 
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil 
liability with respect to the portions of the registration 
statement for which he was responsible by showing that 
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable 
ground[s] to believe" that the statements for which he 
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a 
material fact. 26 § 11 (b)(3)(B)(i). See, e. g., Escott v. 
·26 Other indlViduals who sign the registra.tion statement, directors 
of the issuer, and tht> underwriter of the securities similarly are 
accorded a complete defense agamst civil liability based on the exer-
cise of reasonable invcotigation and a reasonable belief that the 
rt>gistration statrmrnt was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A), (C), 
(D), (c) . See, e. g. , Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment 
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but 
not officer-dirrctors, established their due diligence defense). See 
generally R . . Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027 
(3d ed. 1972) , and sources Cited therein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under 
the Federal Securities Acts: The Batchtis Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 19\J 
(1969) . 
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Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 
(SDNY 1968). The express recognition of a cause of 
action premised on negligent behavior in § 11 stands in 
sharp contrast to the language of § 10 (b), and signifi~ 
cantly undercuts the Commission's argument. 
We also consider it significant that each of the express 
civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negli-
gent conduct, see§§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U.S. C.§§ 77k, 77l, 
77o,27 is subject to significant procedural restrictions not 
applicable under § 10 (b). "8 Section 11 (e) of the 1933 
27 SectiOn 12 (2) creates potential civil liability for a seller of 
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or 
omissions m connection with the transaction. The seller is ex-
culpated if he proves that hr did not know, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care. could not have known of the untruth or omission. 
Section 15 of the 1933 Act, a.~ amonded by § 208 of Title II of the 
1934 Act, makes persons who "control" any person liable under § 11 
or § 12 liable joint!~· and sew•rally to the same extent as the controlled 
person, unless he "had no knowledgE' of or reasonable grotmd to be-
lieve in the ex1stence of the facts by reason of which the liability of 
t.he controllrd pen;on 1:; alleged to ex1st." 15 U.S. C. § 77o. See Act 
of JunE' 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II § 208, 48 Stat. 908. 
28 Each of the provisiOns of the 1934 Act that expressly create 
civil habiht.y, rxcept thosE' dirrcted to specific classes of inclividuals 
such a.<; directors, officers, or 10% beneficial holders of securities, see 
§ 16 (b), 15 l J. S. C. § 78p, F01·emost-M cKesson, Inc. v. Provident 
Securities Co., supra ; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petro. 
leum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), contams a state-of-mind condition 
requiring something more than negligence. Section 9 creates poten-
tial civil liability for any person who "willfully participates" in the 
manipulation of securities on a national exchange. § 9 (e). 15 
U. S. C. § 78i (e) . Sect JOn 18 creates potential civil liability for mis-
leading statements filed with the Commission, but provides the de-
fendant with the defense that "he acted in good faith and had no 
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." 15 U.S. C. 
§ 78r. And § 20, which imposes liability upon "controlling persons" 
for violations of the Act by those they control, exculpates a defend-
<~ont. who ."nctrd in good faith and did not . . induce the act .. . • 
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Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plain-
tiff bringing a suit under§ 11, § 12 (2), or§ 15 thereof to 
post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees and in 
specified circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion 
of the litigation. Section 13 specifies a statute 
of limitations of one year from the time the 
violation was or should have been discovered, in 
no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or 
sale, applicable to actions brought under § 11, § 12 (2), 
or ~ 15. These restrictions, significantly, were imposed 
by amendments to the 1933 Act adopted as part of the 
1934 Act. Prior to amendment § 11 (e) contained no 
provision for payment of costs. 48 Stat. 83. Act of 
May 27, 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, c. 38, Title I, § 11 (e). 
See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II 
§ 206 (e), 48 Stat. 908. The amendments also substan-
tially shortened the statute of limitations provided by 
§ 13. Compare Pub. L. No. 22, supra, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, 
with 15 U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 48 Stat. 908. 
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the 
judicially created private damage remedy under § 10 
(b)-which has no comparable restrictions 29-cannot be 
constituting the violatwn .... " 15 U. S. C. § 78t. Emphasizing the 
important difference between the operative language and purpose of 
§ 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 14n (a), as contrasted with 
§ 10 (b), however, some courts have concluded that proof of scienter 
is unnecessary in an action for damages by the shareholder recipients 
of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issuer corpo-
ration. • Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281, 1299 
cf· (CA2 1973) ;.., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., supra, at 
289-290. 
29 Since no statute of lrmitations is provided for civil actions 
under § 10 (b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed 
as in other cases of judicially implied remedies. See Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and cases cited therein. Al-
though it is not always certain which state statute of limitations 
should be followed, such ~tat111es of limitations usually are longer 
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extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to ac .. 
tions premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension 
would allow causes of actwn covered by § 11, § 12 (2), 
and~ 15 to be brought mstead under§ 10 (b) and thereby 
nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural 
restrictions on these express actions.80 See, e. g., Fisch-
man v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 786-
787 (CA2 1951); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F . 2d, at 867-868 (Friendly, J., concurring); Rosenberg 
v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (ED Pa. 
1948) ; 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1787-1788 (2d 
ed. 1961); R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regu .. 
lation 1070-1074 (3d ed. 1972) . We would be un .. 
willing to bring about this result absent substantial sup-
port in the legislative history, and there is none.31. 
than t.he period provided under § 13. 3 L . Loss, supra, at 1773-. 
1774. As to co~t;:; seen. :30 infm. 
8° Congress regarded the;;e restnctwns on private damage actions 
as ~ngmficant . ln mtrodurmg Title II of the 1934 Act, Senator 
Fletcher mdicated that the amendment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, 
providing for potential pnyment of costs, including attorneys' fees, 
"Is the most Important I amendment] of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669. 
One of 1ts purposes wa;:; to deter actiOns brought solely for their po-
tential settlement value. See ~btd., H. Rep. 1838, 73d Cong., 2<1 
Sess ., 42 {1934) (Conference Report) ; Blue Ch~p Stamps, supra, at 
'740-741 This deterrent is lackmg m the § 10 (b) context, in which 
a distnct court';; power to award attorneys' fees is sharply circum-
::;cribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co . v. Wilderness Society, 
421 U.S. 240 (1975) (''bad fmth " reqUirement); F. D . Rich Co. v. 
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U. 8.116,129 (1974). 
31 Section 18 of the 1934 Act create~; a pnvate cause of action 
against per~ons, such a .. ~ accountants, who "make or cause to be· 
made" matenally misleadmg :>tatements in reports or other docu-
ments filed with th!.' Commis,;Ion. 15 U S. C. § 78r. We need not 
consider the question whether a cause of action may be maintained 
under § 10 (b) on the basis of achous that would constitute a vio-
lation of § 18. Under § 18 habihty extends to persons who, in re-
li;wce on sttch Htatement:s, purchased or sold a security whose price· 
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We have addressed, to this point, primarily the lan-
guage and history of § 10 (b). The Commission con-
tends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule 
lOb-S are cast in language which-if standing alone-
could encompass both intentional and negligent behavior. 
These subsections respectively provide that it is un-
lawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading ... " 
and "to engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person. " Viewed in isolation the lan-
guage of subsection (2), and arguably that of subsec-
tion (3), could be read as proscribing, respectively, any 
type of material misstatement or omission, and any 
was affected by the statements. Liability is limited, however, in 
the important respect that the defendant is accorded the defense 
that he acted m "good faith and had no knowledge that such state-
ment was false or misleading." Consistent with this language the 
legislative history of the section suggests something more than negli-
gence on the part of the defendant IS required for recovery. The 
original versiOn of § 18 (a), § 17 (a) of S. 2693, H. R. 7852 and 
H. R. 7855, see pp. 14-15, supra, provided that the defendant would 
not be liable 1f "he acted m good faith and in the exercise of reason-
able care had no ground to believe that such statement was false 
or misleading." The accountmg profession objected to this pro-
vision on the ground that liability would be created for honest errors 
in judgment. See Senate Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, 
supra, at 7175-7183; House Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, 
supra, at 653. In subsequent drafts the current formulation was 
adopted. It is also sigmficant that actions under § 18 are limited 
by a relatively short statute of limitatiOns similar to that provided 
in § 13 of the 1933 Act . § 18 (c). Moreover, as under § 11 (e) 
of the 1933 Act the D1stnct Court is authorized to require the 
plaintiff to post a bond for costs, including attorney's fees, and tQI 
~ss.ess S"QJ)h cos.ts at the concl't~iQn of th.El litigation. § 18 (al. 
·, 
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course of conduct. that has the effect of defrauding in~ 
vestors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not. 
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmo-
nized with the administrative history of the rule, a his~ 
tory making clear that when the Commission adopted 
the rule It was intended to apply only to adivities that 
involved scienter.32 More importantly, Rule lOb-5 was 
82 Apparently the rule was a hastily drafted response to a situ~ 
ation clearly involving mtentional misconduct. The Commission's 
Regional Admm1strator m Boston had reported to the Di-
rector of the Trading and E~hange Division that the president 
of a corporntion was telling the other shareholders that the corpora-
tion wm; doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the resultant 
depre:;:;ed price:;, when 111 fact the business was doing exceptionally 
well. The Rule wa:; drafted and approved on the day this report 
was received. See Confereuce on Codification of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton 
Freeman, one of rule 's co-drafters); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 
767 (BLACKMUN, J ., di:;senting) . Although adopted pursuant to 
§ 10 (b), the language of the rule appears to have been derived in 
significant part. from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q. 
E . g., !bid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867 
(Friendly, J ., concurring) . There is no indication in the adminis~ 
trative history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended 
to proscribe conduct not mvolving scienter. Indeed the Commis-
sion's release issued contemporaneously with the rule explained: 
'The Secunties and Exchange Commission today announced the 
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection 
with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules 
against fraud m the purchase of securities applied only to brokers 
and dealers The new rule clo::;es a loophole in the protections 
agamst fraud admm1stered by the Commis:;ion by prohibiting indi-
vidttals or companie:; from bu~•ing securities if they engage in fraud 
in the1r purcha:;e," SEC Releasr No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). 
That :;arne year, m its Annual Report, the Commission again stated 
that the purpose of the rulr wa::; to protect investors against "fraud": 
"Durmg the fi~cal year the Commi:ss1on adopted Rule X-10B-5 
m; an additional protection to mve~:;tors . The new rule prohibits 
fral.ld by an · person in connection with the purchase of ~ecurities, 
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adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission 
under § 10 (b). The rulemaking power granted to an 
administrative agency charged with the administration 
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, 
it is " 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect 
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' " Dixon 
v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Man-
hattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view 
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, 
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Com-
mission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons 
stated above, we think the Commission's original inter-
pretation of Rule 10b-5 was compelled by the language 
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts. 
See, e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 
1281, 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 
2d 1277, 1304-1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., supra, at 868; 3 L. Loss, supra, 1766; 6 id., at 
3883-3885 (Supp. 1969). When a statute speaks so spe-
cifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of 
implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly 
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and 
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we 
are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to 
negligent conduct.33 
while the previously exi;;ting rules against fraud in the purchase of 
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep. 
10 (1942) . 
33 As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of 
the appropriate standard of li~tbility, there is no occasion to examine 
the additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties, 
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the 
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would 
significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose 
n.ability upon accoUJltant~ and other experts, who perform services or 
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III 
Recognizing that § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be helq 
to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by 
Ernst & Ernst as a precondition to the imposition of 
civil liability, respondents further contend that the case 
should be remanded for trial under whatever standard 
is adopted. Throughout the lengthy history of this case 
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability 
premised on .negligence, specifically disclaiming that 
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional mis-
conduct.34 In these circumstances, we think it inap .. 
propriate to remand the action for further proceedings. 
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term, 
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 747-748, the Court pertinently 
observed: 
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the 
elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not 
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening or 
the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ulti-
mately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Co1·p. v. 
Touche, 255 N, Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), Chief Judge Cardozo 
observed with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate amount for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause': 
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the 
implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.' !d., at 
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444.'' 
This case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the standard 
urged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by 
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the 
financial statements prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents con-
ceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements ot 
Ernst & Ernst's certificates of opinion. See n. 9, supra. The class 
of persons eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in 
this case, could be numbered in the thousands in other cases. Ac-
ceptance of respondents' view would extend to new frontiers the 
"hazards" of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious 
policy questions not yet addressed by Congress. 
34 See 503 F. 2d, at 1104, 1119; n. 5, supra. 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
